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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND SOCIAL REDISTRIBUTION IN NIGERIA

by

KEZ G.O. UGBOR

©

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

INTERNATIONAL/INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1991

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P.O. Box 107, Nnobi
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Anambra State, Nigeria

Date: February 27, 1991

AN OLD STAR departs, leaves us here on the shore
Gazing heavenward for a new star approaching;
The new star appears, foreshadows its going
Before a going and coming that goes on forever . . . .

Christopher Okigbo (1932 – 1967)
Labyrinths New York: Africana, 1971, p. 72

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Educational Opportunity and Social Redistribution in Nigeria" submitted by Kez G.O. Ugbor in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International and Intercultural Education.

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Date: January 25th, 1991

DEDICATION

Realizing that some people have lost their lives while attempting to make this damned world fair and just to the weak and powerless, this work is dedicated to the evergreen memory of the following:

Cletus Ikechukwu Ugbor,
who died as he lived: an event. Ikay, your tragic death not only reminded me of Eliot's "What do we live for if it is not to make life less difficult for each other?", but convinced me that parenting is often one long night of a thankless job.

Christopher Okigbo,
Nigeria's albatross, who, as a model of the Gramscian poet– intellectual, demonstrated the difference between preaching "Girouxian resistance" from the comfort of the ivory tower (in the hope that the peasants of Nicaragua would indulge such fancies?) and participating in the assault itself as Major of the defunct Biafran Army.

Captain Thomas Sankara,
Africa's "best" example of purposeful leadership nipped in the bud, whose assasination forced me to review some of my concessions about the nature of humankind and the human society.

ABSTRACT

Inspired by the structural dilemmas and contradictions implicit in the ethnic-territorial orientation of equal opportunity policy and politics in Nigeria, this study sought to determine whether patterns of educational participation and expectation were related to social class, gender, urban-rural residence, ethnic-political constituency and region of origin. The theoretical model underscored the reproductive-contradictory, reformulative-accommodative and hegemonic-contested character of public education in the delineation of class and non-class relations. Conceptualized as differential control over economic-production, political-coercive and cultural-ideological resources, social inequality was summarized as a class structure stratified by gender, ethnicity, race, religion, language and location. And educational inequalities were seen as the bequest of social inequities.

Other than nation-wide university and federal high school enrolment figures collected from the Nigerian bureaucracy, the sample of 650 stratified, non-random respondents was drawn from a survey population delimited to the Lagos-area federal high schools and the law and medical programs of federal universities. Data collected through a structured survey questionnaire were subjected to cross-tabulation analysis, illuminated on occasion with Lazarsfeld's elaboration technique.

It was found that first, the offspring of the bourgeois classes were disproportionately over-represented in the survey sample, even as female, Muslim, northern and rural students seem to depend largely on such backgrounds for accessing the institutions studied. Second, males outnumber females three times in Nigerian universities, even as gender disparity seems less pronounced in the arts, education, high school, south-western, urban, high mother's education, bourgeois, Muslim and academically low-performing sub-groups. Third, urban students outrepresent their rural counterparts by thirteen times in one, even as an urban background seems to boost access for the working class, female, Muslim and low-performing sub-groups. Fourth, and notwithstanding recent northern gains, educational participation is related to ethnic-political constituency and region to the advantage of the Yoruba particularly and southerners generally, and to the disadvantage of the Hausa-Fulani particularly and northerners generally. Fifth, educational expectations are primarily a function of social class, even as they are in varying degrees related to urban-rural residence, academic performance, ethnicity, region and gender.

It was recommended that equal educational-cum-social opportunity policies in Nigeria should seek not only to attack the roots of inequality in rural and urban poverty and in rural and slum schooling generally, but also to incorporate family income/indigence, rural residence and gender in a selective application of preferential treatment in education and employment.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks are due to the underlisted supervisory and committee members for reasons too numerous to mention here:

To Dr. Raj S. Pannu, co-supervisor for this work, who has been of considerable intellectual assistance to me these past years.

To Dr. M. Kazim Bacchus, also co-supervising, who has consistently encouraged my interest in pursuing scholarship alongside the demands of formal studentship.

To Dr. A.M. Decore, who, after defining the broad outlines in a sociological theory course, allowed me free rein on neo-Marxian schooling discourse.

To Dr. G. D. Taylor, who would always offer methodological advice while retaining the wisdom to leave the final decisions up to me.

To Dr. P.A. Saram, whose excellent social relations of work made academic discussions of ethnicity and politics routine conversation each time I dropped by at the Sociology Department.

The works and ideas of Claude Ake, Michael Apple, Samuel Bowles, Martin Carnoy, Herbert Gintis, Wayne Nafziger and Madan Sarup among others also deserve honourable mention here as part of the intellectual tradition from which I have drawn in the furtherance of my academic engagements.

As for help with data collection, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. A.M.K. Balogun of the Federal Ministry of Education, Dr. I.W. Sama'ila of the National Universities Commission, Mr. E.E. Korie of Queen's College, Mr. Olabode of King's College, Barristers Philip Okafor and Adeola Oyeigbemo of the Nigerian Law School, and a host of medical students and university personnel too numerous to be squeezed into this shortened roll call. Special thanks to Phil MacKenzie for assisting with data analysis at the University of Alberta Educational Research Services.

Eventually, I alone am responsible for any shortcomings in the views and information presented here.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

Broadly speaking, three areas will be explored in an attempt to set out the background to this study. The first is the advent of distributional issues in development thought and policy. The second deals with Nigeria's cultural pluralism, and the largely colonial bequest of contemporary forms of ethnic-regional inequalities and politics. The third then overviews the dynamics of Nigeria's redistributional policy, paying attention not only to gestures toward social justice and equality of educational opportunity, but also to the structural dilemmas and contradictions which help to delineate the problematics of this study.

Development as "Redistribution with Growth"

The emergence of radical development literature since the late 1960s has brought to the fore questions of the actual distribution of a country's socio-economic resources amongst the mass of the population. This "paradigm-shift" to distributional issues came largely as a response to the unfulfilled promises of "growth-and-trickle-down" development models. By that we refer to the assumed "spread effects" of growth in a country's Gross National Product (GNP)--a viewpoint championed in the 1950s and the early 1960s by liberal-functional economists, politicians and intellectuals. Contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion, quantum leaps in the per capita GNP of many "developing" countries had not been matched with significant improvements in the living standards of their populations. In fact, inequality, poverty and malnutrition seemed to be on the increase. In their wake came political revolts, widespread social conflict and large-scale repression. Such had been the political and social context in which radical development thought was born as the world entered what has been called the Second Development Decade: the 1970s. In the words of one development economist:

> The very meaning of the term "development" has been altered from an almost exclusive preoccupation with aggregate economic growth to a much broader interpretation that encompasses questions of poverty, inequality, and unemployment as well as aggregate growth. If nothing else, the 1970s will be remembered as a decade during which the problems of domestic and international poverty and income distribution rose to the top of the agenda of the development debate. (Todaro, 1981, p. xxiii)

Under the circumstances, attention has had to be drawn to how far the mass of the population are actually partaking of the "largess" of the welfare state. The redistribution or restructuring of educational opportunities (however defined) is one major way through which most countries have attempted to "equalize" socio-economic opportunities for the mass of their citizens.

Cultural Pluralism and Nationhood

However, the ethnic-religious pluralism of Nigeria, together with certain features of her political-economic history, adds unique dimensions to both the perception of inequalities and the pursuit of equal educational and social opportunities. With some "250 ethnic groups"

(Gandonu, 1978), Nigeria fits the model of a "plural society." First employed by J.S. Furnival, and then elaborated or applied by B. Malinowski, G. Myrdal and M.G. Smith (for details, see Hon-Chan, 1970; Rex, 1959, 1986), the model "draws attention to the fact that social systems do exist in which conflict is more obvious than consensus" (Rex, 1959, p. 124). In the sense that "they mix but do not combine," Furnival describes the plural society as a medley of peoples, ideas, cultures, languages and nations within the same political unit. "As individuals they meet, but only in the marketplace" (in Hon-Chan, 1970, p. 17). M.G. Smith's elaboration posits the inevitability of zero-sum conflict and antagonism over the territory's limited political and economic power resources. Smith has been accused of exaggerating antagonistic relations at the expense not only of a minimum core of shared values, but of the possibility of sharing power by administrative fiat (in Bacchus, 1987, pp. 3-4; Hon-Chan, 1970, p. 18).

Nevertheless, going by the historical trajectory of struggle and change in, say, Anglo-Native, Anglo-French and French-Native relations in North America, there had been "instances" during which the Smithian model was clearly validated. By the same token, the idea of the "Canadian mosaic" or the "American melting pot" would be seen as illusory. It is in the more civilized, post-war world of the welfare state that notions of "inevitability" and "zero-sum" distribution have clearly become unfashionable. This notwithstanding, a recent global study of race and ethnic relations in multi-ethnic societies demonstrates that conflict and competition, often involving between-group violence and hostility, has yet to disappear (Marger, 1985).

Whatever happens, the point is that political independence in the plural societies of Africa and Asia meant the inheritance of just a framework--the post-colonial state infrastructure--toward which a nation was then to be built (Hon-Chan, 1970, p. 11). Following Rejai (1984), these countries are "state-nations" rather than "nation-states." Thus, in Nigeria as elsewhere, national integration is on the development agenda, and politicians and policy makers have again off-loaded to public education the burden of building such a national society. Under the circumstances, real or imagined ethnic-territorial inequalities are seen as the greatest barrier to national unity. And the pursuit of equal educational and social opportunities tends to be premised on the necessity of developing a sense of national belonging among the various ethnic-regional groups in the country.

Imperialism, Inequality and Conflict

This focus of policy and politics is further complicated and legitimized by the post-colonial heritage of large-scale inequalities in Western-type educational and social opportunities between northern and southern Nigeria. This "north-south dichotomy" is largely the twin bequest of Islamic and British imperialism in the area now called Nigeria. For much of northern Nigeria, Islamic/Middle East imperialism (through the Fulani *Jihads* which overran the then Hausa City-States) had resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate (Islamic Empire) from the first two decades of the nineteenth century. The Caliphate comprised Emirates (provinces) administered by Emirs, who were (and, in changed circumstances, still are) political and religious authorities in one. In line with the practice in the Islamic centres of the Middle East (including the Sudan in north Africa), Koranic and Mallamai schools flourished in the area. Although the British, advancing from their strongholds in southern Nigeria, were later to proclaim the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900, Sokoto itself was not captured until 1903 (Nafziger, 1983; Paden, 1986).

Much as British imperialism in southern Nigeria began formally with the proclamation of the Crown Colony of Lagos in 1861 (Nafziger, 1983, p. 29), the history of Western-type formal education in the south goes back to September, 1842, the year of the arrival at Badagri, near Lagos, of three missionaries dispatched from Sierra Leone by the Wesleyan Mission and the Church Missionary Society (Taiwo, 1980, p. 6; Enaohwo, 1982, p. 99). As other missions soon joined in the scramble for souls, intensive missionary activity (the joint establishment of stations/churches/schools) quickly spread to south-eastern locations such as Calabar (1846) and Onitsha (1857). The missionaries were said to have been encouraged by the locals, who readily contributed land, labour and (especially the coastal kings) cash. In 1885, the British proclaimed the Oil Rivers Protectorate in south-central Nigeria. And the colonial Church and State were already getting involved in coordinated educational expansion or provision. Of course, locally generated revenue sustained both the program and its personnel (for details, see Nafziger, 1983; Taiwo, 1980).

The point, however, is that, at the proclamation of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900, the area already had a modest Western-type education system, with the full complement of ordinances, directorates, inspectorates, provincial boards, primary schools, secondary schools, as well as industrial and teacher-training institutions (Taiwo, 1980). Some of the graduates had also obtained higher education at the Fourah Bay University College in Sierra Leone, while a select few had gone to do so overseas. Northern Nigeria was a sharp contrast:

> At the proclamation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900, there was no school of the Western-type in the territory except the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) school in Lokoja. (Taiwo, 1980, p. 35)

Situated immediately north of south-central Nigeria, Lokoja happens to be one of the most southerly and accessible (beginning from the Atlantic Ocean and moving inward through the River Niger) parts of northern Nigeria. In fact, the land areas stretching to the left and right of Lokoja later came to be called the Nigerian Middle Belt. As this middle-belt zone never fully came under the influence of Islam/the Sokoto Caliphate, it was tagged "the pagan areas of the north," and so came later to experience intensive missionary activities after 1900. Today, it is nearly as educationally advanced as the south.

For "the predominantly Muslim areas of the north," however, many factors combined to further shield them from much missionary presence even after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914. One was the cost-saving "indirect rule" agreement which the British had struck with the Emirs as a strategy for running the economically "unviable north": the latter, with the stand-by assistance of the colonial army, were to oversee their subjects and collect the highest revenue possible; the former pledged to keep the missionaries out of Muslim areas by government order. Second, many Muslim parents felt that if their children attended mission schools, they would return home as infidels in the

Islamic faith. Third, and quite critically, the administration was already becoming concerned about: (a) the way in which some missionaries were preaching the brotherhood of Man/the equality of Natives and Europeans; and (b) the fact that educated southerners were becoming "noisy and arrogant," so much so that during the 1880s nationalist associations and anti-government newspapers sprang up in Lagos. Fourth, the feudalistic dispositions of the emirate system (as the Emir was, and continues to be, a feudal-religious authority) dovetailed with the British interest in simply establishing a few government schools in which mallams (teachers) and the sons of Emirs and Chiefs would be specially trained as trusted allies of Britain in the rulership of Nigeria. The British resolve to cultivate special friendships with the feudal-religious oligarchy and its offspring was strengthened both by the nationalist "menace" from the "Christian" south and by their experience of "cooperation" from Muslims in India (for details, see Taiwo, 1980, Chs. 1, 2 and 4).

Not surprisingly, then, the colonial administration had to expend a lot of tact to make Muslim northern Nigeria see itself as: (a) very different, culturally and biologically, from the southerners; (b) under threat of domination from the horde of educated southerners working for the colonial civil-service and commercial establishments in the north, not to mention the large numbers of southern traders who had begun to settle in the north; and (c) assured of British protection at all times. This strategy particularly paid off when the northerners refused to participate in the 1945 general strike organized by a radical nationalist movement operating from the south. But the embarrassment of that strike also forced the colonial government to adopt a more formal divide-and-rule strategy. Between 1947 and 1950, a series of constitutional reformulations split Nigeria (which had been amalgamated in 1914) into three regions, with the requirement that elections for representation at the National Legislature should be conducted by, and within, each separate region. Northern Nigeria was left intact, while the "troublesome" south was divided into east and west. Opportunistic Nigerian politicians quickly seized this chance to form regional parties by politicizing ethnicity. In 1951 alone, the Action Group emerged in the west just as the Northern People's Congress made its debut in the north. The hitherto only existing nationalist party (the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens, N.C.N.C.) automatically degenerated into an eastern party. Such was the major political environment at independence in 1960--an event which was to have taken place in 1957 except that the north, supported by the colonial government, had refused to follow the east and the west in embarking on respective self-government in 1956. Northern self-government eventually began in 1959 (for details, see Nafziger, 1983; Nnoli, 1980).

Essentially, then, the differential penetration and impact of two waves of imperialism gave southern Nigeria some half-a-century head start in Western-type educational, business and general socio-economic opportunities. Although northern Nigeria had enjoyed the benefits of Islamic civilization and the socio-economic opportunities arising from the trans-Saharan trade with the Arab world, all that lost its real value with the advent of a more powerful and transcendent colonial authority. Determined to entrench itself, this new authority restricted missionary influence in the upper north, reinforced the feudal-religious establishment, encouraged mainly the secular education of the sons of Emirs and Chiefs, as well as pursued a divide-and-rule strategy which not only regionalized politics, but exacerbated ethnic-regional suspicions, hostility and open violence. Add to this the consequent politicization of ethnicity by some of Nigeria's first-generation politicians, and we have a post-colonial state literally inundated with ethnic-regional politics, real problems of national integration, as well as very unique dimensions and perceptions of educational and social inequalities.

Post-independence Continuities in Inequality and Conflict

These problems were still "visible" by the end of the first decade of political independence, 1960-1970. In 1966 alone there were two regionally-biased bloody military coups. From July 1967 to January 1970, Nigeria experienced a civil war which is said to be "the biggest bloodbath in Africa's history" (Forsyth, 1977:blurb). Whereas the Northern Region was still left with the only university which it had established in 1962, there were already four universities in the south. The first national university started at Ibadan in 1947; the East opened one in 1960; two more were opened in 1962, one by the West and the other by the federal government. In fact, a fifth southern university was to follow in 1972--opened in the Mid-Western region which had been carved out of the Western Region in 1963. Furthermore, the federal civil service, institutions and corporations have been historically concentrated in and around Lagos, as well as Ibadan, in the south. Historically, they have also been disproportionately staffed with the educated personnel from the south.

Southerners, moreover, have historically worked for, or owned, a medley of foreign and indigenous industrial, commercial and financial establishments spread between Lagos and Ibadan, besides Port-Harcourt, Enugu, Onitsha and Benin-City, all in the south. Together, the socio-economic opportunities in these southern locations have tended to outmatch those of major northern cities such as Kano, Kaduna and Jos put together. In spite of both the exceptional case of the northern Kano-Kaduna industrial concentration and the relative industrial-commercial decline experienced in the south-east during the Nigerian civil war, and notwithstanding noticeable improvements in socio-economic opportunities in the post-1970 north, available evidence suggests that intra-regional inequalities persist side by side with north-south regional inequities in economic and social indicators such as industrial output and employment, electricity and water consumption, total wage employment, postal and telecommunications facilities, as well as the average per capita expenditure or services provided by each state government (Anusionwu, 1981).

It was with such visible inequalities in ethnic-regional (specifically north-south) educational and social opportunities already institutionalized in the political economy that Nigeria, from the early 1970s, has had to join the world in pursuing "equality of opportunity" for the mass of the population. As was noted earlier, the redistribution or restructuring of educational opportunities (whatever the definition) is the major approach adopted by many countries for eliminating poverty and inequality. Furthermore, as in plural societies like India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tanzania (Samoff, 1987; Selvaratnam, 1988; Wang, 1983), Nigerian education already has had to bear the burden of national integration and equalization of ethnic-regional opportunities. The dominant tendencies and contradictions arising from such multiple claims on public education will become obvious as we now turn to the relevant details of distributional policy and politics in Nigeria. The said contradictory tendencies constitute the critical entry point to the problem of this research.

Redistributional Policy and Politics

The five main national objectives of Nigeria as stated in the Second National Development Plan (1970-1974), and subsequently endorsed as the necessary foundation for the 1977 National Policy on Education, are the building of:

1. A free and democratic society;
2. A just and egalitarian society;
3. A united, strong and self-reliant nation;
4. A great and dynamic economy; and
5. A land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens (see the revision, Federal Republic of Nigeria, F.R.N., 1981, p. 7).

Having made this clear, the education policy proceeds to dedicate itself to "equal educational opportunities for all citizens of the nation at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, both inside and outside the formal school system" (F.R.N., 1981, p. 7).

Furthermore, the revised Constitution commits the Nigerian state to the principles of equality, democracy and social justice (F.R.N., 1979, sections 14.1 and 17.1). On the nation's educational objectives, the said

Constitution states that "Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels" (sec. 18.1). For the purpose of eradicating illiteracy, "Government shall as and when practicable provide (a) free, compulsory and universal primary education; (b) free secondary education; (c) free university education; and (d) free adult literacy programme" (sec. 18.3).

Nevertheless, "in so far as Nigeria has seen its politics governed by distributional issues, these have been communally defined for the most part and have centred on allocations from the centre to regions and states in the Nigerian federation" (Bienen, 1981, p. 102). Distributional policy and politics in Nigeria have tended to be fixated on devising and negotiating a formula for federal revenue and resource allocation (what the Nigerian press calls "sharing the national cake") to ethnic-territorial units reformulated into the constituent states of the federation. Questions of class, income brackets, economic sectors, gender, and urban-rural locations have never been major distributional issues. Instead, it is region, religion (the two mainly north versus south), ethnicity and/or state of origin which dictate policy and practice. From the siting of federal/state projects, to employment in the federal/state civil service, to the spread of and admission and hiring into federal/state universities, polytechnics, colleges of education, as well as federal high schools, there are constitutional directives to be followed by the relevant agencies at the federal and state levels.

> The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic

> or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies. (F.R.N., 1979, sec. 14.3)

There is a parallel provision for both the state governments and the local government councils:

> The composition of the Government of a State, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the peoples within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the Federation. (F.R.N., 1979, sec. 14.4)

Translated into the National Policy on Education, the foregoing has meant that federal high schools must "admit students on a quota basis from all the states" in order that young people can "develop a horizon of a truly united Nigeria." Furthermore, "university development will ensure a more even geographical distribution to provide a fairer spread of higher educational facilities. Admission of students and recruitment of staff into universities and other institutions of higher learning should be on a broad national basis" (F.R.N., 1981, sections 25.1 and 37).

To implement the emerging policies of the 1970s, the federal government had to take over all existing universities in 1975. During the same year, seven new universities were created (five in the north, two in the south), such that each of the then 12 states of Nigeria would have a federal university. In 1978, a Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board (J.A.M.B.) was set up to handle new admission quotas: 40 percent for merit; 30 percent for state of origin (what Nigerians call "Federal Character"); 20 percent for catchment area; and 10 percent at the discretion of the university. As seven new states were created in 1975, seven matching federal universities followed in 1980, thus bringing the total to nine in the north and ten in the south. With a recent university in the new Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the number of federal universities is now ten on either side. What has once more skewed the spread of universities in the country is that virtually all the ten southern states today (there are eleven states in the north now) have gone ahead to set up their own universities, eight of them in the early 1980s. Rothchild (1986) describes the overall Nigerian approach as "redistribution" and "executive power sharing." And Kazi (1987) makes a case for more of such practices in Pakistan, praising them as the "ethnic arithmetic."

Structural Dilemmas and Contradictions

Unfortunately, this so-called redistribution or ethnic arithmetic is also a contradictory ideology which hides more transcendent structural issues, such as class, gender and urban-rural inequalities in educational and social opportunities throughout Nigeria. The complex dynamics of Nigerian pluralism, historical north-south inequalities, elite power struggle, ethnic-regional politics, as well as communal competition for socio-economic resources, have diverted distributional policy to merely ethnic-territorial considerations. To the extent that the dominant approach to equal educational and social opportunity in Nigeria is fixated on the contradictory ideologies of region, ethnicity, state of origin and (within most states) local government area, it ignores the fact that both the rich and the poor, women and men, rural and urban locations, etc., will be found in every region, in every ethnic group, in every state, and in every local government area.

Thus, Saram's (1989) persuasive argument for a political analysis of ethnicity must here be extended to a class analysis of the politics of public policy in the context of developing multi-ethnic societies. Samoff (1987) suggests that focusing public educational policy on region, ethnicity and district even in avowedly socialist Tanzania diverts attention away from other social cleavages such as class, and so makes them politically less threatening. Following Charney (1987), clientelism is a major basis of class domination and, hence, state hegemony in Africa. Thus, such a focus of policy ensures that ethnic-regional elites (the patrons) have something to deliver to their clients or communities. The "neutral state" does not mean something objective and impersonal but, instead, ethnic-regional balance in patronage (Charney, 1987).

As inequalities in class, gender and urban-rural opportunities transcend, but are hidden under, the diversionary politics of region, ethnicity and/or state of origin, the much-flaunted historical disparities between northern and southern Nigeria today beg the question of who exactly is getting or keeping what out of Nigeria's educational opportunity ideology. It may well be that impoverished southerners are as educationally and socially disadvantaged as the north's marginalized lumpens. In each case, the women and the rural dwellers are likely to be further disadvantaged.

In the matter of admission into federal universities and high schools, therefore, more affluent families in both the north and the south may actually be appropriating disproportionate shares of the quotas supposedly allocated to different states and catchment areas. For one thing, despite the fact that 14 universities were opened between 1975 and

1980, the universal primary education which took off in 1976 actually disintegrated in 1979, the year that it was supposed to become compulsory. Secondly, admission quotas provide for just formal access; fees still have to be paid; the few scholarships available are not awarded on considerations of indigence but, instead, on grounds of ethnic-territorial quotas and supposedly meritocratic examinations or credentials. Thirdly, the highly competitive/selective national entrance examinations for admission into universities and federal high schools may simply be legitimizing the rejection of economically poorer and/or rural students who usually attend third-rate primary and secondary schools. The ostensibly fair and meritocratic oral examination conducted in "Queen's English" before final selection to federal high schools may also be another class-linked sorting mechanism. In addition, expensive private nursery and primary schools, together with exclusive university-run and command (top military) primary and secondary schools, abound all over Nigeria. And what is more, Nigeria, for all the rhetoric of "a just and egalitarian society," is a post-colonial capitalist social formation. Quite simply, "capitalism is rooted in and flourishes by inequality, so that it is inconsistent with its philosophy to advocate the provision of equality whether in educational opportunities or in anything else" (Okeem, 1980, p. 8, emphasis in original).

There remains making a passing note on the ripples of the current global crisis of capitalism. Nigeria's "periphery capitalism" is experiencing deep-rooted fiscal and accumulation crises: balance of payment problems; declining oil and federal revenues; deficit budgeting; unprofitability of investments in production; a forcibly devalued currency; inability of industries to produce at installed capacity because of lack of spares and raw materials; declining overseas markets for the little that is produced; transnationals preferring speculation to production, etc. Thus, under pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the Nigerian government is freezing spending on "social overheads" such as housing, health, food, electricity and education. Unemployment, lay-offs, meagre wages, hunger and disease seem to have become second nature to particularly the poorer sections of the population (see Chuta, 1986; Newswatch, July 24, 1989, August 7, 1989; South, August 1988). Under the circumstances, sending kids to school is likely to be a luxury which the poor cannot afford.

Together with these harsh realities, the contradictions inherent in the form in which the ideology of equal educational opportunity is manifested in the Nigerian context provide ample circumstantial warrant for embarking on this study. The project is to go beyond Nigeria's largely diversionary politics of educational opportunity, in search of the real net losers and gainers from the federal government's quota policy on educational provision and access. This should help us determine whether education is actually redistributing social opportunities, or serves instead to perpetuate and consolidate social inequality, in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Is educational opportunity (i.e. patterns of participation and expectation) in Nigeria a function of social class, gender, urban-rural residence, ethnic-political constituency, and region of origin? Ultimately, what exactly is the "role" of formal education in Nigeria:

the redistribution of social opportunities, or the perpetuation of social inequalities?

Purpose of the Study

This study was designed to find out the relative educational-occupational representation and expectations of different social classes, males versus females, urban versus rural students, as well as ethnic-political constituencies and regions in federal educational institutions in particular. Specifically, the objectives of the study were as follows:

1. To determine the relative participation and expectations of different social classes in federal educational institutions;
2. To determine the relative participation and expectations of males and females in federal educational institutions;
3. To determine the relative participation and expectations of urban and rural students in federal educational institutions;
4. To determine the relative participation and expectations of different ethnic-political constituencies in federal educational institutions;
5. To determine the relative participation and expectations of northern and southern students in federal educational institutions; and
6. To determine the relative effect of social class and academic performance on educational-cum-occupational expectations.

Need for the Study

First, the actual distribution of a country's social opportunities (education, occupation, income, etc.) among the mass of the population is in its own right a major development issue. To the extent that fundamental issues such as democracy, equity and social justice should inform any meaningful development strategy, governments and policy makers must constantly be challenged over the development value of aggregate GNP data, as well as "faceless" statistics on per capita GNP or educational spending and enrolment. As educational experience has, for whatever reasons, become one major "entry permit" to modern-sector employment, the denial of educational opportunity to any sections of the population is the same thing as circumscribing their life chances from the start. Therein lies a major justification for this study.

Besides, this study is an attempt to build a case for the necessity that distributional policy and politics in Nigeria go beyond the discourse of region, state of origin and catchment area. It urges that attention be paid to usually more transcendent structural issues such as poverty versus wealth, together with gender and urban-rural disparities, in the allocation of educational and social opportunities in Nigeria.

Drawing on the above, this study calls for a rethinking of both the over-flogged educational disadvantage of the north and the presumed educational advantage of the south. The evidence here is not just the collective educational and social disadvantage of the poor in both northern and southern Nigeria, but the composite advantage of the rich regardless of their region of origin.

Lastly, this study should help to question the validity of certain generalizations claiming the absence of class reproduction in the education systems of Africa. Not infrequently, a week's sojourn in Kenya or Tanzania by wildlife sightseers/"development tourists" has resulted in published "expert" studies asserting the absence of social class (and hence the modality of class domination, the state) in all Africa. This has been the bequest of those British and American "social scientists" taking after the ethnocentric traditions of the horde of anthropologists who had provided the intellectual support for the colonial adventures of the nineteenth century.

Delimitation

We start by delimiting the conceptual parameters of the key terms in the title of this study. According to Nduanya (1980; see also Husen, 1975, 1987), "educational opportunity" is a four-dimensional concept which includes the provision of facilities, the accessibility of such facilities, the actual utilization of the said facilities, and the resultant end-products of the entire process. For our purposes, however, educational opportunity is refocused or delimited to patterns of participation (more or less subsuming provision and accessibility) and patterns of expectation (more or less implicating utilization and end-products) in the educational institutions or programs contemplated.

As for "social redistribution," we shall reverse Mahon's (1985) views on educational/social inequality by seeing it in terms of a situation in which educational/occupational participation and/or expectations are randomly distributed throughout the population. Should they take systematic patterns on the basis of social class, gender, urban-rural residence, ethnic-regional grouping, and so on, such would be evidence of social inequality rather than redistribution. That noted, part of the evaluation of social redistribution in the Nigerian context shall be whether historically advantaged/disadvantaged ethnic-regional groups have in recent years decreased/increased their enrolment proportions in federal educational institutions.

Besides, this study was more or less delimited to the locus of educational opportunity politics in Nigeria, namely, federal universities and high schools. I said "more or less" because to the extent that state-owned universities emerged in the southern states as a compromise solution to the presumably pro-north politics of quotas in federal universities, such state universities have had to be considered alongside federal universities in the particular matter of patterns of participation in public education. Needless to say, politically less salient federal educational institutions such as polytechnics, colleges of education, as well as schools of arts and science were left out of the study. To return to the universities, other than nation-wide enrolment figures obtained from the National Universities Commission, the survey population had to be delimited to the core professional faculties of law and medicine for several reasons. First, focus on who (in terms of class, gender, etc.) goes through what program has been a neglected area in studies of the backgrounds of university students in Nigeria. Second, examination of the trends across a multiplicity of disciplines simply was not an option given the resource constraints attendant upon this study. Third, the high-status and/or costlier areas of knowledge are best suited to tell us something about class and/or gender selection (or the lack of such) in Nigerian higher education. Perhaps more importantly, the graduating faculty of law cohorts in a given academic year for those Nigerian universities offering law would be available for study at the Nigerian Law School, Lagos, where they undergo a statutory one-year Bar Admission training in the academic year immediately following graduation from their respective universities.

As for federal high schools -- the so-called unity schools, other than overall male-female enrolment figures obtained from the Federal Ministry of Education, the survey population was delimited to the two "model" schools (one male, the other female) in the supposedly out-going Federal Capital Territory, Lagos (the supposedly in-coming F.C.T. is Abuja, in the Nigerian heartland). As with the related case of university disciplines, the ideal of undertaking a multi-stage cluster sampling for the forty-one full-fledged "unity schools" sprinkled across the twenty-one states of Nigeria was made impracticable by resource constraints. More importantly, as both the historical seat of the federal government and the oldest colonial urban centre in Nigeria, the Lagos area has always boasted an astonishing mix of Nigerians of all walks of life, including class and ethnic backgrounds, regional origins, as well as religious persuasions. In addition to the fact that the Lagos territory has its huge metropolis, small urban centres and basically rural locations, it was precisely such a structurally diverse population (the sort that ideally should be present in the all-Nigerian assembly in the Law School) that held any promise of meeting the concerns of this study.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter is in two parts. Part One spans a broad sweep of theoretical perspectives, in an attempt to set out the intellectual predispositions of this study. As with most issues in the social sciences, the major theoretical divide has the functionalists and their liberal-conservative allies on one side, while the Marxists and their conflict-structural comrades are arrayed on the other side. Without doubt, liberal viewpoints may simply hover around the centre of the theoretical-ideological continuum. From the role and expansion of schooling, to social inequality and stratification, to mobility and status attainment research, and thence to equality of educational and social opportunity, we shall acknowledge the salient theoretical conceptualizations, besides taking care to underscore our theoretical position.

Part Two attempts an overview of related empirical research or case studies. Much as we cannot afford to ignore the literature on industrially advanced countries, we are necessarily more interested in the comparative experience of developing countries of which Nigeria is one. In order not to overload this chapter, however, literature dealing exclusively with Nigeria will be reviewed immediately after a political-economic profile of the country in the next chapter. To the extent that our review of empirical literature organically extends or tests out some of the perspectives noted in the theoretical section, the two parts are complementary. Together, they structure the knowledge terrain from which we launch our investigation of educational opportunity and social redistribution in Nigeria.

Part One: Theoretical Perspectives

Explanations of the Role and Expansion of Schooling: Toward a Theoretical Schema

The expansion of the public school system is historically associated with the rise and expansion of the welfare state as a particularly twentieth-century phenomenon (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Hurn, 1985; Schecter, 1987). The widely copied United States example of mass secondary and higher education in the post-World War II era has been described fondly as "the schooling revolution" (Hurn, 1985, ch. 3). For our purposes, two broad theoretical perspectives mark off the existing explanations of the role and expansion of schooling. One is the functionalist-liberal paradigm; the other is the Marxist, conflict-structural perspective.

(i) The Functionalist-Liberal Paradigm

Functionalists and liberals generally profess the modernizing, distributive and equalizing impact of schooling. The breakdown of traditional mechanisms of socialization in the wake of industrialization and urbanization is said to have warranted the schooling of whole populations toward those shared values, attitudes and skills required for competent and functionally integrative living in a modern social order. The schooling of everyone is also said to be an insurance for achieving cultural consensus, and thus forging a sense of nationhood in an ethnically diverse society. Schooling, it is further claimed, inculcates the cognitive skills and technical competencies demanded by increasingly more complex jobs in a "high-tech" era (in Fagerlind and Saha, 1983; Hurn, 1985).

Predisposed to a meritocracy-cum-mobility model of schooling and the society, the functional-liberal position also holds that the school's recruitment and reward structures are so open, objective and competitive that formal education has indeed opened the gates to that long-awaited epitome of a democratic, rational, efficient and expert society. This choice society is the land of social justice and equal opportunity, one in which talent and effort, rather than privilege and origins, determine "who gets ahead" as Jencks et al. (1979) would say (in Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Glennerster, 1980; Hurn, 1985).

Associated with the liberal-functionalist paradigm is the human capital theory. This theory claims that investment in the knowledge and skills of individuals (i.e. schooling or training) increases their employability, productivity and, therefore, income. By spreading or liberalizing the distribution of such knowledge and skill "investments in people" through mass secondary and higher education, so the argument goes, we can change the structure of rewards, achieve greater equality of incomes, and thus boost social mobility across the population. This way, equality of educational and social opportunities would prevail (in Carnoy, 1979; Fagerlind and Saha, 1983; Glennerster, 1980; Hurn, 1985).

The foregoing formulations actually dominated political, social and intellectual thought in what La Belle (1986) calls the "equilibrium society" of the 1950s and the early 1960s. They have been part of the accessories of "modernization" produced especially in the capitalist world centres, and quickly packaged and shipped to the emerging independent nations of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (see Webster, 1984, p. 3). We shall return to this point. For now, disillusionment had however begun to set in by the mid-1960s, as more than a decade of secondary and higher-education expansion or reform was yet to deliver on liberal-functional promises of "life more abundant" for poor and dominated groups. Radical perspectives on schooling followed in the wake of such failures.

Before we turn to that, however, a passing note on a somewhat purely liberal, if Weberian, explanation of the role and expansion of schooling might be in order. Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson and Boli-Bennett (1977) explain the worldwide expansion of school enrolments between 1950 and 1970 in terms of trends in world-level cultural and organizational drives toward development, together with educational development ideologies such as equal opportunity, nation building and manpower training. More recently, Boli, Ramirez and Meyer (1985) again offer a world-level developmentalistic "rationalization" account for the origins and expansion of mass education. Although Fiala and Lanford (1987) confirm the preponderance of certain national and educational development aims around the world in the 1955-65 period in particular, they find no dependable link between such cultural-ideological trends and the worldwide expansion of educational enrolments between 1950 and 1970. Echoing the point we introduced early in the preceding paragraph, they further suggest that attention be paid to the politico-economic dynamics of such world-level cultural-ideological forms in the context of the "international system." As we shall soon see, it would appear that a matching neo-Marxist, structuralist account is offered in Carnoy's (1974) "cultural imperialism" thesis on schooling.

(ii) The Marxian Perspective

The gamut of Marxist-influenced educational theorizing is sometimes sub-divided into two broad sets of conceptualizations. The first set, which spans the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, is fashionably described as theories of reproduction/correspondence. The second set, which dominated the 1980s, is celebrated as theories of resistance/contradiction. As long as we recognize the risk of "obliterative subsumption" (as they say in the psychology of remembering and forgetting) inherent in this manner of indexing and pigeonholing a multiplicity of conceptualizations, we start with those which generally fall into the label of theories of reproduction.

(a) Theories of Reproduction/Correspondence

Theories of reproduction represent the radical response to liberal-functional "fairy tales" about schooling, bourgeois narratives which had sedated social, political and intellectual life in the "equilibrium society" of the 1950s and the early 1960s. Employing theoretical arguments, as well as macro- and micro-level data, radical educational theorists and scholars set out to show that schools, in fact, played a major role in the social, economic and cultural-ideological reproduction of class relations and, hence, domination and inequality of various sorts. Pursuant to this project, both the form (hidden curriculum) and the content (overt curriculum) of the school were implicated in a determined effort to uncover the processes and mechanisms through which schooling caters to the legitimation and perpetuation of the hierarchical social division of labour (i.e. the inequalities of the work place) under capitalism (see, for example, Althusser, 1971; Apple, 1979; Bernstein, 1977; Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1976).

We now sketch in some of the enabling conceptual strands of a fairly representative sample of the theorists in view. Drawing on the insights of Marx and Machiavelli concerning the manipulation of consent by the ruling classes, the Italian Marxist theoretician, Antonio Gramsci, used the term "cultural/ideological hegemony" to explain the capacity to persuade the ruled and exploited of the justice or inevitability of existing unequal arrangements. Espousing the interconnections among power, politics, ideology, cultural practices, and the form and content of schooling, Gramsci lamented the complicity of intellectuals and schools in this process of transforming power into right and obedience into duty. He nevertheless hoped that critically-minded, "organic intellectuals" would help to challenge such hegemony in league with the working class through revolutionary political parties (Gramsci, 1971; see also, Sarup, 1978; Worsley, 1982).

For the French Marxist, Louis Althusser, education is the preeminent ideological apparatus of the state. By reproducing both the job skills or labour power and the worker-discipline or habits of submission essential to an exploitative organization of production, education plays a critical role in the reproduction of the conditions and relations of capitalist production. The education-economy nexus is mediated by the state through two sets of apparatus, namely, the Repressive State Apparatus (which comprises the army, police, courts and prisons) and the Ideological State Apparatus, whose major institution is the school, but which also includes the church, mass media, and the constitution. State rule by ideological control is the standard practice in civil society (see Althusser, 1971; Sarup, 1978).

Pioneering a "new," Marxist-phenomenological sociology of education, Michael F.D. Young and his associates (Young, ed., 1971) theorize an intimate connection between the existing organization and differentiation of knowledge and the distribution of power and privilege in society. What counts as "science," or "technology," or valid medical or legal knowledge is socially constructed. As with all social inventions, the school curriculum has the structural trappings of power, control, interest, as well as differential status and access. While the high-status areas of knowledge tend to be monopolized by the dominant classes, the poorer sections of the population are disproportionately ghettoized in the low-status segments of the curriculum.

Ivan Illich, the priest turned sociologist, literally invoked Armageddon by urging that society be unconditionally deschooled (Illich, 1972). For him, schooling is a ritual of indoctrination and initiation into the acceptance of existing inequalities of power, property and privilege. Furthermore, whereas schools are repressive institutions which stifle creativity and instead reward blind conformity, true education is a creative, liberating and exploratory experience, one which could be accomplished through non-formal "skill exchanges" and "learning webs" constituted freely by individuals with similar interests. And while otherwise professing the liberating potentials of education, Freire (1973) mourns the phenomenally repressive and silencing character of schooling. The way to liberate the poor is through a pedagogy of "conscientization": a dialogic, problem-posing and consciousness-raising form of popular education. By infusing the oppressed with the capacity to "read" the word and the world, such critical literacy would eventuate in the praxis that would transform the world (Freire, 1973, 1978; Freire and Macedo, 1987).

Drawing on the assumptions of the neo-Marxist dependency theory (see, for example, Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984; Clark and Lemco, 1988; Frank, 1969), Martin Carnoy formulates a theory of education as class colonialism and cultural imperialism within and between "metropole" and "satellite" nations (Carnoy, 1974). Unlike the liberal-functional world-level developmentalistic "rationalization" account noted earlier, Carnoy argues that the elaboration of Western-type education in the "Third World" is, with the aid of local intermediary elites, part of an exploitative incorporation into the capitalist world economy. In the industrialized countries themselves, education, together with its ostensibly meritocratic tests and examinations, is a weapon of internal "colonization" (i.e. domination and legitimation) used by people of power and privilege to impress upon the rest of us that everybody is getting what s/he deserves (see also Lê, 1986, pp. 13,28).

Carnoy and Levin (eds., 1976) argue that schools systematically provide differential opportunities and class-specific experiences for students from different social class backgrounds. Through supposedly neutral testing, counselling and placement, schools generally channel students through programs (professional-academic versus vocational-manipulative) whose social relations (democratic-fulfilling versus authoritarian-alienating) mirror both the class background of such students and the social organization (democratic versus hierarchical) of the jobs in which they are likely to end up. Corroborating with a bold political-economic critique of schooling in capitalist America, Bowles and Gintis (1976) posit a structural correspondence between the social organization of schooling and the hierarchical social relations of production under capitalism. It is not so much the "content" as it is the "form" (i.e. hidden curriculum) of schooling which imbues students with the kind of work-place discipline and role expectations which roughly tally with their class background.

Thus, far from liberal-functional claims of personal fulfillment, democracy and equal opportunity, schooling is a mechanism for the reproduction of the social division of labour and, hence, class relations. Educational reforms and expansion have for the most part been responses to the changing worker-discipline needs of capitalism. As the root of inequality is the distribution of economic and political power, rather than the distribution of human capital, pursuing educational reform without a revolutionary transformation of economic life merely perpetuates bourgeois hegemony (Bowles, 1977, 1978; Bowles and Gintis, 1976, 1977). Perhaps as a footnote, criticisms of the idea of a "tight fit" between schooling and capitalist production relations subsequently made Bowles and Gintis (1981) reconceptionalize schooling as a site of contradictions in the reproduction of the hierarchical social division of labour.

Bernstein (1977a, 1977b), Bourdieu (1977), as well as Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) formulate a related theory of the cultural reproduction of class domination and inequality under the guise of transmitting legitimate, public knowledge. How a society "selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates" the "formal corpus of school knowledge" reflects both the existing distribution of power and principles of social control. To the extent that the "visible" and "invisible" pedagogies or curriculums of the school mirror the "habitus" and "cultural capital" of the dominant classes (i.e. their linguistic preferences, modes of thinking, leisure practices, qualities of style or taste), education is a mechanism for the symbolic or cultural reproduction of class relations. Furthermore, Williams (1976) actually delineates the dynamics of such reproduction in an extension of Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony. By constantly reinterpreting and incorporating some of the meanings and practices of other groups/classes as part of the effective dominant culture, education ensures the effective legitimation of the class structure, as well as the corresponding relations of domination and subordination. The two processes at work in this continual re/making of hegemony are those of "selection" from and "incorporation" of "residual" and "emergent" range of meanings, values and practices. This way, the active consent of the dominated classes or groups is secured.

Apple (1979) posits a dialectical relationship between the school curriculum and matters of power and ideological control. For him, both the hidden curriculum and the "formal corpus of school knowledge" are dialectically related to the normative and conceptual consciousness supportive of the existing hierarchical distribution of power and privilege. Indeed, schools and kindred cultural-ideological institutions "create and recreate forms of consciousness that enable social control to be maintained without the necessity of dominant groups having to resort to overt mechanisms of domination." Thus, social, political and economic values are already embedded "in our curricula, in our modes of teaching, and in our principles, standards and forms of evaluation" (Apple, 1979, pp. 3, 8-9).

Criticism and Response. Theories of reproduction have been criticized both rightly and wrongly by radicals and non-radicals alike. A fairly bandwagon criticism has been that of "sociological" or "Marxist" or "Parsonian" functionalism (see, for example, Curtis, 1984; Giroux, 1983; Kelly, 1987; Partington, 1988; Sarup, 1978). There is also this criticism of a failure, with the exception of Apple (1979), to show reproduction at work in the classroom or everyday life of the school. Aside from questions of failing to problematize the role of the state in the education-reproduction nexus, some critics have expressed reservations over the "methodological positivism," that is, the Marxist causalism or scientism in the political-economic critique bequeathed by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (see Sarup, 1978). Other critics (e.g. Lê, 1986) have also alleged that theories of reproduction have nothing to offer on social change.

The most unrelenting critics of this "orthodox Marxian discourse" (as they prefer to call it) are Henry Giroux and his associates.

According to them, reproduction theory is an exercise in radical defeatism and disabling pessimism (Giroux, 1983, 1988). "In Giroux's terms, this type of analysis is theoretically flawed, politically incorrect, and strategically paralyzing" (McLaren, 1988, p. xiv). "Rigidly operated within and in response to the logic of capital," it is "basically a reactive mode of analysis," one in which "schools, teachers and students have often been written off as merely extensions of the logic of capital" (Giroux, 1989, p. 130). Indeed, its most significant flaw is a "failure to move beyond the language of critique and domination," in order "to develop a theory of schooling that offers a viable possibility for counterhegemonic struggle and ideological contestation" (Giroux, 1989, p. 130; see also Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985, 1987; Giroux and McLaren, 1986, eds. 1989; Giroux and Simon, 1989; Simon, 1987).

As a kind of response, the foregoing criticisms are insightful but frequently exaggerated. For example, "a lack of understanding of social change is not one of [the] many problems with reproduction theory." The import of this theory "is that general features of inequality remain intact by means of educational practices that are generally assumed to reallocate the intellectual capital and alleviate the lot of the poor" (Nafisi, 1987, p. 288). As for the preferred mechanism of social change, Bowles and Gintis (1976, p. 265) are fairly definitional: "The creation of an equal and liberating school system requires a revolutionary transformation of economic life." Besides, some reproduction theorists actually drew a line between the phenomenally repressive character of schooling and the potentially liberating capacity of real education. And more sophisticated, dialectical versions of reproduction theory had actually begun to emerge by 1980 (e.g. Apple, 1979, 1982; Bowles and Gintis, 1981). Thus, much as Henry Giroux and his associates frequently capitulate to a theology of faith and hope in the name of neo-Marxian thought on schooling, the persuasive insight in reproduction theory remains that schooling and school reforms are not what the ruling liberal-conservative ideology would have us believe; those ambitioning to effect change in and through schools must also brace themselves for an assault on the economic, political and other cultural-ideological structures.

(b) Theories of Resistance/Contradiction

The applicable theoretical conceptualizations share a number of assumptions. First, there is the active, mediating capability of the human agency in the face of domination. Second, the experience of and response to domination is a matter not just for social classes but for social groups or social movements based on gender, ethnicity, race, religion and so on. Third, there is the relative autonomy of the school and other cultural-ideological apparatuses of the bourgeois democratic state. Fourth, the school-economy or school-domination nexus is fraught with contradictions which create significant spaces for contestation, resistance and transformation.

Allowing for these commonalities, there are so to say two versions of resistance theory. The more modest version pays equal attention to the dynamics of reproduction and resistance, and has no illusions about transforming the world through the school (e.g. Apple, 1982, 1986; Benn, 1980; Bowles and Gintis, 1981; Carnoy, 1989; Carnoy and Levin, 1985; Dale, 1982; Shapiro, 1986). Dale (1982) identifies "three broad core problems" of the capitalist state and education system, namely, furthering the process of capital accumulation -- the reproduction or "logic of capital" function; creating a societal context favourable to capital accumulation; as well as legitimizing the capitalist order -- the latter two being the hegemonic function. As these "core problems" frequently involve the collision of the "productive" and the "allocative" policies of the welfare state, they generate contradictions in the character and programs of the state. Thus, highly elitist and selective practices would be found in an education system that claims to be pursuing equality of opportunity.

Carnoy and Levin (1985) posit a dialectical relationship between the social organization of education and the social relations of work under the welfare state. This dialectic entails a perpetual tension between two competing dynamics, namely, the imperatives of democracy/ social movements and the logic of reproductive accumulation/domination by big business. Depending on the particular conjuncture of issues, actors and circumstances, each side continually gains and loses dominance. And, in identifying the conflicting aims of liberal-capitalist and democratic-egalitarian ideology as the defining feature of the bourgeois democratic state, Shapiro (1986, pp. 53-60) sees the school as a site in which the state attempts to reconcile the democratic, formally egalitarian values of the political order with the hierarchical, free-market imperatives of the economic order. Once public education is seen as an expression of the "contradictory moments" of the bourgeois democratic state, "the comprehensive high school may be understood as the quintessential bourgeois form of educational organization." While claiming "to provide equality of access to the progeny of all citizens," it is "at the same time dispensing differentiated forms of knowledge and educational experience to those same individuals" (Shapiro, 1986, p. 60; see also Benn, 1980). In essence, the school-domination nexus is not simply one of correspondence or reproduction. It is fraught with contradictions, disjunctures, contestations and compromises.

There remains the rather flamboyant and utopian version of resistance theory. Closely associated with Henry Giroux and the trio of Stanley Aronowitz, Peter McLaren and Roger Simon, this perspective generally chides reproductionists for allegedly failing to transcend the "statics" of domination in order to explore the multiple possibilities inherent in its "dynamics." Schools are not simply instructional sites disguised such that class rule or domination is unproblematically reproduced. Instead, they are contested cultural and political sites actively engaged in the production, reproduction, critique and transformation of meanings and subjectivities. As a locus and focus of class, gender and ethnic-racial struggles over cultural-ideological forms, meanings and practices, public education is an arena of conflict in which dominant-subordinate group interactions are informed and shaped by the complex dynamics of domination, mediation, resistance, accommodation and transformation (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985, 1987; Giroux, 1983, 1988; Giroux and McLaren, 1986, 1989; Mallea, 1987; Giroux and Simon, 1989; Simon, 1987).

Furthermore, the contradictions of the schooling process hold out material and ideological spaces which can be exploited for political action and overall structural change (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1987; Giroux, 1983, 1988). The essence of resistance is that it not only "prompts critical thinking and reflective action," but "contains the possibility of galvanizing collective political struggle around the issues of power and social determination" (Giroux, 1983, p. 111). Evidently enamoured of the "liberation theology" of Paulo Freire's "conscientization" thesis (see La Belle, 1987), the emancipatory goals of critical theory/the Frankfurt School (see Bottomore, 1984), as well as the transformative role ascribed to "organic intellectuals" by Gramsci (1971), the promise of resistance theory is the possibility of building "a society where alternative public spheres will no longer be necessary" (Giroux, 1983, p. 24). Thus, resistance theory is above all else a theory of emancipation -- one which is simply a matter of "philosophy of hope," "prophetic vision," "ethical conversion," and "faith in the possibility of creative risk-taking" (Giroux, 1983, 1988; Giroux and McLaren, 1989).

Criticism and Integration: Toward a Theoretical Schema

Much as the Girouxian version of resistance theory ought to be commended for a bold attempt to theorize for rather than simply about schooling, it may not be an exaggeration to diagnose it as neo-Marxist evangelism. Especially given its partiality for the pulpit vernacular of "faith," "hope," "prophecy," "vision" and "conversion," surrendering to the seductive idiom of evangelism simply conflates sociological theory and the theology of liberation. And, as a casual reading of Johnson (1972), Robinson (1978), Sklar (1988) and Thomas (1986) would confirm, neither the assumption that "intellectuals" would commit the "class suicide" of sharing curricular/instructional power with students, nor the presumption that the working class and oppressed women and minorities are available for a collective struggle for total human emancipation is sociologically probable. Just an article of faith.

Thus, much as it makes sense to go beyond a "language of critique" to a "language of possibility," yet possibilities need to be grounded in a sense of history, "in an unromantic appraisal of the circumstances in which we find ourselves," for "these conditions cannot simply be wished away" (Apple, 1986, p. 178). Furthermore, the real question is not whether contradictions and resistances have historically occurred. Instead, the issue is whether they are contradictory themselves, whether they lead anywhere beyond the reformulated reproduction of ideological hegemony, whether they can realistically be exploited for political education and intervention (Apple, 1982, p. 162). And what is more, compromises or concessions from the dominant groups do not actually mean that the fundamental character of the social structure is altered or threatened (Apple, 1982; Shapiro, 1986, p. 55). For ideological consent formation, by way of selective incorporation, is part of the constant re/making of hegemony (Williams, 1976).

That stated, schooling is not simply equal to the processing and packaging (i.e. reproduction) of class relations and the corresponding patterns of gender and ethnic-racial domination. Public education is fraught with struggles, contradictions, reformulations and accommodation. In the matter of culture, ideology and hegemony, and hence of class, ethnic-racial and gender relations, schooling or school reform could be seen as a mechanism of production, reproduction, contradiction, mediation, resistance, reformulation, incorporation and even transformation. That noted, public education alone does not and cannot eliminate existing class, gender and ethnic-racial relations. Public educational reform is a mode of reproducing, reformulating and administering class, gender and ethnic-racial relations by the welfare state. At best, the scenario changes the form or appearance, rather than the basis or substance, of such relations. As one way in which the state administers such structural relations, schooling or school reform reproduces class or gender or ethnic-racial struggles in displaced forms (for class relations, see Curtis, 1984; Halsey, 1980; for class, gender and ethnic-racial relations, see Anyon, 1982; Apple, 1986; McCarthy, 1988).

Everything considered, then, the relationship between education and class, as well as gender and ethnic-racial, relations may be conceptualized as depicted in Figure 2.1. In due regard to the undeniable insights of Marxian analyses, our model does privilege class relations. But by incorporating gender and ethnic-racial relations, we also draw on neo-Marxian, neo-Weberian and disinterested convictions regarding the intersection or articulation of non-class "instances" in the "structuration" of domination -- what Bowles and Gintis (1986) evocatively call the "mosaic of domination" (see also Apple, 1986; Giroux, 1983; Grabb, 1990; Li, 1988; McCarthy, 1988).


REPRODUCTION
HEGEMONY
(domination, legitimation)
EDUCATION AND CLASS
(with Gender & Ethnic-Racial)
RELATIONS
CONTRADICTION
(democracy, mediation, resistance)
REFORMULATION
(incorporation, accommodation)

Figure 2.1. Relationship between Education and Class (with Gender & Ethnic-Racial) Relations

Social Inequality: Class Structure with Stratification

The Problem in Perspective

Following Haralambos (1981), Hurn (1985), Mach and Wesolowski (1986), as well as Salaman (1972), sociological discussions of inequality and stratification are not simply debates on the nature and number of classes or strata in society. They are a "weighted combination" of theoretical, ideological and axiological arguments about the nature of the human society and social change, the sources and desirability of inequality, as well as our vision or model of the "good society." The literature seems to betray a multiplicity of approaches to the conceptualization of social inequality. In some cases, the terms "social inequality" and "stratification" are simply interchanged or used synonymously with careless abandon. In other cases, "social stratification" is employed as *the* choice term for structured social inequality, with "social class" seen as its most modern form, one which has consigned to antiquity such forerunners as the estate, orthodox Hindu and slave systems of stratification (see, for example, Abrahamson, Mizruchi and Hornung, 1976; Haralambos, 1981; Kelsall and Kelsall, 1972; Littlejohn, 1972; Salaman, 1972).

Thus, an otherwise well thought out passage informs us that social stratification is:

> . . . a way of referring to and classifying certain sorts of structural characteristics and constraints, notably those deriving from the organization of economic processes and the division of labour. Stratification, by whatever definition, has to do with socially structured inequalities and deprivations, of various sorts, and from various sources, and *the relationships between them*. (Salaman, 1972, p. 23)

A third approach, one which we favour, takes care to make a cautious distinction between the "class" (or relational) and the "stratification" (or distributive) perspectives on social inequality, without, however, suggesting that such a conceptual distinction is not or cannot be (meta)theoretically or empirically connected. Indeed, it is often quite the opposite (see, for example, Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981; Grabb, 1990; Li, 1988). For, as long as we do not indulge in the extreme of erroneously equating Marxist social classes with structural functionalist occupational prestige strata, conceptual distinctions are frequently no more than heuristic aids to study and description.

Notwithstanding differing approaches, then, the typical image of society in the vast scatter of literature is that of a class structure or/and a social hierarchy with groups bunched one against, or/and ranked one above, the other in terms of the Marxian thesis of property ownership and production relations, or/and the Weberian tridimensionalization of power as class, status, and party, or/and the Parsonian/Davis-Moore status-gradational, structural-functionalist fascination with both the "functional importance" of occupations and the "differential scarcity" of people with the requisite talent or training, or else the permutations and combinations in latter-day reformulations (see, among others, Cuff and Payne, eds. 1984; Collins, 1988; Filson, 1988; Grabb, 1990; Hamilton and Hirszowicz, 1987; Haralambos, 1981; Sklar, 1979; Turner, 1984).

Having appreciated part of the confusion in the deployment of terminology, what then is social inequality? Following Grabb (1990), it is a term for those socially structured differences between people which are consequential for (i.e. which affect) their rights, opportunities, rewards and privileges vis-a-vis other individuals and/or groups. Thus, "purely" biological differences in height, weight, physiognomy, sex, skin colour, and other personality characteristics do not in themselves constitute social inequality. It is when such differences become structured into unequal social (including work or economic production) relations, that is, are "built into the ways that people interact with one another on a recurring basis" that we can refer to them as social inequality (Grabb, 1990, p. 4). The rest of the discussion will attempt to delineate and integrate the class and stratification perspectives on social inequality.

The Marxian Perspective

Marx's position on social inequality is tied up with his contention that the central dynamic of social change is historical class struggle between the dominant and the exploited classes. The classical Marxian perspective contends that the "objective" basis of social inequality is the relationship to the means and social organization of production. Whereas the bourgeoisie are "the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour," the proletariat are "the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live" (Marx and Engels, 1967, p. 79, footnote). Although Marx identified an in-between "petty-bourgeois" class of shop-keepers and small businessmen, took cognizance of in-house competition between "fractions" of the bourgeoisie, and even loathed such lower stratum elements as the "lumpen proletariat" and the peasantry, yet he was convinced that the inherent contradictions of capitalism, as expressed in the tendency toward polarization, homogenization, pauperization and monopolization would surely reduce social inequality and the class struggle into a straight battle between the propertied bourgeoisie and the propertyless proletariat (see Cuff and Payne, eds., 1984, pp. 82-84; Haralambos, 1981, pp. 42-44).

The sociological fundamentum in Marx's theory is that it deals neither with innate personal qualities nor with social interaction in general. Instead, it treats "the interaction among human beings in the production process as determining -- in the sense of setting limits to, and engendering dominant tendencies in -- other forms of interaction" (Bottomore, 1984, p. 81; see also Abrahamson, Mizruchi and Hornung, 1976, p. 35). Nevertheless, Marx has also been criticized for offering an apparently mono-causal explanation for social inequality. As for Marx's theorized trends in the capitalist economy, labour processes and the class structure, neither the intellectual left nor the right nor yet the centre seems to be winning the on-going debate over both what is actually happening and what is likely to happen in the foreseeable future (for the said debate, see Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984, pp. 53-55; Bell, 1986; Bell, 1973; Bottomore, 1984, pp. 62-63; Burgess, 1986; Cuff and Payne, eds. 1984, pp. 102-106; Filson, 1988; Haralambos, 1981, pp. 50-61; Hindess, 1987; Kelsall and Kelsall, 1974, pp. 119-130; Morrish, 1978, pp. 147-150; Pannu, 1988; Porter, 1985; Ranson and Ribbins, 1988, pp. 2-17; Walby, 1986; Weeks, 1972, pp. 57-59; Worsley, 1982, pp. 60-62). Other than what will be presented here, interesting Marxian and non-Marxian attempts to grapple with the related crisis or impasse in the sociology of inequality, social change, and development may be appreciated in Barone, 1985; Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984; Booth, 1985; Cohen, 1974; de Lepervanche, 1986; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; McCarthy, 1988; Rizvi, 1986; Sklair, 1988; van den Berghe, 1976; Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988).

The Weberian Perspective

Weberian sociology attempts to reformulate Marx by conceptualizing power and inequality in terms of three interconnected social phenomena: class, status and party. Much as he partly draws on Marx in seeing "property" and "lack of property" to exchange in the marketplace as the basic categories of all class situations, Weber does add that "class situation" is a function of the power, or lack of one, to dispose of both material goods/possessions and services/skills in exchange for income in a given economic order (in Gerth and Mills, 1968, p. 181). Weber identifies four social classes under capitalism: the propertied upper class; the propertyless white collar, middle class of professional, intellectual, administrative and senior technical workers; the petty-bourgeoisie; and the working class (in Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984, p. 39; Haralambos, 1981, p. 45).

For its part, "status situation" is a matter of the power and inequality arising from a "specific positive or negative social estimation of honour" or prestige in the "status order" of, say, ethnicity, race, gender, religion and language (see Gerth and Mills, 1968, pp. 186-187). Status groups attempt to prevent others from enjoying an equal access to material resources and opportunities through exclusionary "social closure," usurpation and monopolization. And "parties" -- the third phenomenon of the distribution of power and inequality -- are those interest and pressure groups (e.g. political parties, professional associations, labour unions) which are specifically concerned with the acquisition of social power over policies and decisions in the interest of the membership. Just like status groups, parties can and do overlap with, or cut across, classes. And status groups may or may not overlap with, or cut across, parties.

In brief, Weber's message is the pluralist and complicated nature of power and inequality. Stratification "manifests itself in three main dimensions, class, status and power, and . . . the strata in these dimensions in a given society need not necessarily coincide" (Littlejohn, 1972, p. 28). "Economically conditioned" power is not identical with "power" as such, for the emergence of economic power may actually be the consequence of power existing on the "political" or "status" order. Thus, it is sometimes but not necessarily the case that class inequalities condition inequalities based on gender, ethnicity, race, religion, professional skill, party affiliation, and language. Indeed, it could be quite the opposite (see Gerth and Mills, 1968; Salaman, 1972). That noted, a common criticism of Weber is that his fascination with the marketplace often results in stressing "distributive" inequalities at the expense of the "relational" inequalities inherent in the social organization of production under capitalism. Sympathetic critics think that it would make better sense to accord equal recognition to the manifestations of power and inequality at the level of both production and distribution.

The Functionalist Perspective

Unlike the Marxian perspective in particular which sees inequality as "socially constructed," conflictual and exploitative, the functionalist viewpoint assumes *a priori* that stratification is inevitable, differentially equitable and socially integrative. All this, together with the assumptions of societal value consensus and equilibrium imperatives (the so-called problem of order), is the stuff of Parsonian functionalism.

In this extreme version of the stratification perspective on inequality, society is perceived as a hierarchy composed of layers or strata, along which groups of individuals are ranked on the basis of the adjudged importance for society of their occupational status-roles. For the likes of Talcott Parsons, then, "the stratification system is really a consequence of collective *judgements* by which society *evaluates* the worthiness of a person with regard to his or her importance or contribution to the collectivity" (in Grabb, 1990, p. 109).

Enamoured of this overall theoretical parameter, Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore set out to demonstrate the functional and universal necessity of social inequality. For them, the "functional prerequisite" of effective role allocation and performance means that social roles must be assigned to the ablest and best talented individuals. Because of both the "differential functional importance" for society of various roles or occupations, and the "differential scarcity" of people with the requisite talent or training, unequal material and prestige rewards are the mechanism by which society motivates its best talents to undergo the rigorous training and sacrifice needed in order to occupy those positions that are the toughest, most important, and hardest to fill (in Cuff and Payne, eds. 1984, p. 62; Grabb, 1990, p. 114; Haralambos, 1981, pp. 33-35).

Criticisms of the Davis-Moore position range from the circularity of the argument that the most highly rewarded positions are the most functionally important, through the misleading assumption of societal value consensus, to a failure to address how positions come to be created in the first place. The definition of functional importance, critics maintain, is a matter of whose or what criteria one is using. So is occupational prestige often a matter of gate-keeping and monopolistic practices. In attempting to bleach class, power and conflict out of the discourse of stratification, this theory ignores the fact that class, ethnic-racial and gender inequalities can and do detract from equality of access to recruitment and training for all potentially talented people (see Grabb, 1990, p. 119; Hamilton and Hirszowicz, 1987, pp. 32-35; Haralambos, 1981, pp. 34-35).

It would appear that the ingredients of the functionalist perspective "do not add up to a fully adequate theory of social inequality, mobility and ascription, much less of stratification" (Abrahamson, Mizruchi and Hornung, 1976, p. 111). However, we must acknowledge that even for Weber and Marxist-influenced reproduction theorists (i.e. those espousing the cultural reproduction of class domination and inequality) like Bernstein (1977a) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), "cultural property" is itself a power resource. Up to a point, different skills and technical competencies ordinarily do not have the same epistemological rigour, strategic efficacy and even average social valuation.

Delineating and Integrating Recent Perspectives

> The ideas of Marx and Weber, especially as they have been refurbished in current debates involving Poulantzas, Wright, Parkin, and Giddens, provide the most fruitful basis for examining the general problem of inequality in modern societies. (Grabb, 1990, p. 129)

Eventually, our summation of social inequality as "class structure with stratification" may be generally described as "neo-Marxian." It will soon be obvious, however, that neo-Marxian positions actually draw on both "neo-Weberian" and such ubiquitous perspectives as the "dual economy"/ "segmented labour market" literature. In attempting to integrate the Marxist class analyses of Poulantzas and Wright among others, and the class-and-non-class power- or domination-based perspectives of Miliband, Parkins and Giddens among others, the project, as Miliband (1987) would say, is:

> . . . to arrive at a conception of social inequality that maintains the primacy of class analysis but that also appreciates the complex nature of both class relations and the other power relations that are at work in shaping social structures. (in Grabb, 1990, p. 191)

(i) Neo-Weberian and Allied Perspectives

For Dahrendorf (1959), class and power relations take their form and substance in authority relations or structures. Classes are "'social conflict groups' distinguished from one another by their 'participation in or exclusion from the exercise of authority'" within the vast scatter of institutions and organizations in society. Thus, the crux of social inequality is not necessarily antagonistic property relations between capital and labour, but, instead, "the authority relations arising within a wide variety of social and organizational settings" (in Grabb, 1990, p. 132).

As for Lenski (1966), the root of inequalities in material privilege is differential access to power resources, and "power and privilege together determine most of the prestige attached to various groups or individuals in society" (Grabb, 1990, p. 138). While indicating that existing inequalities are perpetuated by both control over coercion and access to legally or conventionally sanctioned rights, he follows Weber not only in defining power as the probability of realizing one's will despite opposition, but also in maintaining that coercive force is "the most effective form of power" and, therefore, the "ultimate guarantee" or "foundation of any system of inequality" (in Grabb, 1990, pp. 138-139). And although his class structure comprises a dominant propertied class, a subordinate working class and a range of middle classes, Lenski goes beyond the standard economic concerns in identifying "property classes," "educational classes," "ethnic classes," "religious classes," etc., as constitutive of the overall class system. Allowing for the apparent confusion in terminology, what we take away from Lenski is the pluralist and multidimensional nature of both class and non-class forms of power, domination and inequality (see Grabb, 1990, pp. 140-141).

Parkin (1979, 1982) offers a clearly neo-Weberian perspective on social inequality. Adopting the framework that power relations, rather than merely class (power) relations, are the crux of social inequality, Parkin goes on to subordinate power to the idea of "social closure," which is given no more than a secondary attention in Weber's original formulation. Power remains important, but only as a built-in attribute of any closure situation. A reflection of where power resides, and of whom or what the state (a repository of power) has (or once) defined as desirable or inferior, social closure refers to those processes or strategies ("exclusion" versus "usurpation") by which some social groupings restrict others from access to resources and opportunities. Whereas the dominant groups employ exclusionary powers (sanctioned by the law, convention and/or coercion) like the legal right to own property to restrict access to resources and opportunities, the subordinated classes try to wrench some concessions through usurpatory actions such as strikes and sit-ins (see Grabb, 1990, pp. 165-166; Parkin, 1982, pp. 100-102).

Class relations remain fundamental to the extent that control of productive property continues to be "the most important form of social closure" under capitalism. However, the next layer of class-based exclusion involves the use of formal, if educational, "credentials" to restrict access to positions of power and privilege. Thus, just as class cleavages in modern society go beyond the narrow, orthodox Marxian focus on the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat, there are "numerous other forms of exploitation that are distinct from class and that persist both with and independently of class structure itself." Effectively, "closure processes are the common factor behind all structures of inequality, including ethnic [racial], religious, sexual, and other forms of exploitation in addition to class relations." Rather than wish them away, we need to discover "how they reinforce, negate, or otherwise interact with class closure" (in Grabb, 1990, pp. 164, 166).

We turn to Anthony Giddens. Often categorized as neo-Weberian Giddens mixes both Marxian and Weberian precepts, besides articulating a general "theory of structuration" hewn out of structuralism, hermeneutics and allied traditions. His overall position is that social inequality is generated by differential control of the instruments and resources, the positions and structures of power and domination -- whether they be economic, political or cultural-ideological, class-based or otherwise.

Giddens holds that three rights, powers, or capacities--productive property, education or recognized skills, and manual labour--generate a corresponding threefold class structure in capitalist society: an upper class, a middle class, and a lower or working class. He cautions, however, that to the extent that groups like the petty-bourgeoisie and self-employed professionals tend to straddle class lines by having some access to more than one of the three powers/rights noted above, we should not "speak of classes as if they were discrete groups explicitly delineated and separated in all instances" (Grabb, 1990, p. 174). To deal with the empirical anomalies in capitalist class systems, Giddens suggests that the class structure be understood as a phenomenon subject to varying degrees of structuration or delineation.

Aside from the major mediating influence of property, educational and labour powers in the delineation of classes, three other everyday factors which can blur or reinforce the three-fold "generic" class structure include the division of labour in the work place, the structuring of authority relations in the work setting, and the distributive, lifestyle groupings which arise in consequence. Ditto for social inequality.

Nevertheless, capitalist class relations, though pivotal, are not the only form of power, domination or exploitation in society. Domination and exploitation are also generated and reproduced -- if you like, structurated -- in other asymmetrical power relations involving gender, ethnic, language, religious, racial and regional groups, as well as nation-states. Once again, we have a conflict-liberal, multi-dimensional image of class (economic power) and power and domination and, hence, social inequality.

(ii) Neo-Marxian and Allied Perspectives

There remain neo-Marxian and segmented labour market perspectives. Marxist-influenced scholars now emphasize effective control, rather than simply ownership of the means of production. Also, non-economic terrains of class domination, exploitation and inequality are now incorporated in a new, cautiously Weberianized sociology of class. And non-class forms of domination, exploitation and inequality are increasingly theorized. There continues, however, to be an internal debate over whether or not to privilege class analysis. While some insist that class inequality is always the supreme and pervading principle, others contend that class, gender and ethnic-racial forms of inequality are co-ordinate variables, each of which is capable of assuming primacy in particular historical conjunctures.

Nicos Poulantzas defines class as a set of "places" or structured locations in the sphere of economic production, but notes that political-supervisory and ideological-technocratic control can act both to reinforce class control and to generate secondary splits within the two "basic" classes (bourgeoisie and proletariat) in the form of class "fractions" or "strata." In addition to the "old" or "traditional" petty-bourgeoisie recognized by both Marx and Weber, his class structure identifies a "new" petty-bourgeoisie in the form of a motley collection of more or less highly paid professional, intellectual, managerial, supervisory and technical employees. While allowing that "power relations stretch beyond class relations" to questions of gender, race, religion, etc., Poulantzas nevertheless maintains that economic power is central "in the last instance," and that "class power is the cornerstone of power" in other spheres (in Grabb, 1990, pp. 144-148; see also Hindess, 1987).

Erik O. Wright and his associates employ three control criteria to define three "pure" social classes (defined as common positions within the social relations of production) and three "contradictory class locations." These are control over physical capital, i.e. the physical apparatus of production; control over money capital, i.e. investments and resource allocation; as well as control over labour power. The three social classes are the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. And, depending on the degree of autonomy and/or control over capital and labour, the three contradictory class locations are small employers, managers and supervisors, as well as semi-autonomous employees. These locations are contradictory because they simultaneously share the relational characteristics of two distinct classes but have interests identical to neither (Wright, Costello, Hachen and Sprague, 1982; Wright and Perrone, 1977; see also Carchedi, 1987, pp. 112-131; Li, 1988, pp. 46-47; Ornstein, 1983).

Incorporating elements of Weberian sociology, Wright imaginatively employs the same rationale of control and autonomy to identify a roughly matching set of class and contradictory locations for those individuals involved with the "non-economic," political and ideological structures in capitalist society. These are the personnel who head, manage, or simply labour in the production and reproduction of law and order, policies, ideas, and beliefs generally (see Grabb, 1990, p. 155). Subsequently, however, Wright (1985) adds two other bases of "economic" class exploitation to the traditional idea of control over the means of production: control over "organization assets" (i.e. strategic location within the authority structure of the production process); and the possession of "skill/credential assets," on the basis of which more qualified persons gain special rewards at the expense of unskilled labourers. Rather ill advisedly, he this time proposes a twelve-fold class structure, with four "pure" classes (including small employers) and eight contradictory class locations. Aside from taking the conceptualization of class beyond the sphere of economic production, Wright (1985) warns against perceiving gender, ethnic-racial and religious domination as simply class domination in disguise, but with the proviso that such a recognition should not lead to the "displacement of class from the centre stage" (in Grabb, 1990, p. 159).

For Miliband (1987, p. 329), class domination and inequality in both capitalist and socialist societies is rooted in effective control over three main sources of domination: the means of production, where control may or may not include ownership; the means of state administration and coercion; and the main means of communication and consent. And, taking after Stanley Ossowski, Sklar (1979) posits that class inequality in Africa or developing countries generally is constituted by virtue of control over not simply the means of production, but also the "means of compulsion" and the "means of consumption." Indeed, class inequalities in Africa are legitimized and perpetuated through patron-client networks spawned by the interpenetration of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production, reproduction and exchange (Charney, 1987; see also Ake, ed. 1985, chs. 1 and 2).

Determined to distance themselves from the criticism of economistic narrowness which has been applied to orthodox Marxian political economy of education and/or social life (e.g. Apple, 1979; Bowles and Gintis, 1976), new "cultural Marxists" like Apple (1986) and Bowles and Gintis (1986) now accentuate non-class, non-economic forms of domination and inequality. From this perspective, class, racial and gender domination are three dynamics which cannot be reduced to one another, "but intertwine, work off, codetermine the terrain on which each operates." We "live in a class and gender and racially structured society," and "it is the articulation among the three that needs to be understood" (Apple, 1986, pp. 34, 184). Theorizing what they call a "historical-structural model of power," Bowles and Gintis (1986) conceptualize the social structure as "the mosaic of domination," and attempt to show the ubiquity and heterogeneity of power and inequality. Although they focus on "three general forms of the asymmetrical exercise of power: domination through the monopoly of the means of coerion, through the exercise of property rights, and through the operation of gender-based privilege," the other forms of inequality in their roll call are those of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and region (Bowles and Gintis, 1986, pp. 92-96).

The "dual economy" and/or "segmented labour market" literature also amplifies the foregoing ideas of multiple and articulated bases of domination and inequality. The central argument here, backed with an avalanche of empirical evidence, is the existence of a non-synchronous capitalist economy and labour market in terms of career and material opportunities and privileges. Far from the homogeneous, free-market competition often presumed for advanced and international capitalism, there exist differential career opportunities and reward structures not only in the "dual" economic/industrial sectors of the labour market (core/primary/oligopolistic versus periphery/secondary/competition-ridden), but, within each sector, for a labour force that is further "segmented" on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, language and so on. Needless to say, the spheres of "production" and "distribution" articulate in the structuring of such inequalities (for details, see Beck, Horan and Tolbert, 1978; Bielby and Baron, 1983; Blakely and Harvey, 1988; Bonacich, 1972, 1976; Carnoy, 1977, 1979; Grunsky, 1983; Li, 1988; Mach and Wesolowski, 1986; Ornstein, 1983; Taylor, Gwartney-Gibbs and Farley, 1986).

All this is especially evident in societies such as Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, the United States and South Africa, where native populations (this excludes Britain), visible or "caste-like" minorities (to echo Ogbu, 1983), and immigrant women generally, find themselves at the intersection of three-to-six systems of domination and inequality: class, gender, race, ethnicity, language and locality (see, for example, Moore, 1986; Li, 1988). In Africa and other developing multi-ethnic societies generally, there tend to exist complex and contradictory overlaps, intersections and articulations between and amongst class, gender, urban-rural, ethnic-racial, regional and even religious inequalities (see Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981).

To conclude, it is reassuring that the multiple and articulated terrains of domination and inequality noted in the foregoing survey actually inform the vernacular of a recent "composite scheme" of the major constitutive indexes of power relations, as expressed in "the principal [class and non-class] bases for social inequality that typically operate within and across" the economic, political-coercive, and cultural-ideological structures of domination (see Grabb, 1990, pp. 192-198). The point, then, is that class analysis should inform, but does not and cannot delimit, the theoretical parameters of a composite sociology of inequality. Non-class forms of domination, exploitation and inequality exist with, alongside, and in spite of overall class cleavages. To the extent that such "vertical" forms of inequality fractionalize and intersect "horizontal" class divisions and vice versa, class inequalities inform and suffuse, but do not necessarily obliterate or supplant, inequalities more or less specific to gender, race, ethnicity, region/locality, religion, language, age, and so on. "The result is a complex system of stratification that is primarily based on class, but also on ethnicity, race, gender and other social fractions" (Li, 1988, p. 48).

Social Mobility and Status Attainment Research

> The [dominant] ideology of students of American stratification has remained optimistic, individualistic, and evolutionary. Belief that the stratification system selects for mobility those who are biologically and socially most fit has generally prevailed since the inception of the discipline. Sociologists have also believed that rates of occupational mobility have tended to verify the dominant ideology because the "relatively high" rates have reduced extremes of economic, social and political inequality and have created a middle-class society. A corollary of this basic functional argument suggests that status differences become increasingly important as economic equality and political enfranchisement become more widespread. (Abrahamson, Mizruchi and Hornung, 1976, p. 151)

The citation above should forewarn us that, especially for Marxist-influenced theoreticians expounding the structural and cultural reproduction of domination and inequality (e.g. Althusser, 1971; Bernstein, 1977a; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1976), the sociology of social mobility is actually regarded as a creature of very misleading liberal-functionalist images of modern industrial society as fluid, open and increasingly homogeneous or "classless" (for these images, see Coxon, Davies and Jones, 1986; Knottnerus, 1987). This is especially so because nation-wide mobility surveys in advanced capitalist societies have tended to turn in the "normal science" (borrowing from Kuhn, 1970) or data purporting to "prove" the convergence of all industrial nations toward an open, mobile middle-class or "middle-mass" society (see, for example, Boyd et al., 1985, pp. 513-525).

A "concept used in the sociological investigation of inequality [if not the sociological validation of convergence theory], social mobility refers to the movement of individuals between different levels of the social hierarchy, usually defined occupationally [in mainstream status attainment research]" (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984, p. 196). Morrish (1978) defines social mobility as:

> . . . basically the movement of individuals, or groups of individuals, from one social position to another; such a movement may be up or down between the classes in any social hierarchy or stratification (that is, vertical mobility), or it may occur within a particular social class (that is, horizontal mobility). (p. 146)

A number of factors are said to influence social mobility one way or the other. These include social class, educational opportunity and/or attainment, occupation, income, gender, ethnicity, race, religion, language, region/locality or migration, financial windfall, rising through the ranks, royalty or title (religious or traditional), family size, marriage (especially for women), and general social or structural change. Of course, most Marxist-influenced scholars would settle for "class position" as the "determinant last instance," with the other instances having "relative autonomy" of their own.

A vast array of concepts and indicators have informed research on social mobility, thus:

> The study of social mobility looks at mobility rates, mobility patterns (whether short-range between adjacent hierarchical levels or long-range between widely separated levels), who is recruited to various positions and the determinants of this selection. Intergenerational mobility compares the present position of individuals with those of their parents. Intragenerational mobility compares the positions attained by the same individual at different moments in the course of his or her working life (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984, p. 196)

While "those people are intergenerationally mobile whose career, status or class differs from that of their parents or grandparents," the term self-recruitment is used if it remains the same. "Outflow establishes what happens to the members of an occupational group (status group or class) or their children." What do they or their children end up as? In contrast, "inflow shows where the members of an occupational group, a stratum or class come from" (for all this, see Kaelble, 1981, pp. 114-115). By the way, the terms "outflow" and "inflow" express mobility rates.

Kaelble (1981) further notes that two different kinds of investigation are often used to analyze historical changes in social mobility. One is the comparison of surveys which have been carried out at different periods. The other, especially where data for earlier periods do not exist or are inaccessible, is cohort analysis. Also called "retrospective method," this is "based entirely on the data of contemporary mobility surveys, divides the interviewees into different age groups (cohorts), and assumes that the alterations in mobility rates between the older and younger age groups correspond to the historical changes in social mobility" (Kaelble, 1981, p. 118). This assumption may have a tenuous link with reality, and only crude statements can be made about trends. As well, interviewees will have to be probed about the particular dates or ages at which they had been mobile, upwardly or downwardly.

Mobility ratios (the proportion of those who are mobile) are also part and parcel of mobility rates. They show the proportion of the survey sample who either did not continue in their original occupations (for occupational or intragenerational mobility), or did not continue in the same occupation as their fathers or mothers (for intergenerational mobility). Where vertical mobility is being investigated, combining the upward and downward mobility quotients yields a value for the mobility ratio. However, a major disadvantage of mobility rates (including outflow and inflow, mobility ratios or quotients) is that they do not take account of historical changes in the occupational and class structures of the society being studied. For example, if over a ten-year period more workers are found in non-manual rather than in manual occupations, this may be mistaken on its face value as evidence of upward mobility. But it may actually be that the occupational structure has altered such that manual jobs have constricted, pushing most of the solid working class entirely out of employment. And a higher proportion of the non-manual workers presumed to be mobile have not come from solid working-class backgrounds in the first place.

In order to account for changes in the occupational and/or class structure, historical comparisons of mobility rates employ association indices, as well as explore the distinction between structural mobility (also called enforced or demand mobility) and circulation mobility. Sometimes called a "recruitment index," an association index tells us whether an observed decline in the number of, say, farmers' children entering higher education actually means a reduction in the access opportunities for such children, or else is due to a decline in the proportion of farmers within the population. The point, then, is that better information is likely to be gleaned when the proportion of proletarian or bourgeois children observed in the research referent (such as federal high schools and university professional programs) is put in relation to the proportion of proletarians or bourgeoisie in the research universe (such as Nigeria).

Structural mobility refers to the mobility "enforced" by structural changes in the occupational and class structures. In contrast, circulation (or exchange) mobility derives from factors which constitute an "open" or "fluid" society--whatever they may be. While circulation mobility is a residual category, with the reasons for its occurrence remaining unclear, subtracting the rate of structural mobility from the entire mobility rate yields a value for the amount of circulation mobility (Kaelble, 1981, p. 121). One qualification, however, is that more often than not the estimation of structural mobility is still based on the assumption that mobile people from declining occupations transfer directly to the expanding and better occupations. But the reality may be far more complex than that.

Generally speaking, all the foregoing indicators and concepts, together with the idea of working out "expected mobility" rates against a standard or model of "perfect mobility" (for details see Kaelble, 1981, p. 123) are methodological details which arise only when the investigation is set up as such. They also take their meaning within the theoretical predispositions of the investigator. The intimate connection between theoretical apparatus and the concepts and indicators that go into the operational details will be given greater relief as we turn to a more contemporary research technique in the "sociology of social mobility," namely, the status attainment research tradition.

Typically biased toward the upward mobility of individuals, the basic status attainment model claims that:

> The extent of social mobility, either across or within generations, can be measured in the differences in status of origin, which refers to the status of the parents during the time the individual was growing up; status of entry, which refers to the prestige of the first full-time occupation engaged in upon entrance into the labour force; and, status of destination, which is the individual's principal occupation. (Abrahamson, Mizruchi and Hornung, 1976, p. 206)

Status attainment theorists thus proceed to map out the "socio-economic life cycle" of individuals, typically broken down into three broad components: "the period during which an individual receives his education; the translation of that education into an occupational position; and the career from labour force entry to the present" (McRoberts, 1985, p. 90). Essentially, the status attainment model attempts to answer the following questions:

> 1. What are the nature and strength of the relationships between the social background variables and the respondents' educational attainments?
> 2. Given educational attainment, what effect does this, in combination with background, have on occupational status at the time of labour force entry?
> 3. What effect do all these factors have on current occupational status? (McRoberts, 1985, p. 91)

The names of Otis Duncan and Peter Blau, together with William Sewell, are historically associated with the specification and elaboration of the "material particulars" (i.e. concepts and indicators) of the status attainment model. Apart from the independent and dependent variables adumbrated above, a number of socio-psychological factors are often specified as control or intervening variables in the status attainment process: ambition/achievement motivation, parental expectation, I.Q. (this doubles as an independent variable), value orientation, significant others, and so on. A typical practice is to construct prestige scales of occupational titles, such as Duncan's Socio-Economic Index (S.E.I.) of occupations or the Blishen Occupational Class Scale (O.C.S.). Based on the social importance which the public allegedly attaches to particular occupations, these scales are used to assign the appropriate status rankings to the jobs that different individuals hold. The status score for every occupation (i.e. the S.E.I. or O.C.S. score-value) is taken as a measurement of the occupational achievement or status attainment of the individuals concerned (for all this, see Boyd et al., 1985; Horan, 1978; Knottnerus, 1987; Li, 1988; Porter, 1965).

This research tradition has been praised on account of the technical advances and the statistical elegance entailed in the use of a regression methodology (path analysis) "to represent status attainment as a multivariate, causal process" "captured in a recursive model using structural equations" (Knottnerus, 1987, p. 113; Li, 1988, pp. 39-40). Path coefficients are particularly helpful in determining the relative effects of the variables thought to impact on the dependent variable(s). But that is about as far as it goes. For, as Mach and Wesolowski (1986) have noted,

> "Structural equation models" used in these studies are better or worse "translations" of descriptive statistics (means, variances and co-variances of the appropriate variables) pertaining to the actual distribution of valuable goods (occupational prestige, income, education) into a set of so-called "structural" coefficients or parameters. The interpretation of structural coefficients has become, however, a separate sociological problem, the discussion of which lies outside the scope of the statistical model itself. (Mach and Wesolowski, 1986, pp. 15-16)

Furthermore, Burawoy (1977) and Coser (1975) have accused status attainment research of sacrificing theoretical substance for methodological or technical finesse--allegedly a price for its obsession with linear models or linear statistics. However, Horan (1978) has argued that, far from being atheoretical, that is, lacking theoretical substance, status attainment research is "heavily theory-laden." Its methodological and technical details rest on the structural-functional theory of stratification and the human capital argument in neo-classical economics (Horan, 1978; Li, 1988). There are follow-up criticisms. Stratification research is reduced to status attainment research; social mobility research becomes individual occupational mobility/prestige research; non-prestige dimensions of occupational differentiation and stratification are conveniently wished away; occupational structure is equated with class structure which, in turn, is trivialized as a structure of families. Furthermore, its structural-functional assumptions of a unidimensional, consensually evaluated hierarchy of occupational prestige rankings deny and trivialize not only the multiplicity of evaluation criteria which respondents use in rating occupations, but also the multidimensional character of the ratings obtained from respondents (Horan, 1978).

Coxon, Davies and Jones (1986) outline what they call the "structural functional fallacy" of studies of stratification and mobility in the mainstream tradition of "the Duncan SEI score and the British Hope-Goldthorpe scales." These are the claims of: (a) methodological invariance (no matter "who" is questioned, about "whatever" aspect and "however" that is done) of the rank order of occupations; (b) linearity of the rank ordering so obtained; (c) evaluative consensus among the populace making the prestige ranking; and (d) cross-national uniformity of occupational rankings (Coxon, Davies and Jones, 1986; p. 36).

Mach and Wesolowski (1986) have also observed that status attainment research's habit of using occupational differentiation of individuals as the main analytical category literally evacuates the relational or structural basis of inequality from the problematic of stratification and mobility. For, in spite of the posturings of the "tightening bond," "post-industrial" and "employee society" theses--that there is a growing association between education and occupation/income; that knowledge and technical competence, rather than control and/or ownership of the means of production, is becoming the new basis of power and inequality; that virtually everyone is now an employee, as ownership of capital is no longer in a few hands--in spite of all those claims, there still exist class differentials in power and income for the lawyer/doctor who is merely employed in the firm/hospital and the lawyer/doctor who actually owns or manages the business--despite education and profession being the same.

Knottnerus (1987) has taken criticisms of the "occupationalist," "individualist," and "voluntarist" orientation of status attainment research one step forward. For him, this orientation is not simply because of a neo-classical, structural-functional bias as Horan (1978) had suggested. Perhaps more importantly, it is a reflection of the optimistic, if utopian, image of modern industrial society in post-World War II sociological and popular thought. "Society is depicted as fluid, stable and becoming increasingly middle class due to technological progress, the rise of universalistic standards, and the growing importance of education" (Knottnerus, 1987, p. 113).

Thus, the social world of status attainment research is a Weberian "status society," with a finely graded and fluid hierarchy of occupational prestige. It is an idealized homogeneous, "rational free market," in which the rules of competition are equally applied to all. Here, then, is a status-gradational, liberal-functional image of society. This "open society" ideology amounts to a fairy tale when confronted with either the dichotomous, class-conflict model of society or the "dual economy" reasoning. Immersed in both the Weberian "status society" and the structural-functional "equilibrium society," mainstream status attainment research delimits the theoretical parameter of inequality to the differential ranking of individuals along a continuum of occupational superiority/inferiority. This schema not only denies the reality of a non-synchronous capitalist economy and labour market, but wishes away the "economic," "social" and "cultural" reproduction of class relations in capitalist society. The problematic of reproduction theory, as we have noted, is not mobility/status attainment but the subtle and complex ways (including our over-praised resistances) by which class rule and domination generally get perpetuated.

For their part, dual economy and split labour market theorists and researchers (Beck, Horan and Tolbert, 1978; Bielby and Baron, 1983; Blakely and Harvey, 1988; Bonacich, 1972, 1976; Carnoy, 1977, 1979; Grusky, 1983; Li, 1988; Ornstein, 1983; Taylor, Gwartney-Gibbs and Farley, 1986; etc.) have drawn attention to the reality of differential opportunity and reward structures not only in the "dual" economic/industrial sectors' (core versus periphery, or primary versus secondary, or oligopolistic versus competitive), but for different social groups (racial, gender, ethnic, religious, etc.) under advanced capitalism--including the international, "branch plant" capitalism of the newly industrializing countries. Essentially, this school of thought suggests that, far from the assumptions of "open society," "rational free market competition," and individual "talent and effort" in status attainment research, the structural features and constraints of the capitalist economy and labour market operate systematically to ensure "who gets ahead." Minorities and women generally lose out.

Equality of Educational and Social Opportunity

> The IEO-ISO model definitely indicates that stratification is the principal factor responsible for inequality of educational opportunity (IEO) as well as for inequality of social opportunity (ISO), and that any lessening of the rigidity of stratification--for instance through a reduction of economic inequality--is probably more likely to affect the inequality of both educational and social opportunity than any other factor. (Boudon, 1974, p. 193)

The question of "dissolving" the concept of equality/equal treatment (or the lack of it) remains highly problematic even when attempted from the vantage point of analytic philosophy (e.g. Cooper, 1980; Kneller, 1971; Peters, 1967). Most dictionaries add to the confusion by simply suggesting "sameness" or "likeness" in quantity, degree, value, ability, etc. The moral status of "equal" or "same" treatment, for example, becomes tenuous when we realize that people are born with and into different abilities, environments and, therefore, opportunities. Under the circumstance, "equal," "fair" or "just" treatment will have to be unequal treatment (of the unequal)--rather than "same" treatment of avowedly unequal persons or groups. In this "instance" terms such as "equity" and "social justice" are often employed. The apparent "inequality of treatment" may be justified by reference to the circumstance of the original inequalities/inequities: how they had come about and how they could have been otherwise given a different set of circumstances.

With the concept of equality this difficult to "unpack," matters are compounded when we couple it to opportunity, educational or social. Should we consider "equality of educational opportunity" as simply a question of enabling or assisting every individual to maximize his or her potentialities, at least two problems immediately arise. First, the final outcomes are likely to be different to the extent that the potentialities--initial and evolving--are different. Yet many people would argue that unless outcomes are pretty much equal, there cannot have been equal opportunities. Second, schools are set up, among other things, to suppress some potentialities while privileging others (Fleming, 1974). Finally, as we have noted again and again, a wealth of sociological literature suggests that both the "hidden curriculum" and the "formal corpus of school knowledge" are pro-Establishment (Althusser, 1971; Apple, 1979; Bernstein, 1977a; Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bowles, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Illich, 1972; Williams, 1976).

Nduanya (1980) first looks at "opportunity" and "educational opportunity" before plunging into "equality of educational opportunity." Following a dictionary definition of opportunity as a "favourable or advantageous combination of circumstances," Nduanya sees educational opportunity as "a favourable combination of educational circumstances, whereby the individual is enabled to engage in a process of developing his capabilities through acquisition, formally or informally, of knowledge, skills, attitudes and values both for his own benefit and for the benefit of his society" (Nduanya, 1980, p. 28). We shall return to the way in which Nduanya proceeds to specify four dimensions of equal educational opportunity on the basis of the quoted definition. For now, he sees "equality" as a matter of fairness and which, given the differences in the needs and capacities of individuals, may involve unequal but inversely proportionate allocation of educational or other resources.

Coleman (1968) traces the historical development of "equality of educational opportunity" in the United States. He informs us that the earliest meaning included the following:

> 1. Providing a free education up to a given level which constituted the principal entry point to the labour force.
> 2. Providing a common curriculum for all children, regardless of background.
> 3. Partly by design and partly because of low population density, providing that children from diverse backgrounds attend the same school.
> 4. Providing equality within a given locality, since local taxes provided the source of support for schools. (Coleman, 1968, p. 11)

Subsequently, the concept has shifted from providing a diversified curriculum to "separate but equal" facilities for whites and non-whites, to a focus on the results of separate schooling, to racial integration in schools, to the idea of equality of results given (a) the same and (b) different individual inputs, and to considerations of the relative intensity of school and home factors in determining how far groups of children beginning school at different skill levels converge toward similar group averages by the end of particular school cycles (Coleman, 1968).

Wesley (1980) identifies six related stages in the development of the concept in the United States: (a) a single, uniform curriculum; (b) a more varied curriculum, with several optional courses; (c) the 1896 Supreme Court decision (Plessy v. Ferguson) upholding "separate but equal" facilities; (d) the reversion, following the 1954 Supreme Court ruling (Brown v. Board of Education) that legal separation by race was inherently unequal; (e) the post-Coleman emphasis on racial integration in schools as a necessary condition for satisfactory pupil achievement; and (f) the 1971 California Supreme Court ruling (Serrano v. Priest) that equal treatment under the law--as per the "equal protection clause" of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution--entailed that the amount spent on a child's publicly-financed elementary or secondary education should not depend upon the wealth of the child's school district or family, but must be supported from the coffers of the state as a whole (Wesley, 1980, pp. 3-6).

Apart from experimenting with open admission to most colleges and some universities, the equal opportunity agenda in the United States has included the use of "affirmative action" policies to boost the employment of women and ethnic-racial minorities in universities, large businesses, and the federal and state civil service. Mainstreaming handicapped students and the reconstitution of otherwise uni-sex schools have also been part of the pursuit of equality of educational opportunity in the United States (Hurn, 1985, pp. 110-113).

Fleming (1974) offers "the" Canadian version of the concept of equal educational opportunity as follows:

> (i) The provision of facilities and programs of equal quality and variety for "normal" individuals, regardless of differences in physical location or social and economic circumstances; and
> (ii) The provision of special assistance to individuals with obvious intellectual, emotional, physical, or cultural handicaps to enable them to take advantage of educational opportunities. (Fleming, 1974, p. 125)

Fleming notes that there is, however, a general acceptance of social inequality and whatever educational privileges it can purchase. A lackadaisical public commitment to the elimination of the obstacles to the equalizing potentials of schools exists side by side with a general conviction that schooling can and should be effective in reducing inequalities. Notwithstanding these problems and those arising from provincial autonomy and municipal initiatives, efforts toward equalization so far include more and better quality schools, expanded high school enrolment rates, more and better qualified teachers, expanded opportunity for college and university education, improved financial assistance and loan facilities, as well as adult education facilities and larger, supposedly more effective, units of local administration (Fleming, 1974, pp. 125-127).

The British experience has gone from separate schools for distinct class backgrounds, through the fee-free (1944 Education Act) 11-plus selection to secondary grammar, technical and commercial schools, down to comprehensive schooling and the debate over scraping the "remains" of the grammar school. Today nearly two hundred grammar schools remain, private "public schools" keep "class and tradition" alive and, much like Canada and the United States, more than a decade of "conservative restoration" now chants "back to the basics," thus swinging the pendulum back to a supposedly meritocratic pursuit of excellence in the core subjects of the curriculum (Hurn, 1985; Sanderson, 1988).

"Equality of educational opportunity more correctly refers to the independence of the child's educational attainment from social origins" say Garnier and Raffalovich (1984, p. 1) in their examination of the evolution of the concept in France. This resembles the view of Raymond Boudon, who sees inequality of educational opportunity as a matter of "the differences in the level of educational attainment according to social background" (Boudon, 1974, p. xi).

Cooper (1980, p. 68) suggests that "educational opportunities may be ones for education, or ones provided by education." Observing that this is usually seen in the "access" and "provision" senses, Cooper informs us that a version of the provision (of opportunity by education) sense is offered "when Floud, Halsey and Martin define 'equality of educational opportunity' as 'equality of economic and social opportunity through education'" (Cooper, 1980, p. 68). In this sense, educational opportunities are understood as the social and economic prospects which education provides. Cooper insists, however, that all this is patently ideological. He says the same thing of any suggestions of equality of school results or comparable educational achievement, and has no scruples about telling us that he is not an egalitarian!

Whatever happens, Wyn and Wilson (1986, p. 85) have suggested that "a focus on common outcomes for all students would centre attention much more directly on the issue of social equality, not simply educational equality." They are correct. Similarly, Bhagwati (1985, p. 198) sums up the concept as the "equalization of costs and benefits from any level of education" for all social classes and castes. "Costs" here include the relative opportunity costs of both the capital invested at every level of schooling and the child labour lost by having otherwise family farm hands attend school. The opportunity costs are obviously greater for poorer homes. As well, "benefits" would include economic and employment opportunities, together with checking the "rate of return" against the opportunity cost of capital originally invested. Here again, poorer homes tend to be worse off (Bhagwati, 1985, pp. 178-179).

Perhaps we can view the concept broadly as equal opportunities for, and outcomes of, different modes of education (formal, non-formal, informal), levels of schooling (primary, secondary, tertiary), and programs of study (professional, sciences, humanities) for all social classes, gender groups, ethnic-racial groups, ethnic-regional groups, urban-rural groups, age groups, as well as "normal" and "handicapped" groups. However we choose, it should be obvious that the concept is quite problematic, has changed over time, and takes on particular details from one context to another. That stated, there seems to be some recurring decimals in the several ways in which the concept has come to be employed. Our conceptual tour d'horizon at least yields these operative words: "educational circumstances" or "provision"; "possible" or "access(ibility)"; "engage" or "utilize"; "fair" or "proportionate" treatment; "success" or "achievement" or "progress"; as well as "benefits" or "results" or "outcomes."

These essential terms have been collapsed, streamlined and operationalized in Nduanya's four-dimensional approach to the concept of equal educational opportunity (Nduanya, 1980). For him, equalization of educational opportunities means for every individual or group a fair (including inversely proportionate) level of privileges or treatment with respect to each of the following:

1. Provision of favourable educational circumstances;
2. Accessibility of the favourable circumstances created;
3. Actual utilization of the available and accessible circumstances; and
4. The resultant end product of the entire process (Nduanya, 1980, p.29).

There is one qualification to be made here. Nduanya's core dimensions of equal educational opportunity are generally endorsed in the literature (e.g. Carron and Chau, 1981; Husen, 1975, 1987; Spaulding, 1988; Wyn and Wilson, 1986). However, some of them are easier to separate at the conceptual level than at the level of practice, and each is something of a blanket term for a number of variables. Take "accessibility" as an example. Carron and Chau (1981) identify physical accessibility, economic accessibility and socio-cultural accessibility--the third speaks to the cultural or linguistic distance between the school and its clientele. Notice immediately that issues of "provision" and "utilization" are implicated in that typology. The authors also distinguish the notion of "access" from "accessibility," suggesting that even though accessibility is theoretically the same for boys and girls the actual rates of access for one group may be greater because of decisions which will still have to be made by parents depending on the constraints involved. For its part, access is not simply a matter of admission to the first year; it is the probability of entering each of the succeeding cycles in an educational system, especially where there is neither compulsory education nor universal primary education (Carron and Chau, 1981, pp. 57-59, 62-63). So, even though Nduanya's four-dimensional schema lends relief to an otherwise elusive concept, the specified dimensions are but heuristic aids which could guide study and description. They remain very useful aids nevertheless. So much for the purely conceptual survey.

Tyler (1977, pp. 10-11) identifies different types of educational inequality. These are inequalities of scholastic achievement, educational background (of the family and neighbourhood), scholastic aptitude or ability, school environment (including formal and hidden curricula), as well as the tangible outcomes of education, namely credentials and life chances. Tyler further identifies "five main" explanations of educational inequality. According to him, these explanations give us a good map of approaches to policy and thinking in virtually all industrialized countries throughout this century. First, there is the meritocratic model, which emphasizes inherited ability. Second, the class conflict model draws attention to existing patterns of material and cultural inequality, and how these are legitimized and reproduced in school and society. Third, the traditional elitist or "conservative" model combines genetic and environmental explanations of educational inequality; specifically, it emphasizes historical social selection of intelligence/talent, rather than the claims of natural selection in the meritocratic model. Fourth, the evolutionary liberal model of educational inequality resembles the meritocratic model, but proposes a weak connection between intelligence and family background. Lastly, the compensatory liberal model is akin to the class conflict model, but proposes that improving both the school environment and the distribution of credentials can significantly raise the life chances of lower-class children (Tyler, 1977, p. 18).

Cohn and Rossmiller (1987) document some of the most recent reviews of the literature on effective schools. They inform us that S.C. Purkey and M.S. Smith have recently described the components of an effective school using two groups of variables. One is "organizational/ structural variables." The other is "process variables." While the first group is subject to administrative and bureaucratic fiat, the second group, which relates to the climate and culture of the school--the hidden curriculum--cannot be manipulated the same way.

Nine organizational/structural variables are said to characterize effective schools:

> 1. Emphasis is placed on school site management, with considerable autonomy given the school leadership and staff.
> 2. Strong instructional leadership is provided by the school principal, other administrators, or teachers. . .
> 3. Stability and continuity are valued, and actions that decrease staff stability are avoided, thus facilitating agreement and cohesion.
> 4. Curriculum articulation and organization are used to achieve agreement on goals, to develop a purposeful program of instruction coordinated across grade levels, and to provide sufficient time for instruction.
> 5. There is a school-wide staff development program (based on the expressed needs of teachers), involving the entire school staff and closely related to the school's instructional program.
> 6. Parents are informed about, and supportive of, school goals and student responsibilities, especially with regard to homework.
> 7. School-wide recognition of academic success is provided, thereby encouraging students to adopt similar norms and values.
> 8. Time is used effectively, with more time devoted to academic subjects and less time lost to disruptions or non-academic pursuits.
> 9. Support from the school district is evident . . . (Cohen and Rossmiller, 1987, pp. 381-382).

The four process variables which S.C. Purkey and M.S. Smith identify relate to the culture and climate within the school--what is usually called the "hidden curriculum." Again, Cohn and Rossmiller (1987) have the information:

> 1. Collaborative planning and collegial relationships are evident and help break down barriers, develop consensus, and promote a sense of unity.
> 2. There is a strong sense of community. (A feeling that one is a member of a recognizable and supportive community reduces alienation and increases commitment to school goals.)
> 3. Clear goals and high expectations, including clearly defined purposes and agreement on priorities, are evident.
> 4. Order and discipline are based on clear rules enforced fairly and consistently. (This practice helps communicate a sense of the seriousness and purpose with which the school approaches its task.) (p. 382)

It is emphasized that the organizational/structural variables and the process variables are interwoven and interdependent. The former provide the framework within which the latter take shape. Thus, they articulate in the constitution of an effective school.

Although school factors have been found to make significant differences in students' achievement in the less developed countries (see Cohn and Rossmiller, 1987, pp. 377-378, for the bibliography), the situation for industrial nations has been a matter for debate since the 1966 Coleman Report created the impression that schools make little or no difference. We will not go into all that here. We cite the debate between J. Murphy and Evelyn Mahon because it deals with the issue of inequality. Murphy (1981) argues that class disparity in education does not constitute class inequality in education. According to him, it is a difference in educational aspiration, which is merely another difference in a differentiated society. His challenge is that if class differences in education are to be taken as evidence of class inequality in education, the researcher must meet one of two conditions. First, he will have to show that the different classes are similarly disposed to education. Alternatively, if there is no evidence of comparable universal demand for education across classes--as in Britain where there is considerable working-class "indifference" to education--he will need to demonstrate that such indifference or differential demand is the result of structural or cultural inequality.

Mahon (1985) replies that Murphy's "conditionalities" are overly presumptuous, set in bad faith and seem to demand a classless society. Using some of Murphy's choice terms, Mahon argues that to the extent that differences in educational aspiration, participation, taste, indifference, and dissent are not randomly distributed throughout the population but, instead, are systematically class-specific, they constitute structured social inequality. Aspiration does not come out of thin air. So-called working class indifference to education is not necessarily a normative action; it is an adaptive response to both structural and cultural constraints.

Murphy (1985) counters by arguing that the differences which schools are said to make do not, after all, make any difference. He now launches the issue of differential school effects on the world of work outside the school. Rather sarcastically, he notes that the two factors on which schools exert most influence--attendance and attainment--have little effect on employment and economic opportunities. Thus, schools really do not make any difference, concludes a rather cynical Murphy.

Murphy (1986) returns to his earlier argument as a specific reply to Mahon (1985). Boasting that no researcher has as yet shown that class disparity in education is indeed unfair and unjust, he urges Mahon to get back to the fact that different classes are differently disposed to education, with the working class less favourable so. Murphy argues that Mahon overrates inequality while ignoring the question of yet another value difference in a differentiated society. To "prove" his point, he states that neither the fee-free secondary education introduced by the 1944 Education Act, nor the abolition of eleven-plus examination has, so to say, woken the British working class from their deep slumber over higher education. That should do.

A number of theoretical positions attempt to explain how environmental factors (the home and the school, together with their interaction) affect school performance and/or educational attainment. The *culture of poverty* thesis claims that working-class children perform poorly in school because the culture of their homes lacks the ambition, motivation, value orientation, language and modes of thinking required for school success. The *material disadvantage* thesis argues that so-called lack of interest on the part of the poor is actually a reflection of material incapacity. Theirs is a structure of poverty, a poverty of culture, rather than a culture of poverty. The poor are culturally disadvantaged to the extent that they are materially or structurally handicapped. The thesis of *self-fulfilling prophecy* (also called expectancy/labelling theory) is that school personnel--teachers, counsellors, administrators--are servants and agents performing political and ideological functions for the dominant classes. Consciously or unconsciously, their stereotypes about the "good" student tend to discriminate against working class kids in the matter of curricular tracking and being supportive in class. The *cultural capital* thesis, a strand of reproduction theory, contends that the material advantages of wealthy homes confer on the kids the cultural privilege, ethos or code which tallies with the school climate, thus promoting educational achievement and attainment (Haralambos, 1981, pp. 193-217; Tyler, 1977, pp. 101-102).

Ogbu (1978) provides related theoretical explanations of the differential school achievement and attainment of white children and black students in the United States.

> The *cultural deprivation* theory assumes that black children fail in school because they are deficient in the cognitive, linguistic, and other skills that promote a white middle-class type of school success . . . . The *cultural conflict* theory, on the other hand, asserts that black children fail to achieve white middle-class type of school success because they possess

> different linguistic, cognitive and other school-related skills that are not recognized by the schools for instructional purposes. The institutional deficiency theory maintains that it is attributable to the fact that schools are organized to promote success among white middle-class children and failure among black children. Educational inequality theory blames black school failure on lack of sufficient remedial programs to counteract the negative educational influences of the home and the community. Jensen's theory suggests that there may be a genetic or biological basis for the school failure. (Ogbu, 1978, p. 65)

Arguing that none of these theories (except perhaps the gesture in the institutional deficiency theory) "examines the nature of the American caste system and its possible influence on black school failure," Ogbu urges Americans to cast off their ideological blinders and for once confront the differential post-educational opportunity structures in a racially stratified society. This post-school reward theory (also called "job-ceiling theory") maintains that equal educational opportunity for caste-like minorities (paradigmatically, black Americans, but, to a lesser extent, Indians, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans) would remain illusory until the American caste system of stratification is attacked head on and comparable post-educational opportunities created for all social groups. Ogbu's typology of minority status also identifies "luckier" "immigrant minorities" (Chinese, Cubans, Japanese, Filipinos and Koreans) and established "autonomous minorities" (Jews, Amish and Mormons) (Ogbu, 1978, 1983).

Bowles (1968) asks all America (Congress, the White House and the public) whether they are ready to move toward equality of educational opportunity. His recipe contains the following ingredients: (a) allocate unequal amount of resources (i.e. a larger pie) to the education of negro kids and poor kids generally; (b) reject the idea that the education system alone can and should bear the burden of achieving equal opportunity; (c) extend Coleman's "equality of results" to the effects of education on (i) jobs and (ii) income; and (d) undertake a major redistribution of political and economic power between races and amongst social classes. Racial discrimination in the job market will have to be tackled directly. As political power includes educational decision making, America must ask not just what school policies should be adopted, but who should decide and how (Bowles, 1968).

Boudon (1974) offers a class positional theory of educational attainment.. According to him, there are two parts to the relationship between social class and educational attainment. One is that the stratification system confers school-related cultural advantage and disadvantage, respectively, on middle-class and working-class children. Second, even if such cultural differences were held constant, a more serious form of educational inequality would still arise from the fact of differential positions in the class structure. According to Boudon, people make rational educational choices within decisional fields whose parameters are a function of their location in the stratification system. The costs and benefits of the same educational option are different for middle-class and working-class children. A vocational option could be "social promotion" for the latter, but it is certainly "social demotion" for the former. Even with average intelligence, social pressure literally compels the middle-class child to pursue a professional career at whatever cost. This ensures middle-class family and peer group solidarity--a situation that would be jeopardized were he or she to choose a low-status course. Conversely, it is a lower status course which not only retains working-class family and friendship solidarity, but costs less in terms of money and time and farm labour lost to schooling. For Boudon, the only guarantee for achieving equal educational opportunity is the abolition of the stratification system, together with the adoption of a single, compulsory curriculum with delayed and minimal branching points.

Boudon (1974, 1977) also proposes a related structural model of educational and social mobility. This model posits that expansion of educational opportunity does not bring about a reduction in inequality of social opportunity, even if it is accompanied by reduced inequality in educational opportunity. Thus, expanding rates of school attendance or decreasing educational attainment inequalities is one thing, but reducing inequality of social opportunity (i.e. increasing social mobility) throughout the population is a different thing altogether (Boudon, 1974, 1977). This is certainly a deserved hand-out to those who celebrate the equalization potentials of education.

The human capital theory is *ipso facto* implicated. Its "cousins" include the claims of a "tightening bond" between credentials and labour market opportunities; the visions of the reign of professional knowledge and technical competence in the "post-industrial" society; as well as the celebration of higher "rates of return" per additional year of investment in education. Against this background, the human capital school professes the equalization impact of the spread of investments in human capital across the population. The claim here is that the schooling of everyone would increase their employability and productivity, thus raising the national wealth, achieving greater equality of income, and boosting social mobility (see Carnoy, 1979; Fagerlind and Saha, 1983; Tyler, 1977). A well deserved response to these fairy tales has been attempted by Michael Todaro:

> . . . many of the early claims made on behalf of the unfettered quantitative expansion of educational opportunities--that it would accelerate economic growth; that it would raise levels of living especially for the poor; that it would generate widespread and equal educational opportunities for all . . .--have been shown to be greatly exaggerated and, in many instances, simply false. (Todaro, 1981, p. 290)

Collins (1977) and Yulat (1988) provide a more sociologically derived interpretation of the "technical-functional" theory of educational stratification and inequality. Sharing the assumptions of a tightening bond between education and jobs, the technical-functional theory posits that formal education provides the technical training for meeting the rising skill requirements of jobs in an industrial society forever pulled by the magnet of advances in technology. However, a conflict perspective argues that most occupations bear little or no relationship to the educational qualifications required to enter them--in terms of the technical components of jobs, that is. Except perhaps for certain specialized and highly technical fields such as medicine, aeronautics and engineering, education has little or no direct relevance to job performance and productivity. The basic function of much education is sociological and ideological. Education is a means for both social differentiation and the rationalization of such differentiation. Once educational stratification, including curriculum tracking, is properly diagnosed as part and parcel of social stratification, the question of achieving greater equality of income and social mobility through educational expansion alone becomes a kind of fable (Alexander, Cook and McDill, 1978; Collins, 1977; Yulat, 1988).

Following Apple (1986), Britzman (1987) and McCarthy (1988), both liberal and radical theorists have tended to ignore or under-theorize the issue of ethnic-racial and gender inequalities in school and society. Having reduced ethnic-racial inequalities to simply a question of the educability of minorities, the standard liberal-pluralist approach is a gestural (rather than real) solution through multicultural education. For its part, much of radical discourse anchors racial domination to the structural properties of capitalism and its elaboration as a world system. This literature subsumes ethnic-racial and gender inequalities under the general rubric of working class oppression and, not surprisingly, assumes that all inequality will "wither away" with the abolition of capitalism and class society (McCarthy, 1988, p. 267). It is because of these theoretical inadequacies that Apple and Britzman and McCarthy urge us to begin to problematize the intersecting dynamics of "classed," "raced" and "gendered" forms of domination and inequality in school and society. That certainly enriches the agenda of equality of educational and social opportunity.

Blakemore and Cooksey (1981) provide a good overview of the sociology of educational opportunity especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Their chapter on education and social inequality offers familiar insights:

> Great wealth and great poverty exist side by side, and the gap between rich and poor is as wide as anywhere else in the world. Inequalities of wealth and power are reflected in educational inequalities although there is by no means a one-to-one relationship. In general, however, high levels of social inequality are accompanied by high levels of inequality within the education system . . . .
>
> In the final analysis, educational inequalities reflect economic and social inequalities between classes, regions, ethnic groups and so on and these are extremely difficult to eliminate. (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, pp. 51, 57)

Here again we see that the real source of educational inequality is not education _per se_ but, instead, social inequality. The dimensions of social stratification are taken beyond class, race and gender to questions of ethnicity and region. In fact, the latter two, for real and ideological reasons, have been the focus of the policy and politics of educational equity and social justice in Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, Ch. 9; Samoff, 1987).

Blakemore and Cooksey (1981) also outline four kinds of educational inequality in much of Africa. Their typology accords with and extends most of the themes which have come up in this discussion:

> 1. Not all children have the same chance of going to school. This we call unequal _access_ to schooling.
> 2. There are wide differences in _performance_ between children. Some drop out before completing primary school, others have to repeat classes, the majority of candidates fail the secondary entrance examinations.
> 3. Within the education system there are different streams which can be followed leading to a variety of qualifications and possible occupations. These streams may be officially equal but are generally considered to be unequal. For example, in Africa, technical education is generally considered to be inferior to academic education.
> 4. Schools and colleges which are theoretically equal (following the same syllabus and leading to the same qualifications) vary widely in _status_, _quality_ and the _market value of the qualification_ obtained. Thus private schools may be of a higher or lower quality than government schools, places in high-status schools will be more difficult to obtain than places in low-status schools, and the qualifications earned from the best known schools, colleges and universities may be more marketable than the same qualifications earned elsewhere. (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, p. 52)

The authors further outline the interrelated sources of the educational inequalities adumbrated above. These are class background, race, sex, ethnicity, culture, religion, region, birthplace (urban versus rural) and intelligence (p. 52). In passing, Porter (1965, Ch. 6) lists the same factors, together with family size, as the barriers to equal educational opportunity in Canada. He groups them under social barriers (socio-economic status, religion, ethnicity, region, size of family) and psychological barriers (intelligence, motivation), but takes care to emphasize that the two sets of factors are intricately interwoven.

We return to Blakemore and Cooksey (1981). According to them, the factors noted above influence educational inequalities in three main intervening ways:

> 1. Material factors. For example, the availability of funds from parents and other family members will affect such things as the quality of school attended, the number of children in a family who get sent to school, the likelihood of attending private secondary school, the number of books which a pupil possesses and the employment of a private tutor. Material considerations also affect the amount of housework or productive labour which a child performs.
> 2. Motivations and aspirations. Not all parents and students are equally highly motivated as regards schooling. This may or may not reflect material factors.
> 3. Cultural factors. Irrespective of parents' financial means and educational aspirations for their children, the culture of home and community affect educational chances. For example, parents' command of the language of schooling may have an effect on school performance. (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, pp. 52-53)

One qualification must be made here. The so-called "culture of home and community," including "parents' command of the language of schooling," is intimately linked with the material circumstances of those concerned. What counts as school knowledge, school language, good home culture, correct motivation and aspiration, as well as intelligence or learning ability, is socially constructed (extending Young, ed., 1971). It does not emerge from thin air but, instead, flows from the "barrel" of power and inequality. Once this intimate connection between "material" and "cultural" factors is appreciated, the reader can make real sense of what Blakemore and Cooksey (1981, p. 55) call the "variables involved in the analysis of educational inequalities."

I think that the lesson of the section on the multiple and articulated terrains of domination and inequality is applicable to the "independent variables" listed under "dimension of inequality," by Blakemore and Cooksey. First, all the "independent variables," at least at the level of "appearances," are carriers of educational inequalities. Second, class inequalities inform and suffuse, that is, operate within and across, the rest of the listed "independent variables." For differential economic and social opportunities exist here and there between and within cases. Drawing on the second point, class-related educational inequalities inform and intersect whatever educational inequalities we may observe for gender, urban-rural birthplace, ability, region, religion, race, ethnicity, and so on.

Okeem (1980) sets out five major constraints in the achievement of equality and the equalization of educational opportunities in Nigeria. One is that of conflicting ideologies--capitalism versus socialism. Asking, rhetorically, whether capitalist Nigeria can implement socialist goals of equality, Okeem states, for the avoidance of doubt, that:

> Capitalism is rooted in and flourishes by inequality so that it is inconsistent with its philosophy to advocate the provision of equality whether in educational opportunities or in anything else. (Okeem, 1980, p. 8)

Another constraint is that of failure of politicians and policy makers to clarify or operationalize what they mean by "equalization of educational opportunities" and similar concepts. Not infrequently, "provision" of facilities is confused with "equalization" of educational opportunities. A third constraint is the existence of a class society. Class-conditioned differentials in socialization techniques make educability easier and school performance better for middle-class, rather than for working-class, children.

The existence of striking urban/rural discrepancies in the provision of infrastructural facilities is the fourth obstacle identified by Okeem. From roads to hospitals, to water supply, to lighting supply, to shopping facilities to school and teacher quality, something of a "re-entry shock" awaits those arriving at the villages from the cities and towns. Okeem notes that the blame is often and wrongly placed on lack of funds, when the problem lies with the planning strategies in a capitalist society (Okeem, 1980, p. 9). The fifth obstacle is an attitudinal one, but one which is linked with the constraints in a class society. Even when educational facilities have been made available and "freely" accessible to all, the differential orientations resulting from socialization in a class society would still lead to unequal consumption or utilization of such facilities (p. 10). Here again, we must note that what counts as appropriate socialization or orientation is what those in the commanding posts of society define as such. Okeem's conclusion is that equalization of educational opportunities cannot be achieved without a radical re-ordering of the social structure, its political ideology and its socialization process.

Lastly, we look at the I.Q. debate. The root of the controversy is the claim by the Jensen-Eysenck school that high measured intelligence is a genetic inheritance of the upper class/white population and that this fact alone explains their economic success down the generations. The obverse of this postulate is that low measured intelligence is the natural preserve of the working class/black population and that their history of poverty must be seen as such. While the heritability estimate is 80 percent, the remaining 20 percent is attributed to environment or some residual factor, or both. This presumed preponderance of the inherited component is a major part of the "scientific evidence" used to explain success or failure in school and society by those who subscribe to the theory of race and class differentials in measured intelligence.

Bowles and Gintis (1976, 1977) deride all that stuff as "I.Q.-ism," and then proceed to show that it is an apologia for inequality. Rose and Rose (1980) suggest that it belongs more in astrology (or superstition) than in astronomy (or science). The falsity of its theoretical and methodological assumptions are noted immediately below. First, the assumption that all intelligence or mental ability can be accessed and measured is wishful thinking. Second, what counts as intelligence, together with the heritability coefficient, is what we construct as such. Third, whatever "biology" there is to intelligence is not a fixed or an unchanging biology of the individual. It is an interacting aspect of a more complex whole in changing relations with the environment, that is, the social and material world. As such, it is misleading to pretend to be able to isolate an abstract "quality" or a fixed thing from a process with a history and dynamic of its own--individuals and their changing relations with others and with the world.

What is more, the much celebrated heritability estimate is not a measure of some general "inheritance," nor can it give meaningful results in the human situation where conditions of controlled breeding do not apply. Indeed, the heritability estimate is:

> . . . a technical term in biometry (derived for use in plant and animal breeding studies) which: (a) can only be estimated in a controlled breeding study in which different genotypes are more or less randomly distributed through a limited range of environments; (b) gives a figure which is meaningful only for those genotypes in those environments--change the environment and the heritability also changes; (c) is only a within-population statistic--it tells one nothing about differences between populations, and there is no theoretical or practical technique available to biometry which could do this. (Rose and Rose, 1980, p. 91)

Should anyone think otherwise, a "prerequisite for making such a measure . . . would be a randomly interbreeding population of blacks and whites in a classless society" (p. 92). Whatever happens, we have noted that it is not actually possible to partial out the independent effect of either heredity or environment on mental ability. The latter factor goes back in time beyond the prenatal stage to the health of the parents before and at the point of conception. As with physical growth, retarded mental growth can result from malnutrition and poverty (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981; Tyler, 1977).

> The recent evidence on the effect of pre-natal and neo-natal nutritional deficiency on neural growth and mentation indicates strongly that early deficiency in nutrition can cause lasting damage to the intellectual ability--and hence to eventual ability to go through a sustained educational process on equal terms with those not so deprived and afflicted. (Bhagwati, 1985, p. 199)

Essentially, then, the I.Q. ideology serves to legitimize and rationalize the class stratification system. Economic success has little or nothing to do with I.Q. and/or school achievement. By helping to make existing patterns of inequality seem natural and justified, "I.Q.-ism" and "credentialism" work systematically to ensure the (resisted?) reproduction of both class relations and those of ethnic-racial and gender domination.

Conclusions

Without necessarily denying every iota of merit to liberal-functional claims of economic development, nation-building and even equality of opportunity, our schema underscores the reproductive-contradictory, reformulative-accommodative, as well as the hegemonic-but-contested character of public education in the matter of class, gender and ethnic-racial relations. In spite of the diluting effects of the Weberian trilogy (property, prestige and party) on Marxian class analysis, and despite the debate over the structural changes in the class structure and labour processes under advanced (including international periphery) capitalism, differential control of material and other power resources remains the root cause of social inequality.

It is well that Marxist-influenced class theorists have added questions of control of the means of administration/coercion and communication/consent to the conventional notion of production relations. And whether or not we choose to privilege class analysis, it is as well that neo-Marxist and/or "dual economy" scholars have incorporated gender and ethnic-racial inequalities into the problematic of stratification and mobility. This stated, mainstream status attainment research tradition ought to be seen as the intellectual program of the ruling liberal-conservative ideology of an open, objective and meritocratic society.

As with social inequality, differential access or relationship to material and other power resources is the principal factor responsible for inequality of educational opportunity. Educational stratification and inequalities are part and parcel of social stratification and inequalities. Effectively, this means that public educational reform/revolution alone has very limited chances of achieving equality of educational and social opportunity.

Part Two: Empirical Research and Case Studies

The Literature on Industrialized Nations

A few opening qualifications may be in order here. First, it is neither necessary nor feasible to cover even all the major studies of educational and social opportunity/inequality in either industrial or developing nations. Only very few studies, some of which are of historical importance, need be reviewed here. Second, most of the categories and concepts which are used interchangeably in studies of educational and social stratification (e.g. social class, socio-economic status, family background, occupational class, and income group) are by no means synonymous. One consolation, however, is that wherever any of the listed categories is said to constitute a privilege in educational/social opportunity, the more inclusive Marxist conception of social class (relationship to the means of production, administration and coercion, communication and consent--Miliband, 1987) will command a higher level of privilege. Third, although the literature on developing countries will be given a separate sub-heading, no rule is violated if we happen to report on a comparative study in any sub-section.

"The Coleman Report" of 1966, Equality of Educational Opportunity, investigated the apparent "lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, colour, religion, or national origin in the United States" (Karabel and Halsey, 1977, p. 20). Contrary to the expectations of the "anti-poverty," liberal Congressmen who had sponsored the enabling legislation, Coleman and his associates reported that black and white school characteristics were equal, and that school facilities had relatively little effect on student achievement. They then concluded that family background characteristics, rather than school factors, were much more important in explaining differential achievement among school children. This is in line with the theory of the culture of poverty/cultural deprivation of ghetto and black families (for details, see Part One). Critics have, however, argued that it is not spot quantitative data on families and schools but, instead, qualitative, preferably longitudinal data on the processes at work within families and schools which can meaningfully tell whether schools or families make a difference in student achievement. Also, the fact that the study found that the difference in achievement between minority (black, Hispanic, etc.) and majority (white) children "increases with time spent in school" suggests that schools at least reinforce the inferior position of disadvantaged children with respect to educational opportunity" (Karabel and Halsey, 1977, p. 21).

Moreover, a re-analysis of some of the Coleman data by Samuel Bowles and Henry Levin has shown that "some school-related variables have a significant effect on achievement, indicating that schools and teachers do make a difference" (Cohn and Rossmiller, 1987, p. 378). The Coleman Report had employed multiple regression analysis to determine the proportion of variance in scholastic achievement "explained" by factors such as SES (which is not the same thing as social class), school-related variables, community-related variables, and teacher attributes.

> Community-related and SES variables were entered first, followed by school- and teacher-related variables. It was shown that school and teacher variables add very little to the explanatory power of the model (R^2) once SES and other nonschool variables are taken into account. As Bowles and Levin point out, however, the methodology was deficient since the two sets of variables are correlated, so that the order in which variables are entered in the regression affects their contributions to R^2. (Cohn and Rossmiller, 1987, p. 378)

The re-analysis by Bowles and Levin used a methodology based on what is now called "the 'educational production function,' where various inputs are entered simultaneously in a regression equation to 'explain' the educational output (notably, scholastic achievement) and where the 'importance' of a given input in explaining output is based on the size and statistical significance of the regression coefficient" (pp. 378-379). Nonetheless, the educational production function also has its own deficiencies. First, the regression coefficients may be quite unstable, and a significant coefficient does not "prove" causation. Second, since the output produced by schools tends to be multidimensional, the use of a single cognitive outcome, or even the weighted average of a number of cognitive outcomes, could give rise to statistical bias. And although the use of simultaneous equations has been subsequently suggested, even that option may not yield correct estimates to the extent that the educational process is characterized by joint production (p. 379).

All this suggests that elegant statistical models purporting to "prove" causal linkages in social phenomena are frequently based on tenuous and non-existent assumptions. Maybe one source I do not now recall is instructive in saying that "an ounce of insight is more meaningful than a mountain of multiple regression." Whatever happens, Hurn (1985) informs us that a more recent study of high school achievement by Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) "surprisingly" reports that schools and teachers make a difference. They found that private and Catholic denominational schools outclass public schools in the matter of pupil achievement. This was attributed to the disciplinary practices, organizational goals and hidden curricular orientations of private and separate schools. Again, critics have wasted no time in suggesting that Coleman and his colleagues may be attributing causality to what is actually the effect of the differing and more selective composition of the student body. "If private and Catholic schools were required to admit all comers . . . they would not be able to maintain such high standards of behaviour" and school achievement (Hurn, 1985, p. 227).

Jencks et al. (1972) reassess the presumed effects of family background and schooling in America. Although the work under reference is credited with making an impressive use of a regression methodology, path analysis, data so analyzed were actually pooled from investigations (especially work by Otis Duncan and Peter Blau) whose formats, concepts and measures were not only inconsistent, but lacked a conflict-structural perspective. The view of Karabel and Halsey (1977, p. 24) is that Jencks and his colleagues have added "the problems of methodological individualism to the limitations of methodological empiricism" in social science research. Nevertheless, the work found that access to "high-cost" educational services such as pre-schooling and higher education were more unequal than access to "low-cost," compulsory elementary and secondary schooling; it is the combination of genetic and environmental inequality which produces cognitive inequality; middle-class students have access to more than their fair share of the nation's educational resources; family background affects educational attainment much more than I.Q. genotype; while educational attainment greatly affects the occupations which people enter, it has little or no effect on earnings; substantial reductions in the range of educational attainment do not appreciably reduce economic inequality among adults; to the extent that there is about as much income inequality among brothers as among men in general, family background has a tenuous link with life chances (Jencks et al., 1972).

Their conclusion is that equalization of educational opportunity still would not equalize adult economic opportunities. School reforms cannot bring about significant social changes outside the school. The huge amount of unexplained variance in his regression model (in comparison with the "paltry" variance explained by education) leads Jencks to the conclusion that life chances depend largely on luck, including personality traits and competence on the job. The policy recommendation is a more direct approach to the equalization of income distribution: progressive taxation; direct regulation of wages; tax incentives to employers who equalize wages; generous insurance schemes for the poor, etc. Critics have argued that so-called "luck" is often the more elusive effect of location within the class structure, and that the equalization of education could upset the legitimating role of schooling, thus starting a process which might politicize income inequalities and make them subject to state intervention (see Karabel and Halsey, 1977).

Jencks et al. (1979) take another look at the determinants of economic success in America. Contrary to the argument in their 1972 book, they now find that family "background characteristics seem to exert appreciable effects on both occupational status and earnings even among men with the same test scores and education" (Jencks et al., 1979, p. 10). According to them, these background characteristics are more a question of the yet unmeasured, more elusive combination of circumstances arising from growing up in the "right family," than of "standard" demographic measures of parental advantages/disadvantages--education, occupation, income, etc. Nonetheless, all background characteristics put together accounted for some 48 percent and 15 to 30 percent, respectively, of the variance in adult males' occupations and annual earnings (pp. 213-214, 230). In something that echoes the dual economy literature, they report that five background characteristics consistently influenced occupational status independent of educational attainment: race, ethnicity, religion, father's occupational status and farm background. The background factors which affect earnings independent of cognitive skills and education are race, religion, region of birth, father's occupation and growing up in a farm background. The authors generally shy away from saying/suggesting exactly why all this happens (pp. 215-218).

Furthermore, Jencks et al. inform us that it is the first and last years of high school and college, rather than the intervening years, which matter in the association between schooling and earnings. Nonetheless, high test scores/cognitive skills are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for high earnings. They are merely helpful, especially through longer schooling. There are two instructive conclusions: (a) "If one makes the dubious assumption that test performance measures 'ability,' and if one defines 'meritocracy' as a situation in which ability determines success, America is not very 'meritocratic'" (p. 230); and (b) just as the 1972 work had recommended, "if we want to redistribute income, the most effective strategy is probably still to redistribute income [directly]" (p.311). They think that the idea of a socialist society is worth trying.

Karabel (1977) reaches similar conclusions in a study that reveals community colleges as a site of submerged class conflict in American higher education and society. "The community college lies at the base of the stratification structure of higher education both in the class origins of its students and in their occupational destinations" (p. 246). The same conditions apply to the vocational programs of community colleges--"the bottom track of higher education's bottom track" (p. 246). After scrutinizing data on the background characteristics (parental education, income and occupation; race, etc.) of students enrolled in the college-parallel, technical and vocational wings of some 63 "comprehensive" community colleges, Karabel finds that what these colleges offer is hierarchy, not variety; class tracking and veiled class struggle, not equality of opportunity. By shifting attention to questions of individual mobility rather than distributive justice, these colleges (ironically, a showpiece of the so-called schooling revolution in North America) serve to reproduce class relations and struggles in displaced forms (Curtis, 1984, said this about public educational reform in Part One). Although socialism, on the ground, is not necessarily equal to equal opportunity, Karabel feels strongly that:

> The problems of inequality and inequality of opportunity are, in short, best dealt with not through educational reform but rather by the wider changes in economic and political life that would help build a socialist society. (Karabel, 1977, p. 250)

Wilcox and Moriarty (1976) examined the social constraints on equal educational opportunity against the background of a structural relationship between schooling and work as posited in the correspondence principle by Bowles and Gintis (1976). This ethnographic study of school and classroom processes (discipline styles and values taught, including internal/self-directed and external/authority-directed control and responsibility; role of the student in the classroom; presentation of cognitive materials, etc.) found that schools attempt to fulfil the requirements of the hierarchically stratified work place by broadly socializing students in ways that roughly correspond with their class backgrounds. Only students in the upper middle-class school were personally responsible for maintaining the quality of their academic work. This internalized form of responsibility resembles the self-direction demanded of their professional parents on the job.

More recent case studies reporting evidence of social reproduction in American schools include Ginsburg and Giles (1984), Oakes (1986) and Scott (1985). Curriculum tracking, differentiated forms of higher education, as well as class-based differentials in educational recruitment, financial aid and grade/school-level advancement, were found to cater to the resisted but reformulated reproduction--the perpetuation and legitimation--of social inequalities in wealth, power and privilege.

Jones (1985) reports on educational and occupational attainment in Canada. Both his theoretical orientation and methodology are steeped in the structural-functional status attainment tradition, whose shortcomings have been noted in Part One of this chapter. True to the predispositions of this research ideology, he concludes that "the effects of education and first or later occupational status on current occupational status so strongly outweigh the effects of social origins as to suggest that the latter deserve very little further consideration in the analysis of occupational attainment" (Jones, 1985, p. 137). Trapped in the inherent contradictions of this research technique, however, the same Jones states that "social origin clearly exerts a direct influence on educational attainment" (p. 137). This research tradition is so preoccupied with "proving" achievement that it wants to wish ascription away. Yet it has not had the courage (perhaps a price for its other claim that superior intelligence is a middle-class inheritance) to deny the direct link between social origin and educational attainment. Of course nobody bothers to ask whether the distinction between ascription and achievement actually makes sense in the real world--just as that between aspirations and expectations.

Boyd (1985) investigated the influence of families on the educational and occupational attainment of native-born Canadian males and females. The work cites research findings in the United States and Canada which show gender differences in length of schooling and course specialization or tracking. Even though females are more likely than males to complete high school, they are less likely to obtain a college education or a post-graduate degree. They are also more likely than males to be found in secretarial studies, home economics, nursing, teaching, the humanities or social sciences. "These sex differences in length and type of education are attributed to . . . social origins, the socializing influence of the family, the peer group and teachers, self-concept, the internal structure of schools, and the organization of the educational system itself" (Boyd, 1985, p. 241).

Perhaps due to sex-role socialization, same-sex modelling and a sex-segregated occupational structure, the educational attainments of offspring are influenced more by the educational attainments of the-same-sex parent. Thus, the occupational status of fathers continues to influence the occupational attainments of sons more than those of daughters. Also:

> The stronger impact which father's occupational status and mother's labour force participation have on male educational compared to female attainments is consistent with the observation that families may not give financial support as readily to women for post-secondary schooling, particularly those coming from lower social origins. (Boyd, 1985, p. 284)

Nonetheless, there was evidence that middle-class background can attenuate the inhibiting effects of gender inequality. "Data on the first job attainments of married women show that full-time paid women are a select group" (p. 283). Note that the higher mean current occupational status of women in comparison with men in the full-time paid labour force in part reflects these women's higher social origins, education and first job statuses, as well as the higher selectivity of full-time paid jobs for such women (pp. 283-284).

Li (1988) adds ethnic inequality to the emerging issue of class and gender inequalities in levels of schooling and earnings for the same amount of schooling. He recalls that Porter (1965) had drawn attention to the close relationship between ethnicity and social class in his "vertical mosaic" thesis. I would add that Clement (1975, 1985) provides corroborative evidence in a large-scale study of the ethnic backgrounds and behaviours of the Canadian corporate elite. One of the relevant findings reported in Porter (1965) is that class and ethnic background substantially affect a student's chances of getting a university education. Li also cites a 1979 study of over 8,000 Grade 8 to 12 Ontario students by Marion Porter, John Porter and Bernard Blishen. This study found that:

> Students from higher socio-economic families are much more likely to expect to enrol in university. In contrast, among the students with high mental ability, more from lower socio-economic families expect to work after high school. Many other studies have shown that educational plans and vocational decisions are largely determined by the socio-economic background of the students. (Li, 1988, p. 75)

A related 1981 study by Rodney Clifton found that, aside from the well known case of social class, teachers' expectations of students are in subtle ways affected by the stereotypes and status rankings of various ethnic groups and males versus females in society (in Li, 1988). We earlier drew attention to the injuries of the expectancy theory (i.e. self-fulfilling prophecy) in Part One of this literature review.

A correlational analysis of the 1981 Canadian Census data by Li (1988, p. 80) found a moderately strong relationship between ethnicity and years of schooling (R = 0.20). Li also notes that what sometimes appears to be relatively high educational attainment among some (non-white) groups may be more a result of selective immigration policy than improved educational opportunities for ethnic-racial minorities. And using measures of group deviation from the average national income, Li reports that, whether or not foreign- and native-born Canadians are considered together, those of southern European origin and those of non-white origin clearly have the lowest average income levels. Among those of west

European descent, it is only the French who have an average income below the national mean.

Upon exploring the relationship between schooling and earnings for some 17 ethnic groups, Li found that those of Jewish and British descent enjoy the highest returns on each additional year/level of "investment" in schooling. While schooling brings little or no additional earnings for Italians and the Portuguese, Czecks, Slovaks, Chinese and Blacks are among those with the lowest base income (i.e. when the value of schooling is zero). These patterns are generally maintained even when gender and age are controlled for. All this provides further support for the dual labour market literature as noted in the theoretical section of this review. Li's conclusion is that while "the proper meaning of ethnic inequality cannot be fully understood outside the context of a class society," "ethnicity (together with gender) makes a difference to social groups with respect to schooling, earnings, and participation in the class structure" (Li, 1988, pp. 129, 141).

In passing, the first major study of intergenerational mobility in England and Wales was undertaken by David Glass and his associates in 1949. Although the study generally found a fairly high level of short-range intergenerational mobility, it turned in dismal evidence on the degree of openness or equality of opportunity in British society. Much of the mobility was across the skilled manual/lower white collar divide. There was a disturbing degree of self-recruitment in the higher-status categories. Moreover, there was very little evidence of long-range movement upwardly or downwardly. Critics have, however, questioned the representativeness of the sample used in the study, arguing that the findings do not reflect changes in the British occupational structure (and hence structural mobility) in the two decades or so before 1949. Some critics also felt that the post-1944 educational reforms consequent upon the pursuit of liberalization and "parity of esteem" in British secondary education must have made Glass' findings out of date.

The "Oxford Mobility Study" of 1972, led by Goldthorpe at Nuffield College, Oxford, was to help clarify some of these doubts. Netting a national sample of 10,000 men aged 20 to 64, this study used a seven-fold "occupational class categories" based on "market" and "work" situations. The Goldthorpe study produced evidence of long-range mobility (7.1%) from the semi-skilled and unskilled manual "class" to the first "occupational class" category: higher-grade professionals, administrators, managers and large proprietors. Nevertheless, the study still had to face the embarrassment of a large proportion (45.7%) of the sons of "class" I fathers remaining in the same class category in 1972. This high degree of closure or self-recruitment at the top confirms inequality to the extent that a good measure of the openness of a society should consider the number of people dropping from the top. Thus, a presumably high rate of mobility out of the working class exists side by side with elite self-recruitment at the top (together with some 35% of self-recruitment at the bottom).

Goldthorpe takes care to point out that much of the reported mobility is not due to the openness of the British class structure. Instead, it is an enforced mobility resulting from structural changes in the economy and labour processes. The professional-managerial occupations had expanded such that the upper class could not produce enough educated sons and daughters to fill up the new positions in so short a time (for details, see Hamilton and Hirszowicz, 1987, pp. 187-191; Haralambos, 1980, pp. 85-87).

Halsey (1977, 1980), a member of the Oxford study team, uses the 1972 data to examine the articulation of class with education and mobility in Britain. Employing a three-fold class structure (middle, lower middle and working) Halsey (1980, p. 61) reports that the educational norms (private primary schooling, selective secondary schooling, some further education and university degree) for each of the three social classes "are positively related to social class of origin and destination." Thus, "the stable middle-class men are composed 88 percent with selective secondary schooling and 30 percent with a university education, compared with 44 and 1 percent for the stable lower middle class, and 15 and 0.1 percent for the stable working class" (pp. 61-62). Halsey (1977) concludes that "the direct effect of the class hierarchy of families on educational opportunity and certification has risen since the war. And at the same time, the articulation of education to the first entry into the labour market has been tightening." Nevertheless, "social origin or 'ascription' has direct effects on the later career of a man, i.e., family influence does not cease after entry into the labour market" (p. 184).

Citing the last statement in Halsey (1977) may be a good introduction to the revealing conclusion in Halsey (1980). Thus,

> Economic and technical changes since 1945 have enlarged occupational opportunities, but social and educational policy have not successfully seized on these circumstances in such a way as to realize either an egalitarian or a meritocratic society. (Halsey, 1977, p. 184)

One lesson here is that even in a booming economic and occupational structure, the same logic of class privilege operates in changed forms and contexts. This is analogous to the contradictions of educational reforms and/or expansion. In the words of Halsey (1980):

> Expansion there has been . . . . But the anticipated greater equality of access to the national heritage has not materialized . . . . The overall results, on the various measures we have brought to bear, is that inequalities of class opportunity changed their form but retained their substance despite, if not indeed because of, a heavy investment by the state in enlarged educational opportunities. (p. 71)

Anderson and Vervoorn (1983) undertake an extensive review of studies of patterns of participation in Australian post-secondary education since the 1930s. Among the subjects covered are class, female, city/country (i.e. urban/rural) and ethnic participation and prospects. The opening information presented for patterns of class participation sounds rather familiar:

> The socio-economic background of students has been studied more fully than any other factor affecting participation in higher education. Using the holy trinity of sociological indicators of social position--income, occupation and education--the conclusions of the numerous studies that have been carried out are clear and unambiguous: university students and, to a lesser extent, college of advanced education students, are of above average socio-economic status, with a much higher proportion of students coming from professional and managerial families than would be expected on the basis of the proportion of those occupations in the work force, and a much lower proportion of students coming from families in which the breadwinner is a skilled or unskilled manual worker. The privileges, prestige and affluence to which higher education usually give access tend accordingly to remain in the social strata already possessing them. (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, p. 129)

There are other details revealed in the range of literature reviewed by these authors. Indeed, some families took university entrance and a professional career for granted, whereas there is evidence that many gifted students from unskilled and semi-skilled families (particularly the daughters) who completed secondary school and took the matriculation examination did not go on to university (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, pp. 131-132).

Inter-faculty/inter-discipline variations in the class composition of students were also reported. Data for all Australia, 1965-67, show that:

> The largest differences were between teaching and the other three professions. Teacher trainees had the smallest proportion of fathers who held professional or managerial positions, and the largest proportion who were manual workers. A high proportion of engineering students had fathers who were small-scale businessmen, while medicine and law students tended more than students in the other faculties to have fathers in the professions. Differences between the faculties in terms of parents' education followed a similar pattern . . . . Studies of students' fathers' incomes also produced a status ranking of faculties. Law and medicine averaged the highest incomes and teaching and engineering the lowest. (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, pp. 137-138; my emphasis)

Within the overall purview of the selective composition of the university-going population, then, students of lower socio-economic backgrounds who do make it to university "tend to be concentrated in faculties of the less prestigious professions, such as education, engineering and commerce" (p. 149). Although a 1973 report by O. McKevitt and G. Douglas found that the occupational background of female education students in the University of Western Australia tended to be higher than that of males (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, p.141), we have been advised in the case of Canadian women in full-time paid employment that this actually reflects gender selectivity more than anything else (Boyd, 1985).

On the literature dealing with women, Anderson and Vervoorn (1983) find that "participation by women in higher education has increased considerably over the years and is approaching parity" (p. 44). This participation, however, tends to decrease as one goes up the educational ladder: both within the higher degree category and in the university staff hierarchy. Nevertheless, just as the overall higher-education population, female students as a group tend "disproportionately to come from the city rather than the country, to have attended a private rather than a public school, and to be of high socio-economic background" (p. 59).

We can paraphrase the remainder of the evidence. There is a very uneven distribution of the sexes across courses. For whatever reasons, girls are inclined to choose humanities and human sciences, while boys tend to choose physical sciences and mathematics. Again, explanation notwithstanding, motivational data suggest that female students are more interested than men in those courses and careers which provide opportunities for social service and working with people. For their part, male students are more interested not only in dealing with abstractions and manipulating the physical world, but in such external attributes of jobs as prestige, salary, security and the opportunity for advancement. Even within particular career tracks, men and women will often be seen to pursue different sorts of specialization. The explanatory divide is between those who suggest biological make-up and those who posit social learning. A few take a relational, that is, an in-between perspective. It is sounding like the nature-nurture controversy over intellectual ability. A culture-lag theory places the blame on the socialization of girls for an antiquated culture, probably for the future benefit of (not to say exploitation by) patriarchy.

In passing, data on the high school backgrounds of higher education students show that those from wealthier and professional families tended to have come from expensive non-Catholic private schools (as against public high schools and inexpensive Catholic private schools), and then to have gone on straight to university (rather than teachers' colleges or other colleges of advanced education), where they are disproportionately numerous in law and medicine. Anderson and Vervoorn suggest that it would be both risky and dangerous to try to "prove" the dominant factor here by pretending to isolate and measure (recall the obsession with "explained variance" in regression methodology, especially path analysis in the fashion of the Duncan-Blau/Sewell structural-functional status attainment model) the effect of any one of economic, attitudinal, psychological, high school traditional/orientational as well as university administrative/bureaucratic factors. Whatever the case is, public-sector high schools like Melbourne High School and Fort Street High School in Sydney "have been as selective as many academic private schools, maintaining high retention rates and regularly producing top class examination results" (p. 78).

We turn to the geography of higher educational participation in Australia. We are informed that, like the population but more so, Australian universities cluster along the coastal cities. Out of a total of 19 universities, only two (University of New England, Armidale, and Australian National University, Canberra) are not located along the seaboard; fewer than a dozen of the 70 or so colleges of advanced education are situated inland.

Talking about rural under-representation in universities, as in everything else, a distinction has to be made "between the effect due to locality and that due to social class, which is correlated to some extent with where people live" (p. 35). The materially disadvantaged urban poor, or the slum areas of cities generally, frequently share with rural dwellers the same social or cultural distance from schools and universities. Thus, intra-metropolitan differences in higher-education participation can be "explained in terms of the combined effects of socio-economic disparities between suburbs, location of the institution and proximity of public transport" (p. 85).

In the case of rural under-representation, however, the contribution of limited provision or physical accessibility is generally far greater than in the city. Also, there are the added effects of material indisposition and structurally conditioned priorities and values regarding education and employment, all of which make staying on in school rather irrational for those who do not intend to finally leave the country for the city. There are two main indications of city and country students. One is normal place of residence; the other is location of school attended. Although many studies use one or the other measure, the two can yield different results to the extent that a significant number of senior school students who live in country areas go to city boarding schools. We note here that whereas the urban poor can walk to school/university from home, the country poor must finance a new residence (private apartment or boarding school) in order to enjoy same.

Returning to Anderson and Vervoorn (1983), their review found that while in urban centres the degree of social advantage of the feeder area of the school attended has a strong effect on the rate of entry to university, in rural areas it appears to make no difference: whether or not the feeder area of the school attended is ranked as socially advantaged or disadvantaged, country students are very unlikely to go to university (p. 87). This evidence comes from a 1978 report by Neville Behrens, who investigated the important question of the interaction between country residence and socio-economic background. Because country children attending boarding schools in the city or elsewhere are merely campers or sojourners, Behrens counts them as country students. Behrens also found that while the urban poor tended to pursue technical and vocational courses in colleges of advanced education, the rural poor (or relatively poor) would be found more in colleges of teacher education. However, a 1962 report by W.C. Radford had stated that the proportion of city and country students entering teachers' colleges varied markedly from state to state without a discernible pattern of dominance by either group. And a 1972 report, based on the University of Melbourne, found that country student participation was relatively high in engineering and science, but lower in law and medicine (in Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, pp. 91, 93).

Furthermore, a 1976 report by the Australian Schools Commission suggests that three sets of factors are responsible for the lower educational prospects among country children:

> First, the geographic isolation of both the family and the school, which deprives the student of the variety of cultural and social influences and experiences available to urban students of similar socio-economic and educational standing; second, lower educational expectations held by the student's family, the student, and the local community, "expectations" which at least partly reflect the reality of poor vocational opportunities available to rural children; and third,

> disadvantage arising from the lower level of educational provision in many country areas. (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, p. 95)

These authors then go on to suggest that, given their limited range of life opportunities, the country areas may need more than just increased resources, better facilities, new technology and specialist staff. "Perhaps country areas will only be revitalized by radical alterations of social arrangements and living patterns in which education would be just a small part" (p. 95).

One or two additional points before we end this rather lengthy overview of the extensive, but evidently serviceable, review of the Australian literature. In respect of type and level of post-secondary education, Anderson and Vervoorn raise an issue which could guide any investigator so disposed:

> To what extent, then, are part-time and external students different from those who study full-time? Do part-time and external courses provide opportunities for students whose background and personal circumstances make full-time study difficult--students from those social groups who are under-represented in full-time study, such as women, country students, those of working class background, Aborigines and southern European migrants? (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, p. 150)

They observe that access to graduate study increasingly affects life chances, but caution that higher degrees are not equally important for career purposes in all fields: scholarly (academic and/or research) careers versus professional qualification in medicine, law, architecture, dentistry and engineering. What this means is that anyone investigating rates of participation in higher degree study should keep in view the career aspirations of students and the relevance of higher qualifications to the attainment of those aspirations.

Thus, a 1976 nation-wide comparison of the occupational background of higher degree and new university undergraduates in Australia revealed startling results. One, male higher degree students were substantially less likely than new male undergraduate students to have fathers who were either professionals, employers or managers (54.5% versus 60.9%). Two, for female students, it was the reverse: 65.3 percent of higher degree and 60.3 percent of new undergraduate female students had fathers in those categories. Anderson and Vervoorn (1983, p. 161) speculate that the relatively low representation of the upper or middle classes among Australian male higher degree students could be because "some professional and managerial families find careers in business or the professions more attractive than careers in academic research." They then go on to argue that "the study and career structure of bright male and female students varies somewhat according to socio-economic background" (p. 161).

> Thus bright male students of lower socio-economic background go on to study for a higher degree after completing an honours course, while those of higher socio-economic background simply obtain the honours degree and then (as we have seen elsewhere) tend to enter a profession or go into business. For bright female students, the pattern is different: those of higher socio-economic background study at the honours level and then (particularly if they have a mother with a university education) go on to higher study; those of lower socio-economic background, however, undertake an honours degree with much less frequency and consequently cannot proceed to a higher degree. (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983, pp. 161-162)

All this suggests that gender and class sometimes interact to produce startling results in type and level of schooling, and the educational/occupational attainment of mothers could make a difference in the educational/career prospects of daughters.

Garnier and Raffalovich (1984) use French census data to determine the presence or otherwise of equal educational opportunities against a background of the evidence reported for industrial nations. They first state that if equality of educational opportunities, as a concept, "is taken to mean the level of educational attainment, then educational opportunities have increased in the course of the twentieth century" in "virtually all industrialized societies and many developing nations as well" (p. 1). However, if the concept is seen, more correctly, as the independence of the child's educational attainment from social origins, there is the least consensus in findings.

> In Austria, Haller (1981) found a decrease in the pattern of association between father's occupation and son's education for the period 1945-71. A similar pattern has been documented by Halsey (1975) in England and by Hauser and Featherman (1976) in the United States, although an earlier study by Spady (1967) has documented the existence of an increase in the mean educational attainment which separates socio-economic groups. Mare's (1981) reanalysis of the OCGII data led him to conclude that, net of change in the marginal distribution of education, there has been an increasing dependence of educational attainment on social origins. In Hungary, Simkus and Andorka (1982) documented no increase in socio-economic differentials in educational attainment over time, while in Germany, Muller (1979) found a small reduction over time in the association between origins and educational attainment. (Garnier and Raffalovich, 1984, p. 1)

We are further informed that the selection of different variables, different methods of analysis and different designs (e.g. diachronic versus synchronic) do affect the consistency of the empirical findings. Thus, cross-national comparisons have yet to establish any clear patterns of differences between societies, together with the reasons which might account for similarities and differences (pp. 1-2).

After analyzing the data on the French population born between 1874 and 1954, the authors reach the following conclusions:

> Our analysis confirms the findings of those studies done in Britain, Germany and the United States: the educational expansion that has taken place over the twentieth century has not enormously altered differential access to education based on

> social origins, except for sons of farmers and for women. Obviously, everyone has received more schooling, but the relative chances of farmers' children versus children of upper-manual families to attend a university are still significantly smaller. Their disadvantage has decreased, however. Possibly, the changes that have taken place in agriculture have involved the removal of the most marginal farmers. Hence, our findings probably measure that, with time, farmers' children originated from increasingly affluent backgrounds. (Garnier and Raffalovich, 1984, p. 9)

The authors could not establish any dominant pattern for French women. Females who went to schools shortly before or during World War II "experienced greater equality of access net of origins than did either their predecessors or subsequent cohorts" (p. 9). The authors end by suggesting that, in spite of the reported similarity of findings in industrialized countries, the processes or mechanisms through which such inequality is transmitted might actually be different.

Levin (1984) reports on the potential equalization impact of schooling on educational opportunity and labour market outcomes. He informs us that empirical evidence for the United States (Haveman, ed., 1977), western Europe (Levin, 1976), and Latin America (Carnoy, 1978) "indicates that educational attainments were more nearly equalized without the expected improvement in earnings" (Levin, 1984, p. 11). The earnings distribution actually became more unequal in several Latin American countries (see also Carnoy, 1979). Analyzing data on El Salvador and a simulated model of earnings life-cycle, Levin (1984) reveals that high SES males, generally and at every level of schooling, enjoy higher returns on "investment in human capital" than middle and low SES males, more so in the private (as against the public) sector. The lesson here is that even the equalization of educational attainments will not in itself equalize incomes, let alone power and privilege. Newer bases of recruitment and reward will simply reformulate and retain the substance of class, gender, urban-rural, and ethnic-racial domination.

To balance this industrial-nation review with the other side of the ideological divide, we look, finally, at Nigel Grant's overview of education and equality in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Grant (1980) observes at the outset that as these countries are avowed examples of the pursuit of equality of all kinds (sometimes complementary, at other times conflicting, but always relevant to the general principle), their experience will help us to appreciate both the possibilities and the practical difficulties of achieving equality through political power. Grant informs us that women make up between 40 and 50 percent of the labour force in most of the Eastern European countries. "All jobs except the physically heaviest are open to them, at the same pay as men. They have equal rights in family law and, since equality need not mean sameness, special provisions are built into the labour codes to ensure suitable working conditions" (p.252). As for the paradigmatic nation, the U.S.S.R., equality of the sexes in "all spheres of social life," including jobs and education, is officially supported by such measures as paid maternity leave, provision of nurseries and kindergarten, as well as the right to work on the same terms as men.

Much as the details vary from country to country, women generally do as well as men through most of the educational process. All schooling is co-educational, but girls tend to be in the majority in the post-compulsory-cycle, academic upper secondary schools. Boys, on the other hand, tend to predominate in the technical secondary schools. Higher education cuts a good enough, but still uneven, picture of gender parity.

> In the Soviet Union, women students made up 51 percent of the student body in 1977, having increased steadily from 44 percent in the mid-1960s, and in lower-level institutions the figure was 55 percent. There are variations according to field of study: in 1977 women comprised 68 percent of the students in education, 63 percent in economics and law, and only 33 percent in agriculture; but even in engineering, one of the best-paid and most highly regarded professions, the figure was 40 percent. Elsewhere, the proportion of women in higher education is slightly lower: over 46 percent in Poland, 44 in Romania, 41 in Czechoslovakia and 47 in the German Democratic Republic, the last two being increases from 37 percent at the beginning of the 1970s. (Grant 1980, pp. 252-253)

Nevertheless, Soviet and Polish males are twice as numerous as women at the post-graduate level. And although Soviet women make up about 40 percent of the academic and research staff, they are disproportionately concentrated in junior posts. While the great majority of teachers everywhere are women, and much as Soviet women hold a majority of headships at the primary level and assistant headships at the secondary level, over two-thirds of secondary-level heads are men. Aside from the expansion of part-time courses, some combination of academic, political, social class, geographical and work-experience criteria is used to boost the admission of children of workers and peasants to higher education throughout the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Yet the social and regional composition of higher-education students is still tilted in favour of children of professional, intellectual, senior military and party-state bureaucratic elites, as well as city (as against country) dwellers. Saddled with problems such as lower standards of living and amenity, difficulty in procuring or keeping specialist teachers, as well as poorer schools offering a narrower range of courses, country children are at a disadvantage when competing for places in higher education. And academic performance carries great weight when it comes to the recruitment and training of professional-technical personnel for research and industrial development. Indeed, the fact of raising the entry of children of workers and peasants through non-academic criteria still may not guarantee successful completion.

In conclusion, Grant notes that, overall, these Soviet-block countries "have been more successful than many others in opening up their educational systems to previously deprived groups, but are still some way from achieving equality" (Grant, 1980, p. 259). Financial constraints apart, the practical problems include conflicts between particular egalitarian policies (e.g. the interests of girls versus those of working-class boys), and the contradictions inherent in reconciling long-term politico-social objectives with pressing shorter-term needs for trained personnel and economic growth. Even with the best of intentions, the structure of the system allows for equality but does not guarantee it. Lastly,

> What happens in schools does not so much create as reflect social reality, and these are not yet egalitarian societies. Those seeking evidence from the east that educational change can accomplish major social reconstruction are bound to be disappointed; but some encouragement may be had from the ability of education to help the process along. (Grant, 1980, pp. 259-260)

It would appear that whether it be in the Western capitalist or the Eastern socialist industrial nations, both change and stability in educational participation and outcomes characterize the large-scale reforms, expansion or so-called schooling revolution since the mid-century. Although the details appear to vary in favour of the Eastern-block countries, and although contradictory findings abound and cross-national comparisons do not always establish clear patterns, the overall picture is that class, gender, urban-rural and ethnic-racial inequalities in educational opportunity have changed their form but still retain their substance. We return to detailed conclusions after the following section on developing nations. For now, the fact that equality of educational opportunity is still elusive in countries with several decades (and, for some, nearly two centuries) of some compulsory universal schooling raises concerns about the possibilities of achieving the same in non-industrial and impoverished countries--especially as higher education has "exploded" even though universal primary education (UPE) may not be achieved until the next century.

The Literature on Developing Countries

> That prodigious economic inequalities exist in virtually all of the developing countries of the capitalist [and even socialist] world is a fact that hardly needs documentation. Typically, a very large portion of the populations of these countries live at subsistence levels, while a small elite command income and wealth that enable them to live their lives in palatial luxury. In between is a relatively small middle class that has risen above survival levels, but that is precariously susceptible to inflation and underemployment or unemployment while being far removed from the lofty and relatively secure situation of the much smaller, wealthy elite. Typically, the poorest 40 to 60 percent of the population in these countries is receiving only 10 to 15 percent of the national income, while the richest 20 percent is receiving about 40 to 60 percent and the richest 5 percent is receiving about 20 to 40 percent. (Levin, 1982, p. 21)

Just as we did in the last one-fifth of the immediately preceding section, we begin this section with internationally focused studies. Husen (1987) examines the relationship between higher education and social stratification in an international comparative study. We shall simply summarize and critique some of his findings and conclusions. Higher-education institutions in Third- World countries serve what in many cases are still subsistence economies with a very limited "modern" sector. Unlike the pattern in most developed economies where post-primary enrolment from the late nineteenth century increased slowly and in a linear fashion until the explosion after the 1950s, secondary and university enrolment in most developing countries have tended to expand rapidly even though universal primary schooling remains a dream in many of these countries.

Rather controversially, Husen (1987, p. 64) claims that "home background tends in Third-World countries to have less impact on access, survival and outcomes of secondary and higher education than in industrialized countries." The explanation he gives, following Foster (1977), is the alleged immaturity (or, indeed, absence) of social stratification in Third-World countries. Their social structure is said to be merely one of social differentiation on a diversified, traditional-cum-modern basis. Having made this assumption, it is then reasoned that "cultural capital" differentiation is yet to crystalize to the extent of class-related differentials in self-image, values, lifestyles, educational tradition and attitudes toward schooling. I think that there is a mix-up here. First, if school factors are found to greatly affect educational access, progress and outcomes in developing nations, this does not automatically "prove" that home factors are either equal or do not make substantial differences. Even Coleman himself is now saying that schools make a lot of difference in educational opportunity in the United States (Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore, 1982; Coleman and Hoffer, 1987). Secondly, much of the difference attributed to school factors is actually "contaminated" by the differences due to home effects before and during selection for schooling. And there frequently is a rough correspondence between the kinds of schools that pupils attend and the homes from which they come.

Closely related to the above, the influence of home factors on educational opportunity in Third-World countries will not be appreciated if we choose to ignore the extent of material deprivation in the homes of children who do not attend school at all. By far, a major evidence of the selectivity of the school population (notwithstanding within-group social class differences) in developing countries is that secondary and especially higher-education enrolments have exploded even as some families and generations are yet to send their first kid to elementary school. Of course, it is plain ethnocentric narrow-mindedness to imply that social stratification does not exist in developing countries simply because their social structure does not mirror the supposedly perfect model of the industrial nations. Not surprisingly, then, while Husen tells us that parental occupational status and parental education are the two main empirically established dimensions of educational inequality in industrialized countries, he informs us that "in the developing countries the following social background dimensions of inequality can be identified: (1) rural/urban residence, (2) income, (3) gender, (4) ethnicity" (Husen, 1987, pp. 34-35). This, obviously, is an artificial divide. The theoretical and empirical literature so far reviewed makes it clear that the two sets of educational inequalities will be found everywhere.

Groth (1987) examines the extent to which, by the unifying force of Marxist-Leninist ideological commitments, the fledgling socialist states of the Third World might share, amongst themselves and with the prototypical, communist systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, certain distinctive commonalities in educational policy and practice. Not infrequently, educational mobilization is to the Marxist state a major weapon in the ideological, economic, and cultural reconstruction of society: moulding the socialist human; eliminating the remnants of bourgeois and/or feudal mentality; raising the productivity of labour power; promoting equality between the sexes; resolving the contradictions between city and country, mental and manual labour; as well as defending socialism against capitalist imperialism in all its forms. Educational development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has thus tended to be characterized by the following elements:

> 1. High ratio of population-in-school to total population.
> 2. High ratio of preschool children enrolled in institutions of formal education.
> 3. High ratio of persons in primary education to total population.
> 4. A substantial but significantly lower percentage of people in the more academic, competitive institutions of secondary education.
> 5. High ratio of persons enrolled in higher education.
> 6. High degree of female participation at all levels of education among both students and teachers.
> 7. Relatively low student-teacher ratios at all levels of education (few students per teacher).
> 8. High aggregate ratio of teachers to population. (Groth, 1987, p. 330)

Using education data from UNESCO's Statistical Year Book of 1983, Groth demonstrates that in aggregate terms the nine Third-World Marxist-Leninist states examined (in Asia: South Yemen, Laos, Vietnam, China and Mongolia; in Africa: Angola, Congo, Mozambique and Ethiopia) have matched most of the above-mentioned characteristics evidenced by their Soviet-orbit counterparts. As a form of research control, Groth attempts to relate the experiences of Third-World and European communist states to the data for some 57 comparison nations drawn from capitalist Europe, Asia and Africa on the basis of equivalent GNP data and World Bank classifications as low income, middle income, or developed. Overall, the Marxist states (European and Third-World) out-perform the 57-nation comparison group on nearly all counts, though more so for the European Marxist states. Furthermore, there is, for each level of educational practice examined, a wider ratio of difference between the best/highest and the worst/lowest comparison-nation group, than the gap between the best and worst Third-World communist states.

Groth also compares thresholds for the Marxist Third-World and the 57-nation comparison group. In pre-primary enrolments, the poorest Marxist performer, Laos, actually ranks ahead of seven comparison nations. In primary enrolments, the worst communist state, Ethiopia, beats 12 of the 57 comparison nations. In secondary enrolments, the weakest Marxist state, Mozambique, is ahead of some 27 percent of the 55 comparison states reporting the necessary data. It is in higher education that the worst Marxist state, Mozambique, is outperformed by the entire 57 comparison group members. As for the match-up of the best cases in each category, the leading Marxist state in primary and secondary education enrolments, Congo, is ahead of all 57-nation cohorts. Save for Cape Verd, Marxist Angola leads everybody else in pre-primary enrolments. In third-level enrolment, however, the leading Marxist state, Mongolia, is exceeded by four comparison nations.

Groth notes that the remarkable thing about the Marxist Third-World states is that they have been able to achieve such educational advance in spite of differences in their economic capabilities. "Indeed, given the enormous diversity of geographic, cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics among the Marxist systems, the unifying impact of their common ideological commitments appears very impressive" (Groth, 1987, p. 343). Groth does point out, however, that whereas the Eastern European systems, in comparison with their capitalist cohorts, excel in university-level enrolments and lag in secondary enrolments, the Third-World Marxists follow the reverse course *vis-a-vis* their capitalist equivalents. What he leaves unexamined is the social class composition of the students, as well as the forms of stratification which may exist between and within schools. Growth is not the same thing as distribution. Aggregate enrolment figures remain faceless to the extent that they do not tell us whether the dismantling of feudal and/or bourgeois elements has given rise to new sources of inequality in military officers, party-state bureaucrats and intellectuals.

White (1981) draws attention to the emergent forms of class struggle over higher educational opportunity in presumably socialist China. Successive attempts by the Chinese government to equalize social opportunities by redistributing access to higher education have generally been bogged down by an ensemble of contradictions. There is the clash between "meritocratic egalitarianism" (selection on the basis of talent) and "redistributive egalitarianism" (giving more to the labouring, peasant classes who traditionally have had less). There is the policy clash between the long-term socio-political goal of equality and the pressing need for technical-professional personnel in the immediate realization of modernization and economic growth. The trajectory and contradictory manifestations of these competing claims on socialist policy and project are informed by the struggle between party-state officials and the intelligentsia for ideological and material dominance over the means of their own creation and reproduction.

Arnove (1984) outlines the concrete realizations of the foregoing macro-level empirical study of educational practice in China. Without doubt, and especially during the Great Leap Forward, 1958-60, and the Cultural Revolution decade, 1966-76, China has, on a scale unparalleled by any developing country, engaged in mass mobilization to extend educational, medical and cultural benefits to its rural populations (Arnove, 1984, p. 385). Yet there remains ample urban bias in the quality of schools, in the allocation of government funds to education, in the composition of students, in the financial capabilities of families, and in the relative cost of attaining the same level of schooling. The ostensibly meritocratic elitist key-point schools and universities are located in urban areas, endowed with the best facilities and equipment, and disproportionately attended by the offspring of urban, wealthy, intellectual, senior military and senior party-state families.

> According to the New China News Agency, of the entering class of 2,000 students at Beijing University in 1979, 39 percent came from families of cadres and army officers, although these two groups make up less than 5 percent of the overall population. Another 11 percent of the first-year class were offspring of intellectuals, who constitute perhaps 2.5 percent of the population. (Arnove, 1984, p. 389; "cadres" are government and party functionaries)

Thus, the post-1976 return to selective key-point schools and streamed classes, in the context of the broader politico-economic pursuit of Four Modernizations (defense, industry, agriculture, and science and technology), is reinforcing the educational and social inequalities of the poor, workers, peasants and rural dwellers generally. Nonetheless, China is credited with overcoming gender disparities in primary-school enrolment since 1979 or so.

Arnove (1984) suggests that while China in aggregate terms seems to have performed better than India in the pursuit of equal educational and social opportunity, the details are nearly the same. Both countries share high wastage (drop-out/push-out) and stagnation (failure and repetition) rates at the elementary school level, as well as at subsequent levels. But it is 60 percent for Indian primary schools and 40 percent for the Chinese. Female participation in higher education is low and approximately the same for both countries. However, China's 70 to 75 percent literacy rate is clearly ahead of the 35 percent achieved by India within the same 1950-1980 period. Although its less than 800 million population is below the over 1.1 billion figure for China, more than half of the world's illiterates are currently found in India. Inequalities in male-female, urban-rural and caste-noncaste education are deepening. Unlike the strong mobilizational Chinese party-state, India's weak, variegated state has never really undertaken any fundamental social reforms or projects. Unemployment of school leavers is particularly acute among university and higher education graduates in India. It is junior and middle school graduates who have a similar problem in China.

We have noted the class selectivity of the key-point schools and universities in China. This implies that a two-tier system of education is emerging, one tier catering to the mass of poor and largely rural populations, and the elitist tier serving the privileged and mainly urban families.

> In India, the elite system is most frequently comprised of private English-medium schools or government of India schools, for the children of civil servants, that feed into prestigious institutions of higher learning (such as Indian Institutes of Technology, IITs, and Indian Institutes of Management, IIMs). Mostly middle-and upper-class children from the families of those with political and economic influence attend these schools. (Arnove, 1984, p. 389)

Kumar (1987, pp. 30-31) offers a similar passage. He pieces the elite reproduction routes together as follows: expensive private schools, within the government school system, "Sainik" schools (for children of the military), "central" schools (for children of the central government's civil servants), as well as "gifted" children's schools and "model" schools, which are supposed to lead the way that the common schools should follow. These routes, with predictable regularity, pass through elite institutions at the higher education level and thence on to elite positions in the Indian civil service, business and industry.

Unlike the Chinese case, the Indian policy is that a revolution in education precedes any fundamental change in the political-structural profile of the country (Chakrabartty, 1973, p. 4). Kamat (1985, p. 127) informs us that, much as considerable quantitative expansion (i.e. a wider spread of education) has taken place, this expansion has been within the old social framework and so has simply accentuated and intensified the basic contradictions inherent in the social system. Little qualitative improvement has taken place in the schooling received by the mass of poor, rural citizens, urban slums, scheduled castes and tribes; and educational advance has not made any substantial stride toward equality of educational opportunity (p. 131).

In the words of Bhagwati (1985), moreover,

> . . . the higher-income groups confer an unequal advantage on their children by being able to invest more money in their education either by giving them better-quality education through more expensive private schools or by that common Indian phenomenon of hiring private tutors to improve performance at critical competitive examinations such as the Matriculation, the Intermediate Science and Bachelor's Degree level examinations. (p. 200)

The economic return from the education of girls are lower for low-income families, particularly as "girls typically marry and merge into their husbands' families, whereas boys generally in a patrilineal society are supposed to look after their own parents in old age" (p. 188). As a result of this socio-cultural factor, poorer parents generally choose to invest in the education of their male offspring, thus further accentuating gender inequalities in schooling. Again, the opportunity costs of education (including sacrificing domestic female labour for school hours) tend to be higher and the benefits lower, the lower the income group. Unemployment and underemployment tend to be concentrated in the lower-income groups, who obviously have greater difficulty in finding jobs, and who, in a scarce job situation, would take the first thing that comes. As with every other area of subsidization, educational subsidies from the government would continue to be enjoyed disproportionately by higher- and middle-income students (after all, the state subsidizes higher education more than primary schooling), unless they are allocated directly to low-income groups. The said groups also need quota-wise reservations of public- and private-sector jobs. Mainly by reason of economic capability and political clout, high-income groups are best placed to take advantage of state-subsidized opportunities that presume everybody has a fair chance in the contest (Bhagwati, 1985, pp. 192-198).

Johnstone and Jiyono (1983) examine the association of out-of-school factors with educational achievement in Indonesia. They follow J.P. Keeves in conceptualizing home environment into the structural dimension (parental occupation, education and material possessions), the process dimension (home activities related to learning), and the attitudinal dimension (school-related educational support and aspirations of parents and significant others). As long as we understand that this separation is easier at the level of theory than it is on the terrain of practice, the value of the schema is that materially poor families/ students are capable of high educational aspirations (as against the more important issue of expectations), and the newly rich illiterate businessman/woman may not have built a tradition of school-related home activities and values. We must not take this too far, because the newly-rich can take a short cut by purchasing the regular service of a private home tutor, or by sending the kids off to expensive, residential private schools.

The other thing which Johnstone and Jiyono point out is that the effects of home background must not be seen in unitary terms. They follow Samuel Bowles (who had sought to correct the impression--schools make no difference--created by the Coleman Report) in suggesting that home background factors may be more influential in predicting language performance, reading comprehension and general academic aptitude, than in predicting achievement in the sciences and mathematics. School factors are said to be better predictors of the latter two than they are of the former three. Again, we should note that mathematically inclined parents would tend to favour the kinds of toys, home games and activities that fall in line with mathematical logic.

Two other out-of-school factors were also brought into a comparative analysis with home background: individual characteristics, such as age, sex, I.Q. and school experience/history; and, student attitudes toward school and learning, including self-regard and academic motivation. Employing step-wise multiple regression analysis, followed with more precise illuminations using commonality analysis (a method which explores the relative effects of conceptually homogeneous clusters of variables, as distinct from the effect/variation that the clusters have in common or as individual variables), the authors reveal that: (a) home background factors are better predictors of school achievement than are either individual characteristics or student attitudes toward schooling; (b) home process factor produces the greatest individual effect on achievement, but its combination with the home structural factor is the best predictor of achievement in commonality analysis; and (c) the set of home background factors predict achievement in language and social studies much more than in mathematics. For mathematics, the set of individual characteristics appears to be a better predictor. Considering that I.Q. is normally "contaminated" by home background (i.e. environment), it was removed from the set of individual characteristics. The power of explanation for all subjects was found to immediately transfer to the set of home background factors.

The conclusion is that schools, homes and personal factors are all important in determining achievement levels. The complementary nature of the school and the home means that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate the influence stemming from these institutions. I would add that, more often than not, kids attend the school whose quality roughly corresponds with the educative and material convenience of their homes.

Samoff (1979) underscores the close connection between educational opportunity and class situation in Tanzania. He says that we must move beyond concerns with how many children go to school (what I have labelled faceless statistics on educational expansion) and explore the more important issue of who gets into school. He first notes that, in Tanzania, education is the major route to power and wealth, "but access to this is far from equitably distributed across regions, age groups, social strata, religions and ethnic clusters" (Samoff, 1979, p. 47). He immediately points out that the more important question is that "differential access to education has facilitated the perpetuation of a particular pattern of social stratification, which in turn has fostered class differentiation" (p. 47).

After reviewing evidence for Kilimanjaro's regional and class advantages in education, as well as the constitution of the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie and their articulation with the Tanzanian state, Samoff reveals that differential access to education in Tanzania produces the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (borrowing from Issa G. Shivji), that is, citizens whose political, administrative and managerial positions enable them to gain substantial economic leverage and control over the local economy. Control over state power has been the primary mechanism for securing class power. Samoff's conclusion is that differential access to education in Tanzania has been a mechanism of class formation and reproduction.

Not so for Rathgeber (1985), whose study of Kenyan medical education/students claims that Africa does not have a "hereditary aristocracy" (to borrow from Husen, 1987) of professional elites.

> When studying the development of professional elites in most African countries, it is more useful to think in terms of cultural "production" than "reproduction." Commonly, African professional classes are the first generation, and there is no patrimonial elite such as the one described by Maxwell in the Thai medical establishment. Members of African professional elites are likely to come from heterogenous backgrounds, and selection into professional classes is more likely to be directly related to education than to a combination of education and other background variables. (Rathgeber, 1985, p. 300)

This tendency to generalize to all Africa from the presumed experience of one country is in the tradition of the "mini-max" principle (Anderson and Frideres, 1981, p. 76), which enables the ready application of ethnocentric stereotypes. If the paper under reference had any sense of history, it should have recognized that Kenya is more likely to be an exception rather than the rule. Colonial suppression/exclusion was most pronounced, and anti-colonial struggle bloodiest there. Remarkably, the same Rathgeber does recognize that cultural production is linked with the maintenance of existing structures of inequality and dependence (social, political, economic) both on a national and on an international level.

Hughes (1987) is more cautious about the issue of production versus reproduction in Kenyan higher education. His study examines the extent to which family background affects the post-graduation experiences of Kenyan university students. Overall, women who attend the University of Nairobi are disproportionately from advantaged backgrounds: 28.1 percent higher class, 35.1 percent middle class, and 36.8 percent lower class. For men, the corresponding figures are 7.7 percent, 30.0 percent and 62.3 percent. What all this means is that whereas a privileged background can attenuate the social disadvantages of being female, being male can and does negotiate the exclusionary effects of coming from a lower-class background. This is in line with our notion of the contradictory intersections of class, gender, ethnicity and race in the forms that domination and inequality take (see Part One for details).

Returning to Hughes, micro-level analysis suggests that socio-economically privileged graduates are more likely to have families with contacts best able to provide access to high-level employment. In addition, they have the material convenience and the social network to extend the job search process, to continue schooling while looking around, or else to finance emigration to countries with greater opportunities. The class factors in operation may be hidden if the class location of supportive kinsmen is not recognized. Hughes suggests that it is probably because familial clientelist relationships cut across class lines that there is limited evidence of social class reproduction in the data analyzed. He speculates, however, that class formation and reproduction would become more evident as the labour market tightens--a process already underway.

Bach, Gadalla, Khattab and Gulick (1985) examine the influence of mothers' educational attainment on the educational plans and orientations of daughters. The assumption here is that by transmitting new sets of knowledge, values, attitudes and norms, educated mothers are better able than uneducated mothers to prepare their daughters (and children generally) for participation in a new socio-economic order found in the urban sector of Third-World countries. Exposure to new forms of interaction in schools generally results in changes in style of maternal behaviour. The authors reveal, both conceptually and empirically, that daughters' educational goals or intentions are influenced directly and indirectly by mothers' educational and occupational attainments, acting independently and jointly with fathers' occupational attainment, mothers' notion of ideal age for marriage, as well as level of praise and self-confidence acquired in the home. They conclude that there are several mutually reinforcing linkage factors, which indicate multiple causal relationships. It is regretted, however, that they do not have the composite time-series data to test a causal model of these relationships.

Cooksey (198[illegible] examines the association of social class and academic performance in the Cameroun. He first informs us that the "debate over educational selectivity in Africa has so far been inconclusive as regards identifying a definite tendency toward the emergence of a class-based selection system" (p. 403). He then suggests that one reason for this inconclusiveness is the preference which researchers exhibit for studying high school and university students over primary pupils.

> By concentrating on the very few who have survived the selection process we ignore the major features of that process, namely, variations in access to primary school, take-up and drop-out rates, and secondary school entrance examination performance. (Cooksey, 1981, p. 403)

Findings claiming correlations in the "unexpected" directions have led to misleading conclusions "that class subcultures which might affect performance have not yet emerged in Africa, so that performance reflects ability much more than in Western countries" (pp. 403-404).

To correct this apparent error, Cooksey suggests that studies should be conducted in contexts which relate enrolment and performance inequalities/variations to the overall process of social selection. Previous studies have revealed that when primary enrolment levels are low, those who manage to remain in school are either of above average ability or are from unusually high socio-economic backgrounds. As a result, Cooksey locates his investigation in an area of high overall primary enrolment. The findings reveal that, in such a context, social background overwhelmingly determines who scales the selection examination to secondary school. There is also a link between coming from manual or farm background and attending technical (rather than academic) secondary school. As well, levels of parental education and the use of French in the home were also found to be closely related to class background.

Niles (1981) turns in similar evidence on high school achievement in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The author first draws attention to the debate regarding the association between social class and school achievement in Third-World countries. The evidence gathered so far has been equivocal, yet many scholars appear to take the position that SES and academic achievement are unrelated.

> But it is also important to examine the relationship between home and school and the way in which they interact to influence children's achievement. . . . If children of affluent parents all attend the well-equipped schools, and the majority of the impoverished children have access only to poorer schools, then the relationship between school resources and achievement could in effect be the influence of the SES composition of the school population. (Niles, 1981, p. 422)

This is the linkage explored in the present study. Niles feels it is wrong to assume that school factors are actually separable from home factors. The findings, based on measures of various factors associated with family SES, reveal substantial relationships between these SES factors and school achievement and, for that matter, even greater than that generally reported in the industrialized West. It is concluded that differences in social class are linked both directly and indirectly, via school, to achievement.

Selvaratnam (1988) investigates the contradictions of concentrating the pursuit of equal educational and social opportunities on ethnic-communal, as against social class, considerations in Malaysia. The Malay-dominated state has, since the early 1970s, pursued a vigorous policy of preferential treatment for ethnic Malays in the award of scholarships, in admission to especially the professional and science faculties of Malaysian universities, as well as in employment with the civil service and government corporations. All this is meant to achieve national unity by eliminating poverty at the same time as it equalizes social opportunities between ethnic Malays, on the one hand, and ethnic Chinese and Indians on the other. The latter have been historically dominant in business, industry and the professions, while the former is numerically and politically dominant. Unfortunately, these contradictory claims on public policy (achieving an egalitarian society by eliminating ethnic inequalities) ignore intra- and trans-ethnic class inequalities and so have tended to reproduce unequal educational and social opportunities.

Ironically, the balance of university student numbers has tilted visibly in favour of the ethnic Malays. Both the Chinese and the Indian communities have started pointing to the obvious discrimination against them. Their poorer sections have never enjoyed any preferential treatment. And the benefits of state quotas have gone disproportionately to the richer sections of the Malay community--the "bumiputras" or "sons of the soil."

> Therefore, preferential treatment policy in favour of the bumiputras in its present form and official guise has served to diffuse and obscure the more fundamental issues of class inequality within and between the various ethnic groups in Malaysian society. As a result, there is a continuance of inequality, and it has tended to reproduce rather than reduce social inequalities. (Selvaratnam, 1988, p. 196).

Essentially, neither equality nor national unity has been achieved. The politicization of higher-educational expansion has sown the seed of ever-increasing demand for university opportunity in the face of a constricting labour market. Over-education and the "diploma disease" have entered epidemic proportions. In the face of depressed commodity and oil prices, together with growing debt service and balance of payment problems, the evident political gamble with higher education may yet "pose a major socio-economic problem as well as a serious political threat to the Malay ruling class" (Selvaratnam, 1988, p. 194).

The dismal evidence for Malaysia is a good entry point to the remarkably similar Nigerian profile (see the introductory chapter for the relevant information). Before we venture into the empirical literature on educational and social opportunity in Nigeria, however, we will round off this sub-section with the findings and conclusions of two internationally focused studies.

Mingat and Tan (1986) examine the distribution of public resources for education among various SES groups in the populations of several world regions: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Africa, Asia, Latin America, as well as the Middle East and North Africa. Analyzing data from World Bank and UNESCO sources, they reveal that, except for the OECD countries (where the absolute number of farmers is actually very small), farming families and rural peoples generally are disproportionately under-represented in educational participation. Out of proportion to their number in the general population, white-collar and/or high SES families dominate especially secondary and (highly subsidized) higher education. Manual workers and traders receive a share of public resources in education roughly comparable with their representation in the general population. In both the OECD and the non-OECD countries, the relative public unit cost of education increases with the level of study, but the increase is more pronounced in the non-OECD countries, with African nations being an extreme case. The conclusion is that the provision of free or heavily subsidized education does not ensure equity in the distribution of public resources used for this purpose. White-collar SES families appropriate the largest share of public resources for education, followed by trading and manual families. Ironically, (peasant) farmers actually contribute more to public resources via the tax system and other fiscal or marketing policies. In most developing countries, a substantial proportion of government revenue is derived from farmers via export taxes and foreign earnings on agricultural products.

Blakemore and Cooksey (1981) examine the effects of educational expansion on educational opportunities and inequalities in (sub-Saharan) Africa. Their fairly extensive review of the literature reveals the existence of complex overlaps between class, ethnic-regional, urban-rural, gender, religious and racial (for South Africa) inequalities in educational and social opportunity. They also reveal that, more often than not, educational inequalities largely reflect social and economic inequalities between groups and/or territories: levels of urbanization and economic activities; parental literacy, education and occupation; the spread of a cash economy; historical or colonial experience; the sexual division of labour or structuring of opportunities in villages versus towns and cities; etc. Girls attending secondary and higher education tend to come from substantially higher socio-economic backgrounds than boys. The well established elite often send their children abroad for secondary and/or higher education. "High-quality private education, from nursery level upwards, is used disproportionately by the children of the better-off classes." These wealthy parents benefit disproportionately from state subsidization of secondary and higher education. "The charging of school fees is a definite handicap to the education of the children of poor parents." Even when (primary) schooling is fee-free, poor parents will still have to decide on the wisdom of sacrificing children's domestic or farm labour for school hours (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, pp. 61-71).

The authors found against the tendency to dismiss some groups--Muslim parents, and poor and rural families generally--as being uninterested in schooling. "Often we will find that lack of interest is a reflection of economic conditions and life-chances which themselves affect values and attitudes. Usually the latter reflect objective conditions . . . rather than the other way round" (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, p. 56). With one of the world's highest birth rates, population growth is also found to be a factor inhibiting the spread of educational opportunities in Africa. The preponderance of 15-year-olds and under in the population increases the dependency ratio, and so makes it more difficult for meagre family and even national resources to cover the education of all children. The malnutrition, squalor and disease which surround children in poverty may well lead to retarded mental growth, so that equalizing access will simply offer the opportunity to fail, stagnate or drop out (for similar findings on sub-Saharan Africa, see Rideout, 1987, pp. 23-31).

After taking due cognizance of both their own and other people's research on educational opportunity in Africa, Blakemore and Cooksey draw conclusions which appear to be the safest position which anybody could have taken at the time that their book appeared on the market--and may well be so today.

> Educational systems serve contradictory purposes in modern Africa. On the one hand they permit a small number of children from modest backgrounds to achieve varying degrees of upward social mobility. On the other hand they help to perpetuate and deepen general social inequalities between the privileged and underprivileged classes . . . . The social mobility function of education is likely, in our view, to decline rapidly and the class reproduction function to increase in importance . . . . We believe that higher education is likely to become more or less monopolized by the elite. Foster calls this phenomenon "elite closure," but we prefer to see it as part of the process of class formation itself . . . . Social equality is an elusive and rare commodity, and the belief that education can bring it about is a myth. (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981, pp. 93-94)

Now, these conclusions, together with the findings which have been credited to the authors, are based as much on research evidence for Nigeria as on the reports for Ghana, Ivory Coast, the Cameroun and Tanzania. Supplementary evidence was drawn from a host of other sub-Saharan African countries.

Conclusions in Global Perspective

Whether it be in the Western capitalist industrial nations, or in the Eastern socialist industrial countries, both change and stability in educational participation and outcomes appear to characterize the large-scale reforms and/or expansion since World War II. It may be relatively easy to say that educational attainments have increased throughout the populations. But it is not as easy to make sense of what is happening to the association of family background with level of school attainment. Even when it is found to have increased here, or to have reduced there, the magnitude of the observed change tends to vary from one report to the other. Indeed, for some other places, no clear pattern is discernible. The lack of consistency of empirical findings is partly a result of the ways in which different investigations are set up: different objectives, predispositions, designs, variables, methods of analysis, etc.

When questions of gender, ethnic-racial and urban-rural groups are added to the issue of SES, findings on educational attainment and outcomes (including earnings on the same job by persons with the same credentials) become rather complex and contradictory. And when educational participation is further separated into level of schooling, type of higher education (e.g. university versus college of advanced studies), and discipline or course of study, the detailed picture becomes something of a chaos. Although the mechanisms need not be the same between and within capitalist and socialist countries, and although complex and contradictory findings abound and cross-national comparisons hardly establish any clear patterns, the overall picture seems to be that class, gender, ethnic-racial and urban-rural inequalities in educational opportunity may have changed their form but not their substance. There is as yet no egalitarian society, and stratification (i.e. structured social inequality) is the principal factor responsible for inequality of educational opportunity.

While, perhaps in the fashion of the often artificial divide between developed and developing nations, the Fosters and the Husens continue to report on the allegedly limited effect of SES on educational opportunity in Third-World countries, there is a wealth of evidence which suggests that the foregoing conclusions generally apply the world over. Realizing that UPE is still a dream in virtually all developing nations, some studies have attempted to show that those who manage to go to school in the first place are indeed a privileged lot. Much as the educational systems of developing nations appear to double as mechanisms of both class reproduction and some mobility opportunity for a few children from modest backgrounds, the overall prediction is that they will increasingly become a monopoly of the elites. Our reported data on educational opportunity in Nigeria hopefully make a modest contribution toward sustaining or qualifying such predictions.

CHAPTER III

NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: POLITICAL ECONOMY; RESEARCH ON EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Elements of the Nigerian Political Economy

Among others, this section should help to set out the structural context within which both the present study and previous studies of educational and social opportunity in Nigeria ought to be understood. After roughly 100 years of direct British imperialism (1861-1960), Nigeria emerged as a post-colonial state integrated into the capitalist world system, and virtually locked into the neo-colonial logic of playing out relations of accommodation, autonomy and submission within the global order. Varshney (1981, p. 363) identifies three salient analytic dimensions of the post-colonial social formation: (a) the historically shaped structure of the economy; (b) the nature of the new state, particularly in terms of its relationship with the privileged classes (local and foreign, modern and traditional); and (c) the development pattern pursued by the state, given (a) and (b) above.

Briefly, Nigeria's colonially structured periphery capitalism has been marked by structural distortions and disarticulations, by lack of national sectoral and regional linkages, complementarity and reciprocity, and by an extroversion toward metropole economies (see Ake, 1981; Ake ed., 1985). In both the classic and the new international division of labour, Nigeria's historically shaped role remains largely one of supplying so-called cash crops (cocoa, palm oil and kernels, cotton, groundnuts, rubber, etc.) for the industrial needs of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries; serving as an outlet for Western and Newly Industrializing Countries' (NIC's) manufacturers, technology, knowledge and skills; supplying crude petroleum for meeting the energy needs of metropole nations; as well as providing the political and economic conditions for the expanded reproduction of transnational capital (see Ake ed., 1985; Ihonvbere and Falola, 1984; Nafziger, 1983; Onimode, 1982).

What, then, of the Nigerian state and class structure? Colonial socialization and enlistment, through the educational, religious, legal, bureaucratic (civil-military), commercial and political state apparatuses succeeded in moulding a privileged elite as extroverted as the economic infrastructure itself. British determination to economize on foreign personnel also led to the subordinated incorporation, into the colonial state, of "important elements of the pre-colonial rudimentary state structures": the traditional aristocracy and/or the feudal-religious oligarchy. As "the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state" (Ekekwe, 1985, p. 56), such "remnants of the old society" have remained part of the class configurations in contemporary Nigeria (Anikpo, 1985). This is especially as British exclusion of natives from critical economic operations, not to mention colonial vested interest in discouraging local manufacturing and processing, had resulted in the immaturity (some would say underdevelopment) of indigenous entrepreneurship by the time of "flag independence" in 1960.

Essentially, then, the Nigerian state is a sprawling coalition of otherwise contradictory class interests fragmented by region, religion, ethnicity and even state of origin: civil-military barons and bureaucrats, the professional-intellectual class, politicians, comprador and nationalistic industrial, business and financial elites, agri-business magnates, contractors, urban landlords and speculators, feudal-religious emirs, traditional chieftains, and Muslim Imams. The dominant fraction of the Nigerian bourgeoisie comprises the northern Muslim, Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri elements. In a sense, labour and mainline Christian bishops are also constitutive, if oppositional, elements of the state. However, the leverage of the Nigerian proletariat is limited not only by its very small size (arising from "enclave" capitalism with a very limited, capital-intensive modern sector), but also by the fact that the public sector accounts for some 60 percent of all formal modern sector employment. By ensuring the limited development of productive forces and commodity relations, selective capitalist penetration has also concentrated the masses of rural Nigeria in peasant subsistence agricultural production. Nevertheless, the fact that the peasantry must pay taxes and buy basic goods and services (health, housing, education, etc.) entails that they inevitably must eke out "exchange values" or/and double as petty-traders and unskilled workers (the same way as the solid proletariat may have to double as peasants or petty-traders). Just like the bourgeoisie, both labour and the peasantry are fractionalized by religion, region and ethnicity.

In the absence of a strong industrial bourgeoisie, the variegated and contradiction-ridden state has had to take responsibility for capital formation and investment. In executing state capitalism, the Nigerian bourgeoisie (state and private) articulates dialectically (i.e. complementarily and contradictorily) with foreign capital (private and public/institutional), which is another constitutive element of the state. The former directly runs the state machinery but has a limited control of the productive base of the economy. Although it is not directly involved with running the state apparatus, foreign/transnational capital remains indispensable by virtue of its hold over technology, capital and secretive skills. This indispensability rests on the weakness of the indigenous technological base (and bourgeoisie of course), a fact that is reflected in the rudimentary development of the manufacturing sector (itself the purposive legacy of colonial and neo-colonial capitalist penetration). Together with crafts, manufacturing accounted for "only 4.8 percent of GDP in 1974-75 and 7.5 percent in 1977-78" (Ake, 1985, p. 18).

Essentially, after three whole decades of post-independence state capitalism, with the full complement of four elegantly articulated development plans, constantly renegotiated indigenization and overall investment climate, as well as the "explosion" of higher and technological education in the matching traditions of the "human capital" and "modernization" development ideologies, Nigeria remains a largely import-dependent and mono-product economy. Since crossing the 50 percent mark in the early 1970s, petroleum today accounts for over 75 percent and over 90 percent, respectively, of total federal revenue and total foreign/export earnings.

> Dependence on oil and associated dependence on Western corporations, investments, technologies and skills, constitute central features . . . of Nigeria's political economy . . . . Together they constrain its range of foreign policy choices and

> roles and affect its performance in Africa and elsewhere. (Shaw, 1983, p. 223)

Thus, in spite of "massive oil revenues and development projects, Nigeria is likely to remain dependent on the world system in various ways into the next century" (Shaw, 1983, p. 225). Together with the economic irrationalities arising from the contradictions of region, religion and ethnicity within the ruling class, the profligacy, corruption and conspiracy of both the Nigerian and foreign bourgeoisies have combined to ensure that major infrastructural projects like the iron and steel complexes, nitrogen fertilizer plants, and the Bonny Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) project remain more or less uncompleted after over two decades of planning and expenditure (Ake, 1985; Shaw, 1983). "Nigeria's national economy still faces major difficulties in its transition from an oil-extraction and commodity-production base toward semi-industrialization" (Shaw, 1983, p. 225). These are probably the agonies of dependent industrialization or dependent development in a social formation that, strictly speaking, is neither strategically nor racially important in East-West geo-politics. As a sharp contrast, the "strategic mineral geographic and racial position of [white] South Africa" makes it a darling of U.S. and Western interest and investment (Zwingina, 1987, p. 75). And it was a determination to halt "the communist menace" in Asia that made the United States and her allies unleash the motor of growth in the East-Asian "Little Tigers."

In sum, decades of alliance among state, local and transnational capital have not really transformed the Nigerian economy. The social formation is still one of the contradictory interpenetration, not to say stalemated or "disarticulating" articulation, of capitalist and pre-capitalist (peasant or lineage or domestic or quasi-feudal) modes of production, with their corresponding class, clientelist and communal social relations. The magnitude of rural neglect in both planned and actual public and private sector investments in socio-economic opportunities and services is well documented in Okowa (1985) and Sada (1981). The state continues to be the saturated major employer of wage labour. Transnational (oil) corporations generally reward their senior and middle ranks more than the state sector, but do not really employ many people in light of their capital intensive structure.

> Nigerian government sources put the current level of wage employment at about three million or nine percent of total gainful employment. _The Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85_ forecasts a growth rate in wage employment of five percent per annum, but it is clear that actual performance must be well below this since the growth rate of the economy has been way below expectation . . . . _The Third National Development Plan 1975-80_ estimated that as much as 85 percent of the total gainful non-agricultural employment was in small-scale enterprises, while 28 percent of total wage employment was in small-scale enterprises. This statistic is significant because much of what is classified as small-scale enterprises would be in the informal sector . . . . (Ake, 1985, p. 23)

Thus, employment and income or mobility opportunities are fairly constricted for both educated and uneducated labour. Although the ruling class, in search of ethnic-territorial legitimacy, has tended to use unbridled spatial higher educational expansion to transfer responsibility for "getting ahead" to credentials and individuals (rather than the economy and the government), expansion in educational opportunities have not been matched with efforts to create jobs.

> There is an indication that graduate unemployment is increasing in magnitude. For example, a recent federal government survey shows that for the period from October 1982 to October 1983 only 26 percent of the 36 percent of university graduates who applied for jobs were actually recruited. (Chuta, 1986, p. 529)

Indeed, by the end of 1987, only "5,163 out of the 78,338 registered unemployed" graduates and high school leavers had secured gainful employment (see West Africa, August 15, 1988, p. 1504).

In the current global crisis of capitalism, and the frantic bid to redress same by the OECD countries acting through international financial institutions, the Nigerian economy appears to be more than ever before extroverted, depressed and debt-ridden. With or without a "human face," the so-called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) sweeping across Nigeria and virtually all Africa under the surveillance of the "pimps and bailiffs" of international capitalism (the IMF and the World Bank) are more concerned with squeezing out debts, than with promoting industrialization and development (Hoogvelt, 1987). From a figure of U.S. $19 billion in 1985, the country's external debt (in spite of the declaration of an economic emergency and the adoption of IMF-World Bank conditionalities: devaluation, withdrawal of subsidies, liberalization, privatization, retrenchment, etc.), has spiralled to U.S. $26 billion in 1987, and thence to U.S. $30.5 billion as at December 31, 1988 (Newswatch, December 26, 1988, p. 26; August 7, 1989, p. 10; South, August 1988, p. 91). Indeed, the effect of the SAP on the Nigerian economy and society has been "mounting unemployment, soaring inflation, poor public transportation, under-utilization of installed capacities in industry and agriculture, and a decline in the standard of living" (Newswatch, August 7, 1989). Such is the structural context within which educational participation and expectation are currently played out.

Dismal as such a political economy may be, Nigeria is traditionally classified as a middle income country by the OECD countries and international financial institutions. As this classification reduces the concessions which a "Third World" country can get in debt rescheduling, terms of trade and official development assistance, an economically embarrassed federal government successfully lobbied to be placed in the poor country category late in 1988. Overall, however, Nigeria is already an acknowledged claimant to the "semi-periphery" of Wallerstein's "world system." Novel and tenuous as this semi-peripheral status may be, Nigeria certainly walks the fringe of the NIC club, and the prevalent Western attitude to it is that of a Newly Influential Country. It battles between dependence at the global level and interdependence or dominance at the continental (African) or regional (West-African) levels (for details, see Shaw, 1983). Now and again colliding with (albeit resembling!) established Western interests, "Nigeria's petty imperialism in Africa . . . has [adversely] affected the availability and behaviour of foreign capital in Nigeria" (Ake, 1985, p. 21). Without a more autonomous and affluent political economy, Nigeria may for the foreseeable future continue to beat a retreat from the "assertive and interventionist" character of her 1975-85 foreign policy in Africa and the non-aligned movement.

Research on Educational Opportunity

Beckett and O'Connell (1977) provide the empirical evidence which, in line with the introductory chapter, should help us to appreciate the background to the expected contradictory tendencies in the pursuit of equality of educational opportunity in Nigeria. Drawing on both their own research and a 1969 work by P.L. van den Berghe and C.M. Nuttney, they provide evidence of glaring territorial-religious disparities (north versus south, Muslims versus Christians) in the participation trends in Nigeria's oldest universities. Nigeria's premier university, the University of Ibadan, was opened in 1947. Between 1948 and 1952, 97 percent of its students came from southern Nigeria (49.9% from the south-west and 47.1% from the south-east), while northern Nigeria, with about 60 percent of the country's population, contributed only three percent of Ibadan students in the period under review. Between 1953 and 1957, the corresponding figures were 95 percent for the south (53.4% south-west and 41.6% south-east) and five percent for the north. For the period 1948 to 1966, 6.1 percent of Ibadan students came from the north, 38.6 percent from the south-east and 53.3 percent from the south-west (Beckett and O'Connell, 1977, p. 27).

The religious profile of the students between 1948 and 1966 also shows enrolment variations tilted against the predominantly Muslim north: 91.9 percent Christians, 5.7 percent Muslims and 0.1 percent traditionalists; the remainder is either indefinable or unstated (see footnote, p. 25). Data for 1973 from three of the oldest Nigerian universities (University of Ibadan in the south-west; University of Nigeria, Nsukka, UNN, in the south-east; and Ahmadu Bello University, ABU, Zaria, in northern Nigeria) also show an over-representation of Christians: 71.9 percent at ABU (ironically, the only university, until 1975, in the predominantly Muslim north, a region with a less than 10% total Christian population), 85.8 percent at Ibadan, and 96.8 percent at the UNN. The corresponding figures for Muslims were 24.9 percent, 7.6

percent and 1.2 percent. The remainder declared some other religious orientations.

In these universities, moreover, female students were found to be greatly under-represented. "Age also tends to be associated with field of study, students in the sciences and medicine being younger, and students in the arts, social sciences and education older" (Beckett and O'Connell, 1977, p. 25). Although northern students came later to control some 83.7 percent of enrolments at ABU, Zaria, in the 1974-75 session, nearly half of that figure came from two out of the then six northern states, namely Kwara State and Benue-Plateau State. Sometimes called the Middle Belt, these two states happen to be the southernmost parts of the north, and had experienced intensive missionary activity after being code-named the "pagan areas" of the north.

Setting aside the questions of regional and religious variations, however, Beckett and O'Connell (1977) report that over half of the 1973 sample at ABU, Ibadan, the UNN as well as the universities of Lagos and Ife have farming and low-income fathers. The largest other category have fathers who are traders or businessmen. Labourers and industrial workers accounted for a very small proportion of students' parents. Higher income civil servants and professionals did not account for much of the sample either. Nevertheless, the authors do make two qualifications. First, "these parents are less typical of the relevant general population in terms of education than in terms of occupation and income" (p. 33). They are noticeably more educated and literate than the general population. Second, and in spite of the first, higher-income parents "are greatly over-represented among fathers of students in relation to the population as a whole; the same is true for the higher status occupations" (p. 32). Thus, "children of the bureaucratic and business elite are far more likely to attend universities than the children of other occupational groups, especially farmers" (p. 46).

What then of the apparently contradictory, if unexpected, finding that 51.6 percent, 49.2 percent and 30.1 percent, respectively, of the 1973 samples for ABU, Ibadan and the UNN had fathers who were said to be mainly farmers? In addition to the foregoing qualifications, the authors conclude that:

> Perpetuation and consolidation of privilege definitely occurs, but the rapid expansion of the educational systems has thus far permitted continued expansion of recruitment from poorer families to continue, and even to broaden into new groups and areas. It is the rapid expansion of the systems which has permitted the coexistence of contrary tendencies which otherwise would be in clear conflict. (Beckett and O'Connell, 1977, pp. 46-47)

Notice immediately that this conclusion resembles the one reached by Blakemore and Cooksey (1981) in their already reviewed study of education and social inequality in Africa (see the citation immediately preceding the concluding section in Chapter II). These authors also predict that the class reproduction "function" of education is likely to increase over the years. Somewhat anticipating this prediction, Beckett and O'Connell (1977) add to the passage above the following statement: "The important question now is how a levelling off of expansion of higher educational institutions will affect patterns of selection, and thus elite recruitment" (p. 47). As this levelling off actually occurred around 1980, only latter-day studies can both answer the Beckett-O'Connell concerns and validate or qualify the Blakemore-Cooksey prediction. Our study hopefully contributes to all that.

There are a few remaining issues here. The idea of a large proportion of the sample having fathers who are farmers needs some qualification. In relation to the relative 60 percent proportion of farmers in the total Nigerian population of the early 1970s, such families are under-represented in the reported student samples. Again, students must have checked "farmer" because the questionnaire asked about their fathers. Had they been asked about their sponsors (or major sponsor) in the university, the results would have been different. This point is important because some of these so-called fathers may be no more than mere figureheads who hear, as a story, that their child is attending a place called university. Not infrequently, the effective, dominant, sponsoring "father" is an uncle, a brother or a cousin who is a civil servant or businessman somewhere. Especially for rural and poorer nuclear families, this kinship network plays a role (although an increasingly waning one) in child upbringing, educational participation and business/trading recruitment. Our reported study does take this factor into consideration.

Interestingly, Beckett and O'Connell found that both female students and Muslim students (the groups under-represented in relation to males and Christians) "tend to be drawn from higher family backgrounds in terms of education and income than the general student population, and particularly atypical backgrounds in relation to the Muslim segment of the general population" (p. 45). Even more startling is the revelation by a 1973 sample at ABU, Zaria (the only northern regional university until 1975) that:

> The proportion of Muslims among the female students was actually higher than the proportion of the Muslims among the student body as a whole. Alternatively, the proportion of women among Muslim

> students was slightly more than the proportion of women in the sample as a whole. (Beckett and O'Connell, 1977, p. 46)

Without prejudice to the observed existence of overall gender, religious and regional inequalities in university participation, the lesson of this report is that we should be wary of attributing enrolment variations to merely gender, religious or ethnic-regional differences. Class location does make a lot of difference. Moreover, the presumed antagonism of Muslims to western-type education (or, for that matter, the subordination of women in Muslim culture) is in itself either false or exaggerated. It appears to make sense only in the context of (rural) poverty and/or feudal-religious hegemony. What this reviewed study does not accentuate, and which our reported study attempts to explore fully, is the issue of urban-rural, class and gender participation and expectations in professional disciplines.

Ogum (1982) attempts to reply to the territorial/regional politics of educational opportunity in Nigeria on its own terms. As we noted in the introductory chapter, the federal government opened seven universities in 1975 (five in the north and two in the south), such that each of the then 12 states of Nigeria (six in the north and six in the south) would have a federal university. Prior to 1975, five out of the existing six federal universities were in the south. By 1975, then, 12 states shared 13 universities such that only the then Western State housed an extra university--Nigeria's premier University of Ibadan--on behalf of the whole federation. Ostensibly to coordinate and streamline admission to all federal universities, a Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) was established in 1978. Hitherto, each university organized its own entrance examinations/admission procedures, and some candidates secured multiple admissions at some cost to others. I said "ostensibly" because that was the only version made public by the northern-controlled federal military government. In reality, JAMB's statutory mandate was to implement a new ethnic-territorial "reverse discrimination" admission policy: 40 percent merit criterion; 30 percent for state of origin; 20 percent for catchment area; and 10 percent at the discretion of the university (see, for example, Uvere, 1982, pp. 50-51; for overall constitutional provisions, see Chapter I).

It was to empirically confirm and make public JAMB's quota system of admission that Ogum (1982) came into being.

> . . . we shall show that even though the State is made the focus of consideration of equality of educational opportunities, valid pronouncements can also be made regarding the individual's level of privileges vis-à-vis the level of privileges available to his fellow citizens in another State. After all, the State is made up of individuals. In particular, it will be shown, using data from the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), that it is in fact easier for qualified candidates in some States to gain admission into higher educational institutions in this country than their counterparts in some other States. (Ogum, 1982, pp. 9-10)

The author informs us that, in a correct statistical application of quotas to the states of Nigeria, the number of candidates offered university admission in the various states should be proportional to certain relevant characteristics of the states. Examples would include:

> a) the population of each State;
> b) the number of Secondary School enrolment in each State;
> c) the number of qualified applicants from each State;
> d) the number of Representatives of each State in the House of Representatives; or
> e) the number of Senators from each State in the House of Senate. (Ogum, 1982, p. 10)

Squaring JAMB's 1978/79 and 1979/80 admission statistics against the listed characteristics, the author found that the numbers of candidates offered admission in the various states of the country were not proportional to any of the said characteristics. The results reveal that candidates from the then ten northern states had several times more chances of being offered admission than their counterparts from the then nine southern states.

> For example, in 1978/79, a qualified candidate from Anambra State had a chance of only 8 percent of being placed, while his counterpart from Kaduna or Sokoto State had a chance thrice as favourable. In 1979/80, a qualified candidate from either Imo State or Lagos State had a chance of less than 10 percent of being placed, while a qualified candidate from Borno State had a 66 percent chance of being placed. (Ogum, 1982, p. 13)

These results should not surprise us, given JAMB's "reverse discrimination" admission guidelines earlier indicated. Ogum's conclusion is that "the JAMB has not offered equal educational opportunities to all the States and, therefore, to all the candidates. Qualified candidates from the northern States invariably have better chances of being placed, than their counterparts from the southern States" (p. 13). He advises that "in a strict statistical sense . . . a correct application of a 'quota' system of selection would require that the numbers of candidates placed from each State should be proportional to the number of qualified applicants from that State" (p. 13).

Given the fact that JAMB's pro-north political (rather than statistical) quotas have gone on for over a decade now, the cumulative regional/territorial disadvantages which most of the southern states must have suffered should be obvious. However, our interest is not really in regions, states and faceless candidates. The second half of our review of work by Beckett and O'Connell (1977) has indicated that, in spite of observed regional, religious and gender variations in university participation, the most effectively excluded Nigerians tend to be poor families generally and poorer females and Muslims particularly. Thus, much as Ogum (1982) has taken us some way by empirically establishing the role of the JAMB, his understandably "Nigerian-style" study of equality of higher educational opportunities adds the burden of liberal individualism to the contradictory ideologies of region and state of origin. All this increased the necessity of going out there to stockpile fresh evidence not only for quashing Nigeria's lopsided notions of equalization, but also for pressing a case for official recognition of the real net losers from the elaborate politics of educational equity in Nigeria.

Csapo (1981) reproduces the rather qualifiable conventional wisdom regarding barriers to the education of girls in northern Nigeria. He first observes that, overall, females are under-represented in the school-going population in Nigeria. He then notes that the problem is acute in northern Nigeria, backing himself up with a number of cited studies. Integrating a number of theoretical and empirical sources, Csapo outlines certain religious and social factors which interact to hinder female education in northern Nigeria. One is antagonism to (Christian) Western-type education. Another is Islamic marriage customs and seclusion of women. Included here are marrying up to four wives, marrying off little girls before or about the age of twelve, and subjecting married women to "house arrests" in the name of "purdah" observances. The second-class place of women in Islam is a third. And a fourth is misconceptions of the Islamic view on the education of women. The others are fear of moral laxity in Western-type schools, limited post-primary education facilities for girls, and luke-warm support of northern political leaders.

Going by some of the revelations noted in earlier paragraphs, however, these so-called religious and social barriers to the education of girls do not seem to apply to wealthy (and usually urban) families. They frequently are additional complications to the problems of working class and/or peasant/rural poverty. Interestingly, Csapo states that it is the interlocking dynamics of religious, social and economic factors that hinder the education of northern girls. It is something of an economic waste to invest in the education of a girl who would be married off by age twelve. It is the boys who are, by custom, required to cater for their aging parents. Among the nomadic Fulani, children are immersed in the family economy. The boys learn early to herd the cattle, while the girls carry milk to town for sale. The family continually moves in search of water and good grazing land for the cattle. There is no school in sight in the first place. Were one to be around and fee-free, replacement labour for the kids would still be a problem. Thus, "marriage customs, seclusion, place of women in Islam, perception of Western education by parents, coupled with economic factors, result in placing more value on the education of boys than that of girls" (Csapo, 1981, p. 316).

Diejomaoh and Anusionwu (1981) report on the SES background of those attending Lagos metropolitan high schools (including two federal government high schools) and higher education institutions. They group the high schools into first-rate, second-rate and third-rate. The first-rate category includes the two federal high schools in our sample. Just like federal universities, these federal high schools statutorily admit students from all parts of Nigeria, using quota percentages for entrance examination performance/merit, state of origin, and catchment area. They are officially styled as Nigeria's "unity schools." However, the results reveal that the low SES group--some 60 percent of Nigeria's one hundred and ten million people--is disproportionately under-represented in both first- and second-rate schools, especially so in the former. Conversely, the high SES group, reportedly some 10 percent of the Nigerian population, is scandalously over-represented in especially the first-rate (so-called "unity") high schools: going by father's occupation, 83.7 percent and 75.0 percent, respectively, in the all-male King's College and the all-female Queen's College; using father's education, 61.8 percent and 74.9 percent, respectively, in the said King's College and Queen's College; and turning to mother's occupation, 31.8 percent and 50.1 percent, respectively, in the all-male King's College and the all-female Queen's College.

Furthermore, while 41.0 percent of the Queen's College sample have mothers in middle-income occupations, the corresponding figure for the King's College sample is 65.6 percent. As for the educational background of the all-female Queen's College sample, 43.4 percent of their mothers have at least a first degree, 25.1 percent at least secondary education, and 25.2 percent at least primary education. It is the sample for the third-rate high schools that has a preponderance of mothers and fathers with either no formal education or merely primary education (for the findings reported above, see Tables 11.6 to 11.11 of Diejomaoh and Anusionwu, 1981, pp. 387-390).

The authors also provide information showing the links between the foregoing trends in Lagos metropolitan high schools (including the paradigmatic examples of the federal Queen's College and King's College) and what is happening at the nursery, primary and higher education levels. On the connection between trends at the high school level and the kind of nursery and primary school attended, the authors report as follows:

> The advantage that higher income group children have over their counterparts from relatively lower income families appear to begin from their pre-secondary school preparation. The results of our analysis show that more than three quarters of the students in the first-rate schools attended pre-primary nursery schools. The corresponding percentage for the second- and third-rate schools are less than one-third and less than 10% respectively . . . . The first-rate schools administer an oral examination in addition to a written examination. Primary school pupils who have passed through the private schools have a better chance of passing both the written and oral examinations. The results of our analysis show that 67.2% of the students in the first-rate schools went to private primary schools. Corresponding percentages for second- and third-rate schools are 27.5 and 5.2 respectively. (Diejomaoh and Anusionwu, 1981, pp. 391-392)

The information which they provide on the real net gainers and losers from public educational subsidy at the high school and higher education levels is also revealing. We begin with the Lagos metropolitan high schools.

> The average recurrent annual subsidy per student in the first-rate schools in 1976/1977 and 1977/1978 was N1,605 and N1,586, respectively ... the annual fee paid by each student was N90. On the other hand, the average recurrent annual subsidy in the second- and third-rate schools in 1976/1977 was N417 and N220, respectively. The annual fee paid by each student in these schools was N90 also. In 1976/1977 and 1977/1978, the approximate share of total expenditure for a student borne by the student's parents was 1 percent in the first-rate schools, 18 percent in the second-rate schools and 30 percent in the third-rate schools. We therefore had the absurd situation in which the children of upper income families were receiving their education virtually free in the first-rate schools at public expense, while the low income families were shouldering as much as a third of the expenditure on their children at the much inferior third-rate schools. (Diejomaoh and Anusionwu, 1981, p. 392)

These findings generally dovetail with the evidence reported world-wide, including, as we have seen, the Indian example (Bhagwati, 1985) and the report for all major world regions (Mingat and Tan, 1986).

Of course, levels of public subsidization tend to be much higher in higher educational institutions.

> In 1976/1977 and 1977/1978, the average recurrent subsidy per student in the colleges of technology was N2,873 and N2,562, respectively. Corresponding levels in the universities were N4,874 and N5,130. Not only were the subsidies in postsecondary institutions high, the student who makes it to the university has been in the education stream longer, and has been enjoying public subsidies all along. (Diejomaoh and Anusionwu, 1981, p. 393)

Perhaps we should clarify, in passing, that up to the early 1980s, one Nigerian naira (N1) was the equivalent of U.S.$1.50. Today, the naira has been devalued, ostensibly by market floatation as prescribed by the IMF, to around N10.00 for U.S.$1.00.

A ten percent stratified sample survey on the SES background of students enrolled at the University of Lagos in the 1977/1978 academic year yields information on those who enjoy the bulk of university subsidies. While low-income occupations accounted for only 27.3 percent of the sample, middle-income occupations took up 44.5 percent and higher-income occupations 28.2 percent. Thus, up to 72.7 percent of University of Lagos students (44.5 plus 28.2) come from families that do not account for more than 40 percent of the general Nigerian population. It is this same group that benefits almost exclusively from the overly subsidized first-rate high schools. In the words of the authors,

> The shares of the upper middle and the high income groups in university enrolment were disproportionate to their shares in the Nigerian population. Our results broadly corroborate the results of studies on the background of university students at the University of Ibadan and University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and a 1972 sample study of Nigerian universities; as such, our sample survey results could be generalized for Nigeria as a

> whole. The dominance of the upper and middle income groups at the university level is a reflection of the distribution of the various income groups in the three types of secondary schools . . . . Students who have passed through the first-rate and to a large extent the second-rate schools are more likely to meet the university's requirements. As our analysis of secondary schools shows, these schools are dominated by the high and upper middle income groups. (Diejomaoh and Anusionwu, 1981, pp. 394-395)

It would appear, then, that participation in Nigerian universities as well as first- and second-rate high schools is the preserve of privileged families. Also, having fairly well educated and/or high-income mothers appears to be substantially associated with female participation in first-rate high schools. The class character of the whole arrangement probably would be given greater relief if one used Marxian class categories as methodological apparatus. Our reported study attempts to meet this need. The other thing which these authors have not done, and which we have tried to address, is zero in on class, gender and urban-rural variations in patterns of participation and expectation within the professional faculties or disciplines. Had the authors explored all this, using our preferred methodological apparatus and taking account of our control variables (see "Purpose of the Study" in the introductory chapter), the sheer passage of time would still have justified a replication for purposes of historical comparisons.

Urwick (1985) draws attention to the existence of urban bias in the qualitative aspects of centrally organized and allocated school inputs in Nigeria. His overview notes that previous studies of spatial inequalities in education in developing countries have tended to dwell on territorial variations rather than those associated with key or central places of administration or governance. The said studies have also tended to concentrate on quantitative rather than qualitative aspects of educational provision. To go beyond this conventional approach, he uses data from the secondary-level school network of Sokoto State, northern Nigeria, to examine variations in the qualitative features of educational provision as measured by central-place effects. The analysis reveals a consistent pattern of urban bias in the quality of various centrally-organized school inputs. The neglect of rural towns and villages is due not only to inherent infrastructural problems, but also the prevailing styles and structures of political control and bureaucratic management.

Woodhouse (1987) investigates the problem of cultural dependency in Nigeria and the way in which university education enhances such dependency by promoting elite formation and consolidation. We are interested in just the question of elite selectivity in Nigerian universities. The relevant data come from a study of the SES background of the 1980/81 first-year faculty of education students at the University of Calabar, south-eastern Nigeria. The results reveal that nine percent came from upper SES families, 55 percent from middle SES families, and 36 percent from lower SES families. In discussing these results, Woodhouse notes that the figure of 55 percent is disproportionate to the size of the middle class in Nigerian society. (The estimate is between 30 and 40 percent.) Most of these families in the sample came from urban settings. A similar over-representation occurs with regard to students from upper-class families. Nine percent participation is rather too much for a group which is reported to constitute less than two percent of the Nigerian population. In contrast, members of the lower class (estimated to constitute over 60 percent of the Nigerian population) are clearly under-represented--and this, in spite of the fact that the faculty of education is a "peripheral" faculty in a comparatively new, low-status; "peripheral" university (the University of Calabar had only five years of independent existence in 1980). Older Nigerian universities at Ibadan, Nsukka, Lagos, Zaria and Ife are much more the "centre" or mainstream.

Woodhouse attempts to relate these findings to those of a 1973 study as reported in Beckett and O'Connell (1977). Coincidentally, we have already reviewed that study at the beginning of this sub-section on Nigeria.

> The classification in which students with farming backgrounds are grouped in the former study also includes other occupations, such as petty traders and unskilled workers. While students with farming backgrounds decreased in the seven years between the studies, those coming from the middle class, such as teachers, business persons and headmasters, as well as those from the upper class, increased in number. If this is indeed the case, then one can infer that university education, which clearly benefitted the urban middle and upper classes in the 1973 study, does so even more clearly in the 1980 study. (Woodhouse, 1987, p. 124)

The author then goes on to inform us that "in addition to being increasingly marginalized by mass migration to the cities, and the encroachment of government-run farms upon the best land," "the rural poor . . . are very much under-represented in the institutions of higher learning in Nigeria" (p. 124).

Woodhouse also informs us of some relationship between the class background, expectations, and sexual/friendship preferences of the females (30% lower class as against 70% middle and upper class females) in the Calabar sample. Like many young women in Nigerian, Canadian, British and American (i.e. U.S.) universities, they expressed an interest in getting a husband while they were in university (p. 126). Perhaps because of structural and cultural restrictions, their participation in university is not so much for pursuing or building an impressive career, as it is for hitching themselves with men with better chances of career or professional success. "In general, female students showed little interest in dating male students. They tended to set their sights far higher and go out with businessmen, lawyers, doctors, naval officers or even lecturers" (p. 125).

Woodhouse's conclusion is that, even though Nigerian schools and universities seem to be performing the contradictory roles of reinforcing class inequalities while providing some (limited) opportunity for lower class students to gain upward social mobility, they are likely to "intensify the process of elite formation and reinforce the class division between the elite and the rest of Nigerian society" (p. 128). If nothing else justifies this position,

> Studies of elite formation in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular tend to show that the elite groups in competition for economic and political power are fast developing into a more or less coherent ruling class, by means of economic, political and cultural interconnections, this despite the great economic ethnic and political disparities in the country as a whole. (Woodhouse, 1987, p. 127)

That passage, together with the balance of the evidence thus far reviewed, should be advance warning to Foster (1977), Husen (1987), Rathgeber (1985) and a host of others who are yet to accommodate to the all-time trend toward class reproduction in the education systems of less developed countries.

Akande (1987) plunges us into the issue of equality of opportunity and social mobility in terms of differences between the educational/career aspirations of rural and urban female high school students in Oyo State, south-western Nigeria. Her aim is to go beyond the more recognized issue of class and gender inequalities and bring the ignored plight of "the rural girl in Nigeria" (p. 82) to the centre of research and social policy. Out of the 359 respondents pooled from 15 schools in 12 locations in the Oyo State of Nigeria, 224 (62.4%) were from rural families, while 135 (37.6%) were from urban-based families.

The analysis reveals a significant relationship between the student's family location and her educational aspirations. For example, 63.0 percent of urban girls, as against 26.3 percent of rural girls, aspire to have a first degree or attend a polytechnic (which offers an equivalent qualification). In spite of overall low levels of aspiration to higher degrees (Masters or Ph.D.), urban families still fared better than rural families: 9.6 percent versus 2.7 percent. The pattern now changes as we move down the educational/career hierarchy. While 39.3 percent of rural girls aspire to go to schools of nursing, only 17.0 percent of urban girls expressed such intentions. Also, whereas 28.1 percent of rural girls are headed for teacher training colleges and colleges of education, only 10.3 percent of urban-based girls have such plans. The author suggests that, apart from the issues of costs, years of training and, for nurses-in-training, monthly stipends, rural female students may have been motivated by the fact that teachers and, especially, nurses have reasonable status in rural areas (with the latter sometimes running their own clinics and/or managing health centres or cottage hospitals). Thus, teaching and nursing could be perceived as typical models of high female achievement in the socially and occupationally disadvantaged world of the rural area. The preponderance of poor quality teachers and schools in rural areas is also a liability in the matter of motivating students toward higher educational/career ambitions.

The findings also point to a significant relationship between family location and student's scholastic performance.

> About two-thirds (67.8%) of the respondents from rural families showed low and very low scholastic performance. This is in contrast to about a half (46.0%) from urban families who were at the same scholastic performance level. On the other hand, nearly three-tenths (29.6%) of the urban family students showed high and very high scholastic performances while about one-tenth (11.6%) of the rural students were of the same scholastic performance as judged by school records. (Akande, 1987, p. 80)

Akande then suggests that research should not be preoccupied with merely male-female variations in, and obstacles to, school performance. Instead, there is need to look out for systematic performance variations between urban girls and their rural counterparts.

However, Akande does find that the influence of scholastic performance on educational aspirations remains significant for both rural and urban girls. Irrespective of family location, high and medium levels of scholastic performance are positively associated with high and medium levels of aspiration. But more rural than urban girls were found to be involved in after-school trading activities (80 versus 20% of those checking the item), experience disturbances when they want to study at home (48.7% versus 35.7%), and suffer from having to do household chores and errands. Disturbance due to the effect of polygamy and large family size was checked as more a problem for urban girls than for rural girls. This may be partly because housing conditions are more expensive and restrictive in urban areas, while make-shift playgrounds for children are readily available in rural locations.

Akande concludes that "students' family location (rural or urban) has significant relationships with the important personal and family variables which affect the students' educational aspirations. Thus rural family students are at a disadvantage with respect to the variables considered and these may well have a negative effect" (p. 81). Those focusing attention on the plight of rural women should take care not to neglect the development of rural girls (p. 82).

Just as we saw in the Australian evidence as reviewed by Anderson and Vervoorn (1983), this Akande report awakens us to the realization that rural life might actually constitute a thick ceiling on opportunities. Also, women do not experience and respond to social inequalities in a synchronous or homogeneous manner. In fact, urban and bourgeois women may be socially more privileged than rural men generally. There also is a great likelihood that urban-rural variations in male opportunities will resemble the pattern reported for females by Akande. The report by Akande does not, however, make more than passing references to the fact that the career choices and the after-school trading activities of rural girls suggest low income backgrounds. Direct information on the interplay of family location (urban versus rural) and SES would have greatly enriched the study. We hope to have met this need.

Biraimah (1987) reports on the interaction of class and gender in the structuring of the life chances of Nigerian university students. In particular, the study wanted to determine whether SES background affected the career expectations and educational aspirations of male and female students in a similar manner. Apart from the generally pro-male dispositions of certain social and cultural practices in Nigeria, the study was necessitated by the increasing availability of Nigerian and world-wide evidence on the elite composition of university women, but with only a few studies attempting to show that SES may produce varying career expectations or educational outcomes when mediated by gender.

Out of an officially quoted total university population of about 10,000, 500 respondents (300 males and 200 females) were randomly selected from across the 11 faculties in the University of Ife (UNIFE), south-western Nigeria. It was found that UNIFE undergraduates tended to represent a highly urban segment of the Nigerian population, with the female respondents constituting a larger urban group than the males (73% of all female respondents versus 44% of all male respondents). Male and females put together, 40 percent of the sample came from high SES families, 34 percent from middle SES families, and only 26 percent from low SES families (Biraimah, 1987, p. 574). In a country where the lower class command over 60 percent of the general population, the evidence of elite over-representation in higher education speaks for itself. And we have seen this dominant pattern throughout the reviewed literature.

When the information is cross-classified by gender, interesting patterns emerge. While 63 percent of the female sample came from high SES families, only 25 percent of the males came from such families. "Conversely, 40 percent of the male students, but only 6 percent of the female students, came from low-SES families" (p. 574). Evidently, women in Nigerian higher education tend to be drawn from the upper classes, significantly more so than men. The author suggests that part of the explanation is the gender selectivity of (Nigerian) higher education, consequent upon cultural and economic restraints which have historically inhibited girls' educational opportunities. "Also, the relative economic security of these high-SES families might allow them more latitude in supporting their daughters' educational and career expectations that exceed normal female roles within the Nigerian context" (p. 575).

The question which Biraimah poses, however, is: Should we expect the elite family background of female university students to be reflected in equally high educational and career goals? Put in other words, does it necessarily follow that coming from different family backgrounds produces different educational aspirations and career goals among male and female university students? The analysis reveals a closer association between class and educational aspirations for women more than for men. It appears that "gender, more than class, affects the educational expectations of students. Male students, regardless of class, maintained extremely high educational goals, while females, who came mainly from high-SES families, failed to sustain this high-status background in their choice of educational goals" (p. 576). For example, 57 percent of the male students and 33 percent of the female students expected to obtain a doctorate--despite the fact that 40 percent of male (as against 6% of female) students came from low SES backgrounds, while 63 percent of female (as against 25% of male) students came from high SES backgrounds. Also, differential backgrounds notwithstanding, "parity" is obvious in the level of career expectations of male and female students. For example, 53 percent of all males and 54 percent of all females expected high-status careers.

> Thus, as with educational goals, these data suggest that high family SES does not guarantee high-status career expectations among university women. Neither does the lack of high SES

> appear to inhibit the high-status career expectations of male university students. (Biraimah, 1987, p. 580)

Here, then, is a situation where female students "represented an elite segment of Nigerian society but held equal or lower educational and career expectations than did the more socially and economically diverse male student sample." For their part, "male students appear to be less dependent on high SES for university access and are also more inclined to aspire to educational and career goals that far exceed their more humble origins" (p. 582). It would appear, then, that gender effectively mediates class even as the latter affects ultimate life chances. Biraimah's report demonstrates a fairly complex, if dialectical, pattern of the manifestations of privilege and inequality in school and society. In addition to a preference for the more illuminating Marxist class categories, our reported study hopes to have made the extension of exploring the interplay of class, gender and urban-rural residence in the career expectations of students. And Biraimah's work is obviously not set against the broader background issues of religious, regional and ethnic-territorial politics in Nigeria.

Lastly on the Nigerian review, Oni (1988) more or less questions the whole idea of debating the exclusionary or accommodative role of schooling in social mobility. The study attempts to show that Nigerian school enrolment rates are actually declining in the wake of rising school leaver unemployment. This, according to the author, has been "a result of the rapid expansion of the educational system and the subsequent saturation of the labour market" (p. 87). Against this background, the study tries to demonstrate that the overriding reason for the high and rising dropout rates in Nigeria is, ironically, the very process of "modernization" which is normally thought to increase the demand for formal education. In this context, the indigenous apprenticeship system is found to be not only a vigorous competitor with formal education with respect to some skills, but also a major alternative for getting ahead economically and socially.

Data for the study were collected from two local government areas (LGAs) generally, and from two villages (one in each LGA) particularly. Located on the outskirts of a major city, Ojoo is a "peri-urban" village undergoing market and institutional incorporation. It has ready transportation, electricity, pipe-borne water and small-scale industries. By contrast, Okanle is a rural village without any of the listed social amenities and opportunities. The two villages (not to say one small town and one village) thus represent two contrasting points along the modernization continuum.

Overall, data from the Akinyele LGA of Oyo State (where Ojoo is located) and the Ifelodun LGA of Kwara State (where Okanle is located) show declining school enrolment rates since the late 1970s. The author suggests that this apparent resistance to education is not simply a question of the failure of schooling to meet the instrumental objectives of parents. Instead, "education is only one means of social mobility and, in times of rapid social change, not necessarily the most effective or the way that most immediately meets the demands of the clientele" (p. 92). Furthermore, interview results reveal that, irrespective of age and occupational class, the Ojoo and Okanle communities generally do not think that going to school is the best means of securing employment and/or getting ahead in life. "But, for those few people in Okanle [the village without modern socio-economic opportunities] who see it as the best avenue of mobility, an education represents a strategy for overcoming the lack of alternative opportunities within the village economy" (p. 99).

The lesson of this study, then, is that in the context of educated unemployment, the process of modernization, while increasing the demand for the products of the educational system, may actually continue to create alternative avenues of mobility that paradoxically make sending children to school something of an economic waste for those who either can least afford it or who appear to be doing fine without much schooling. As interesting as the reported study may be, however, one problem with taking its findings/conclusions on their face value is that we might be tempted to forget that sooner or later those who appear to be getting by without schooling may have to face exclusionary regulations from governments determined to secure employment diversions for their otherwise politically threatening armies of educated unemployed. And, apart from the possibility that the study may simply have recorded both the "retreative adaptation" of the rural poor (petty traders, peasant farmers, butchers, artisans, and food machine operators) and the bloated egos of illiterate, upstart local business owners, it is silent on the fact that better-off families everywhere seem to be investing more and more on longer years of schooling.

Conclusions in Comparative Perspective

Thus, we really cannot run away from attempting to understand the several ways in which schooling is articulated to different forms and combinations of social mobility or inequality. Much like the immensely similar experience of Malaysia (see Selvaratnam, 1988; Spaulding and Hussain, 1989), the Nigerian review suggests that within and beyond the politics of region, state of origin, religion and catchment area, complex overlaps and patterns of educational inequalities will still be found within and between class, gender, religious, ethnic-territorial and urban-rural groups. In addition to being interested in the specific cases of professional disciplines, federal high schools and the association of female educational opportunity with mother's educational/occupational standing, our reported study hopefully will contribute toward a fuller understanding of the nature of the said complex patterns of educational privilege and disadvantage.

Just as the global review in Chapter II, the Nigerian experience thus far suggests that, notwithstanding the perpetuation of social privilege, neither the working class nor rural families nor yet females have vanished from the corridors of educational institutions and programs. Also, the interaction between and among class, residence, gender, ethnicity, region and religion is such that no particular group or combination of groups (e.g. males versus females; rural versus urban females; high SES females versus diverse SES males) experiences educational participation and expectation in a synchronous manner (e.g. consistently low or high).

And, just as the remarkable commonalities noted in the case of Marxist-Leninist Third World and industrially advanced states alike by Groth (1987), the undeniable similarities between and among nations at differing levels of capitalist industrialization (depending on whose framework you are using, least developed, developing and developed; or, as

Wallerstein [1979, 1987] would say, periphery, semi-periphery, and core) should be sufficient warning for those "sociologists" whose idea of the human society is no more than the boundaries of nation-states. As for the Fosters, the Husens and the Rathgebers (see, for example, Foster, 1977; Husen, 1987; Rathgeber, 1985), whose developed- versus developing-nation blinders are yet to open up to the realities of class reproduction in the education systems of Africa and the developing world generally, nothing more perhaps need be said.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Population and Sample

The population of this study comprised: (a) all the students attending Nigeria's (as at 1989) 41 full-fledged federal high schools (reportedly 47,326 in the 1988/89 session; (b) all the students enroled in the (as at 1989) 28 full-fledged Nigerian universities (reportedly 122,051 in the 1988/89 session); (c) all the students enroled in the mainstream medical program (i.e. MB BS) of the (as at 1989) 13 full-fledged conventional (as against technology and agricultural) federal universities (reportedly 8,985 in the 1988/89 session); and (d) all the students enroled in or graduating from the mainstream law program (i.e. LLB) of the said 13 federal universities (reportedly 5,278 in the 1988/89 session), as represented by those graduands who, by November of 1989, had begun to undergo the 1989/90 Bar Admission training at the Nigerian Law School in Lagos (because of the closure of most of the southern Nigerian state and federal universities for some six months in 1989 following anti-IMF riots, only 1,276 out of the expected 2,000 or so federal-cum-state university candidates were in attendance by that date). As we were particularly interested in finding out the real beneficiaries of federal admission quotas, students coming to the Law School from, or who were enroled in foreign and (except for official statistics on nation-wide university enrolment by gender and state or origin) state universities were excluded from the study population. Specific sampling procedures now follow.

The sample of federal high school students was drawn purposively from the senior-high section of just the two "model" federal high schools (so-called unity schools) in the Federal Capital Territory, Lagos. As we saw in the introductory chapter, this delimitation to the Lagos-area federal high schools was, aside from the question of resource constraints, based upon both the nature of our research aims and our judgement that the ethnic-regionally diverse population of the federal territory held promise of serving those ends. The other delimitation to the senior-high section was based upon the knowledge that "well organized patterns of educational plans and vocational preferences are apparent by the time students are in the senior secondary school" (Akande, 1987, p. 77).

The two participating federal high schools happened to be unisex: one with an all-male student clientele, the other with an all-female studentry. Although we had planned for, and actually attempted a systematic random sampling, the realities of voluntary participation, the pressures of an examination-preparatory week consequent on the adoption of a new school year schedule in Nigeria (January-December, instead of September-August), as well as the impediments of an apparent student conspiracy not to cooperate unless all their peers who wanted to participate were given questionnaires, all this limited our efforts to no more than balloting for the streams of the senior years one and two. Their year-three counterparts (121 in the boys' school, 201 in the girls' school) were completely shielded from the study by a combination of administrative regulation and a certificate examination then already in progress. Questionnaire distribution to whole classmates (except for a few that opted out) in the senior years one and two, over which assistance was received from the counsellor-psychologists and one or two other regular teachers in each school, yielded 199 valid cases (out of a population of 266) in the boys' school, and 171 valid cases (out of a population of 437) in the girls' school. Our regrettably but matter-of-factly non-probability sample thus amounted to 52.6 percent of the delimited population of 703 theoretically accessible students.

The sample of law program students was drawn through a combination of elements of the stratified, quota and purposive selection procedures. As a reminder, the population itself was originally constituted essentially through the same ethnic-territorially biased federal admission quotas (i.e. 40% on academic merit, 30% on state of origin, 20% on catchment area, and 10% on university discretion). Theoretically, then, a uniformly allotted quota selection procedure should offer everyone or, better still, every group a fair enough chance of being represented in the study. Given the nature of our research aims, as well as the ethnic-territorial leanings of federal admission quotas, we decided to make 50 places (in the form of questionnaires) theoretically available to each of the five major ethnic-political constituencies in Nigeria (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Northern Minorities, Southern Minorities).

One male and one female were in each case identified as field assistants for their particular group. Eventually, two of the recruited persons (one male, the other female) were in each case appointed to oversee the northern and southern fronts. At a joint briefing session, the same set of guidelines was handed out to everyone as follows:

1. Quite literally, go after your own people;

2. Males have a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, responsibility for targeting male respondents in their own constituency;
3. Females have a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, responsibility for targeting female respondents in their own constituency;
4. Each pair of assistants covering a given constituency has a joint responsibility for ensuring that, as far as possible, an equitable number of males and females are drawn from that constituency; and
5. Bear in mind that only those students coming from federal (as against state or foreign) universities should be included.

For whatever reasons, returns from the constituencies ranged between 26 and 40, adding up to a total of 168 valid cases (94 males, 74 females), which amounted to slightly over 3% of the 5,278 students enroled in law in the 13 applicable federal universities during the 1988/89 session).

The sample of medical program students was drawn through a combination of elements of the multistage, cluster, stratified, quota, and purposive selection. In the first stage, stratification by ethnic-political constituency yielded five clusters of 13 conventional federal universities distributed thus: four in the Hausa-Fulani zone, three in the Yoruba area, one in the Igbo constituency, two for the Northern Minorities, and three among the Southern Minorities. In the second stage, one university was selected from each cluster by balloting -- except for the Igbo constituency which has only one such federal university. In each participating university, a quota of 50 representatives (in the form of questionnaires) was made theoretically available to primarily the target constituency. Assistants were further instructed to strive to achieve an equitable participation of males and females in each constituency. Our interest in the outcome or professional practice expectations of respondents also compelled us to focus on students in the second half of the normally six-year medical program. To the extent that this was the period for clinical experience, professional socialization, and housemanship concerns, the realities or prospects of practice were expected to be clear enough to most students at that level. The returns from constituencies ranged between 24 and 31 (excluding the 44 completed in the Yoruba constituency which were unfortunately lost in transit on my way back to Edmonton). The remainder amounted to a total of 112 valid cases (86 males, 26 females) which, regrettably, meant a little over one percent of the 8,985 students enroled in the MB BS medical program of federal universities in the 1988/89 session.

Since the medical and law respondents together constituted our university-level sample, adding 112 cases to the law school's 168 valid returns gave a total of 280 sample size (approximately 2%) for the 14,263 officially quoted as the total enrolment in law and medicine during the 1988/89 session. To the extent that many reputable city, community or national surveys have been based on a two-to-five percent probability sample of the relevant population (Champion, 1981; Fowler, 1988), the trouble with our sample may be less its size as its representativeness or method of selection generally. We would, however, urge that its shortcomings be understood in the context of the practical difficulties of doing a politically sensitive survey in a socially unprovocative manner. Indeed, it has become something of a taboo to either compile or request for a handy list showing the ethnic affiliation of a particular set of students or employees in a Nigerian university or government department.

Research Questions

1. What is the proportion of the different social classes (workers, semi-autonomous employees, managers and supervisors, petty-bourgeoisie, small employers, bourgeoisie) in federal educational institutions?
2. What is the proportion of males and females in federal educational institutions?
3. What is the proportion of urban and rural students in federal educational institutions?
4. What is the proportion of Nigeria's five major ethnic-political constituencies (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Northern Minorities and Southern Minorities) in federal educational institutions?
5. What is the proportion of northern and southern students in federal educational institutions?
6. Are levels of structurally based expectations (SBE-HS/PP) in federal educational institutions related to social class, controlling for gender, residence, ethnic-political constituency and region?
7. Controlling for social class in each case, are levels of structurally based expectations (SBE-HS/PP) in federal educational institutions related to gender, residence, ethnic-political constituency and region?
8. Does academic performance affect the relationship between structurally based expectations (SBE-HS/PP) and social class the same way as social class affects the relationship between psychologically based expectations (PBE-HS/PP) and academic performance?

Operationalization of Key Variables

1. Proportion of Participation. This is the percentage distribution in the survey sample and/or the nation-wide school enrolment statistics comprising each of the social class, gender, residential, ethnic-political and regional sub-groups.

2. Structurally Based Expectations (SBE). This variable has two forms. The first, Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) refers to the level of further educational-cum-occupational expectation checked by the respondent (Questionnaire item C1[a]) on the basis of the financial resources and social influence of his/her sponsor and/or family generally. For purposes of data analysis, the eight values indicated in the questionnaire were trichotomized such that levels one and two were labelled "low," three and four "medium," five to seven "high," and eight in accordance with the category which is approximated most. The other form, Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP), is the level of expectation indicated by the respondent (Questionnaire item D1[a]), based upon the financial resources and social influence of his/her sponsor and/or family. Unlike the high school item, which presented a clear enough hierarchy of indicators, the ranking and trichotomization of the ten values listed here were done by considering the relative advantage of the members of each pair or cluster of values. To illustrate with values one to three, the respondent who expects to "seek employment in government establishments" as a matter of hope (value 1) is far below his/her counterpart who has "the necessary connections" to secure employment

in such outfits (value 2). The respondent who adopts a middle course, with some suggestion of the possibility of working for the government first (value 3), was labelled "medium" for purposes of the analysis. The "well connected" fellow was categorized as "high," while the merely "hoping" respondent was labelled "low." Extending the same logic, values four, six, seven and nine were put in the "high" category, values eight and ten in the "medium" category, and value five in the "low" category. Only the first choice of the respondent was considered in the ranking and trichotomization of the ten values provided in the questionnaire.

3. Psychologically Based Expectations (PBE). This variable also appears in two forms. The first, Psychologically Based Expectations in High School (PBE-HS), is the level of further educational-cum-occupational expectation checked by the respondent (Questionnaire item C2[a]) on the basis of his/her proven mental/academic ability. For purposes of data analysis, the eight items itemized in the questionnaire were trichotomized such that levels one and two were labelled "low," three and four "medium," five to seven "high," and eight depending on the category which it approximated most. The second form, Psychologically Based Expectations in Professional Program (PBE-PP), is the level of professional practice and/or further professional education expectation checked by the respondent (Questionnaire item D2[a]) on the basis of his/her proven mental/academic resources or skills. For purposes of data analysis, value ranking and trichotomization into "low," "medium" and "high" categories were done exactly as in SBE-PP above. However, the only adjustment here was

that the terms "connections/contacts/resources/financial support" in the ten values indicated for SBE-PP (Questionnaire item D1[a]) had to be understood as some edge or leverage in academic/mental resources or skills for purposes of PBE-PP.

4. Program/Level of Study. The relevant categories (Questionnaire item A2[c]) are (a) Law, (b) Medicine and (c) High School.

5. Gender. This refers simply to (a) Male and (b) Female human categories (Questionnaire item A1).

6. Religion. The relevant categories (Questionnaire item A7) are (a) Christian and (b) Muslim. The "Other" category, which polled only 12 cases (1.8%), had to be excluded from the analysis because the politics of social opportunity in Nigeria is limited to Islam versus Christianity.

7. Region. As the basis of the politics of educational provision and access in Nigeria is the so-called north-south dichotomy, the relevant categories are (a) North and (b) South. We derived them by recoding the appropriate combination of the states of origin of respondents as yielded by Questionnaire item A6(a). The eleven states of Bauchi, Benue, Bornu, Gongola, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kwara, Niger, Plateau and Sokoto constituted "North." The "South" comprised the ten states of Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bendel, Cross River, Imo, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and Rivers.

8. Ethnic-Political Constituency. Also derived by recoding the appropriate combination of states of origin, this refers to the five major ethnic-political power bases in Nigeria: (a) the Hausa-Fulani, inclusive of Kanuri, northern majority (Bauchi, Bornu, Kaduna, Kano,

Katsina, Niger and Sokoto states); (b) the Yoruba south-western majority (Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo states); (c) the Igbo south-eastern majority (Anambra and Imo states); (d) the Northern Minorities of the middle belt (Benue, Gongola, Kwara and Plateau states); and (e) the Southern Minorities of the south-central, delta, and east-coastal areas (Akwa Ibom, Bendel, Cross River and Rivers states).

9. Residence. The major divide in our data analysis was between respondents who are normally resident, or who have lived longest, in either (a) an "Urban" location or (b) a "Rural" location. Thus, the mere fact of having attended an urban or a rural school is irrelevant here. A rural area, as typified by a village, is one "in which people depend mostly on farming and primary industries for their living and in which most modern amenities are lacking" (Akande, 1987, p. 77). The amenities would include electricity, running water, telephone facilities, hospitals, banks, full-fledged postal service, bus/cab transportation, as well as modern shopping and recreational facilities. In addition to having such amenities, an urban area, as typified by cities and towns,usually has secondary/manufacturing and tertiary/service as well as higher education industries. Concerned with making a detailed distinction, our actual measurement (Questionnaire item A8) identified three categories made up of two degrees of urbanization and one rural value. The first urban value, "Cities and major Nigerian towns," used federal and state capitals as its benchmark. The second urban value, "Small urban towns," used local government headquarters, as well as modest

commercial/travellers' centres, as the standard. "Rural towns and villages" (the third residential indicator) comprised locations that did not fit into any of the former two. For purposes of data analysis, the two urban values were combined, except for 20 high school respondents in "small urban towns" (there were 69 professional cases in that category) who had to be recoded as "rural" because of the limited urban experience they would have had as teenagers vis-a-vis the geographically mobile young adults in law and medicine.

10. Academic Performance. This is the range of scores which the respondent tended to average in his/her subjects/courses in recent years. Questionnaire item A12(a) itemized six such values and required respondents to check the particular value that applied to them: Less than 40% (value 1); 40%-49% (value 2); 50%-59% (value 3); 60%-69% (value 4); 70%-79% (value 5); 80% and above (value 6).

11. Social Class. Because of the confusion in the literature, a preliminary conceptual distinction was thought to be germane here. Following Wright and Perrone (1977), as well as Wright, Costello, Hachen and Sprague (1982), "occupations" designate positions within the technical division of labour -- the so-called technical relations of production (see also Duke and Edgell, 1987). Social "class," on the other hand, designates common positions within the social relations of production. It is within such social relations of domination and appropriation that the technical activities of jobs are performed. To illustrate, for two LLB lawyers in a firm owned by one and employing the other, the "technical content" of the job/occupation of providing legal services to clients remains largely

the same. But the "social relational content" of an employer, wealth-owning class versus an employee, salaried class is a different thing altogether.

Wright and his associates (1977, 1982) employ three criteria in identifying three "basic" classes (bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, and proletariat) and three "contradictory locations" within such class relations (small employers, managers and supervisors, and semi-autonomous employees), namely, control over physical capital or the physical means of production; control over money capital or investments and resource allocation; and control over labour power. For Miliband (1987, p. 329), the dominant class in any class society is constituted by virtue of its control and/or ownership of three main means of domination, namely, the means of production, the means of state administration and coercion, and the main means of communication and consent. As for Sklar (1979), indigenous class formation, consolidation and domination in Africa and the developing world generally is a function not only of the means of production, but also of the means of compulsion and the means of consumption.

To integrate the foregoing conceptual map within a coherent Marxian framework, we expanded the notion of "production" beyond the traditional economic/material conditions of existence on to the production and reproduction of the political-ideological, bureaucratic-coercive, cultural-educational, religious-symbolic and customary-custodial conditions of domination and appropriation in a nation-state conceived of as a giant corporation. From this perspective, we were able to identify several class constituents within the private, state and "traditional" sectors. In this respect, the operational model, logic and criteria developed around the "means and forces of production" by Wright and his associates was equally expanded to serve our purposes (see Table 4.1). Recent works which have followed Wright's basic classificatory scheme include Li (1988), Ornstein (1983), and Wallace and Jepperson (1986).

Just as the intimate details, "structural ambiguities," leeways and hard decisions entailed in operationalizing specific classes from the structural Marxist framework, the overall logic and detailed classificatory criteria of the Wrightian class structure typology appear in Wright and Perrone (1977) and Wright et al. (1982), and so we did not have to reproduce them here. Instead, what we did was to draw on Wright, laced with the conceptual apparatuses of Miliband and Sklar, in outlining six ordinal class positions and in indicating, broadly, their corresponding classificatory logic and criteria (see Table 4.1). Briefly, the class locations were built around questions of ownership, exchange and authority relations, one's degree of control and autonomy, besides supervisory and decision-making power. And, in line with their utility in Wright-influenced research conducted by Ornstein (1983) and Wallace and Jepperson (1986), we included questionnaire items which inquired into the degree of autonomy exercised at work, self-employment status, number of persons employed, managerial-supervisory status, number of persons overseen, as well as plain occupational title and job description. During actual data analysis, class categories five and six (Table 4.1) were collapsed into one bourgeois/employer class, while class locations two to four were, after Nicos Polantzas, collapsed into one "old" and "new" petty-bourgeois class.

Table 4.1

Class Structure Typology, Logic and Criteria

Code	Marxist Class Locations	Operational Logic and Criteria
6 =	Bourgeoisie: - private sector - state sector	Owns means of production; buys labour power; directly makes core decisions over physical and money capital; directly controls the authority hierarchy. Self-employed; employs 10 or more persons. * Of course civil-military "commanders" of state heights (presidents, ministers, armed forces top brass, governors, appeal and supreme court judges, senate president, directors of national media and corporations, etc.) are the trustees or virtual owners of the consortium called a nation-state.
5 =	Small Employers - private sector - state sector	Owns means of production; buys some labour power; makes core decisions; controls authority structure. Self-employed; employs 2-9 persons. * Of course the next layer of political and public (civil-military) office holders, high court judges, university vice chancellors, state commissioners, directors of ministries, local government chairmen or secretaries, Muslim Imams, Christian Bishops, and regional "traditional" authorities (Emir of Kano, Ooni of Ife, Oba of Benin, Obi of Onitsha) are the trustees of "subsidiaries" of the giant corporation called Nigeria. They hire and fire.
4 =	Petty Bourgeoisie - private sector - state sector	Owns and directly uses means of production; complete self-direction within the labour process. Self-employed; employs essentially 0 persons, or else 1 person (clerk/typist/messenger/personal driver) part- or full-time. Included are small business(wo)men, shopkeepers and contractor-class self-employed artisans with fed apprentices who double as househelp and business hands. So are town-level "traditional" rulers, and church ministers with stations.
3 =	Managers and Supervisors - private sector - state sector	Do not own means of production; sell labour power; managers are involved in some core investment or personnel decisions; some sanctioning or task authority; may or may not be titled "manager" in the formal hierarchy; dominant and subordinate, but not really dominated. Employees; exercise some authority (managerial or supervisory) over other employees. Included are those who "manage," "supervise" or determine the allocation of productive communal capital: village-level traditional leaders, chiefs or titled persons; those who manage or supervise vital corridors of the state: the middle ranks of the armed forces, magistrates, and the senior professional, executive, or technocratic personnel of the state sector.
2 =	Semi-autonomous Employees	Does not own means of production; sells labour power; normally excluded from decisions over the work place; subordinate to employers and managers; yet substantial self-direction/autonomy within the labour process. Employee; does not "manage" or "supervise" other workers. Included are professional, technical and related skilled employees in the private or state sector.
1 =	Workers/ Proletariat	Does not own or control anything; of course sells labour power; dominated and subordinated. Includes operatives, unskilled workers, labourers, clericals, petty traders, housewives, peasant farmers, etc., and their dependants.

* These figures are somewhat arbitrary; but they make sense and have been used by Wright et al. (1982) and Wallace and Jepperson (1986). Precisely, they identify the "Employer Class."

Following Duke and Edgell (1987), the unit of class analysis adopted was the household/family, which we considered as nuclear and/or extended. Within the household, our indicator was the dominant member. "Application of the dominance principle for household measures of class allows the husband _or_ wife _or_ significant other in the household to determine the class location of the household" (Duke and Edgell, 1987, p. 452). However, indicators other than the dominant adult member were useful in further delineating the class location of otherwise borderline or ambiguous cases (for measurement specifications, see Questionnaire items B3, B4, B5 and B6).

Instruments and Procedure

The basic instrument in this study was a structured survey questionnaire in two major parts. The first, which consisted of two sections, inquired into background and personal characteristics which yielded measured values for our independent and control variables. The second, which also comprised two sections, called for responses regarding the occupational and/or further educational expectations of the respondents. Because of the intricacies entailed in the drawing of our sample, the procedure used in administering the survey questionnaire has already been discussed early in this chapter. As a brief recapitulation, volunteers and paid assistants (school psychologists and teachers, law and medical students) were duly briefed and coordinated by the investigator before and during the period of instrument administration. Also, the ethnic-territorial imperatives of the study required visiting and staying one or two nights in one of the conventional federal universities located in each of five such Nigerian constituencies.

Given the fact that we also had to make the round of the Federal Ministry of Education and the National Universities Commission regarding official bulletins, digests and abstracts of nation-wide enrolment figures in federal high schools and universities, it was not possible, within the six weeks (November to mid-December, 1989) available for the entire field work, to devote as much time as we would have loved to the various ethnic-territorial sub-populations of the study. Unlike the sub-sample of federal high school students who completed copies of the questionnaire within forty-minute class sessions, the ones completed by the sub-sample of law and medical students generally took days and weeks to trickle in through assistants.

Data Analysis

An essentially non-probability sample restricted our data analysis to a modest use of the cross-tabulation technique of bivariate and multivariate analyses. Thus, comparative percentage figures were obtained through the use of cross-tabulation analysis, a method which, within the limits of a rather modest sample size, was bolstered in the analysis of educational-cum-occupational expectations with the explanatory logic of Lazarsfeld's elaboration technique. This model entails the use of sub-group contingency tables (i.e. cross-tabulations) to explore the stability or otherwise of an observed two-variable relationship, through the introduction of relevant control variables within the same data set (Babbie, 1986; Rosenberg, 1968).

More compositely, recomputing an initially observed two-variable relationship within each of the relevant sub-groups should help an investigator to "replicate" the said association, or "interpret" the mechanism through which it occurs, or "explain" away its disappearance, or else "specify" the conditions under which it holds true. Even where a relationship of "zero" had been observed in an initial analysis for two variables thought to be theoretically connected, the elaboration model could still be used to explore the possibility that some variable(s) might either be "suppressing" the expected relationship, or be "distorting" the true relationship between the variables at issue. Thus, partial or sub-group relationships may well be where to confirm the expected associations (for details, see Babbie, 1986, ch. 16).

Limitations

Given the overall concerns of this study, it probably would profit the most from a population that is neither delimited to the "model" federal high schools in the Lagos Capital Territory nor restricted to the "classical" professional programs of federal universities. It may, however, take both a governmental mandate and a resource-rich research institute to ambition such a nation- and program-wide project. Also, it is not unreasonable to express reservations over the generalizability of findings from a non-probability sample. And the other limitation of a modest, though by no means negligible, sample size did not allow us to make the most of the explanatory powers of elaboration analysis either. However, the problem was not simply the sheer size of the sample, but, instead, the apparent scarcity of "working class" and "rural" attributes in the survey sample. Beyond that, the imperatives of competing research aims, together with a last-minute abdication of funding responsibilities by our sponsors, also constrained the nature and size of our sample.

Besides, the Wrightian typology of Marxist social classes is not free of conceptual and methodological ambiguities. Errors of wrongful exclusion or/and wrongful inclusion are not totally easy to avoid in this kind of exercise, a possibility that was rendered probable by the fact that the enabling information was provided by persons other than the referents themselves. Thus, this exercise may have approximated reality, but cannot have reproduced it.

Lastly, a cross-sectional study may be limited in its ability to mirror social or educational trends over time. One consolation, however, is that this study is historically and empirically contextualized to the extent that it represents a point along the chain of previous related studies in Nigeria and elsewhere, some of which have been reviewed in earlier chapters of this report. Perhaps another consolation is that data from the Nigerian bureaucracy span several years in respect of patterns of gender, ethnic constituency and regional participation in universities as well as federal high schools. Indeed, that set of data somewhat temper the problem of generalizability of findings. Ultimately, the findings and conclusions of this study should be seen within the context of the foregoing qualifications.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

For the purpose of presenting, describing and interpreting the findings of this study, a three-step approach is generally adopted. First, we pose the enabling research question. Second, we present and describe the empirical evidence available to us. Third, we attempt to give some meaning to any observed trends, or the lack of such, and thus draw some conclusions in response to the opening research question. Following Champion (1981), a minimum of five cases in a cell and/or a difference of approximately five percentage points between groups shall suffice for making fairly meaningful statements regarding the characteristics of our sample, and, even if tentatively, those of the study population.

Research Question #1

What is the proportion of the different social classes (workers, semi-autonomous employees, managers and supervisors, petty-bourgeoisie, small employers, bourgeoisie) in federal educational institutions?

The Evidence

Table 5.1.1 shows the proportion of each of the indicated social classes in our study sample. As this table reveals, students from bourgeois and small-employer backgrounds constituted 12.7 percent and 21.3 percent of the sample, respectively. Whereas petty-bourgeois and managerial-supervisory families accounted for 16.3 percent and 38.6 percent of the sample, respectively, those of semi-autonomous employees took up 8.6 percent. The offspring of workers accounted for only 2.5 percent of the sample. If one trichotomized the social classes such that the first two locations became one bourgeois/employer class, the next three an "old"-and-"new" petty bourgeois class, while workers remained distinct, the percentage distribution in the sample would be 34 percent bourgeoisie, 63.5 percent petty-bourgeoisie and, of course, 2.5 percent working class.

To help place these findings in some methodological perspective, a little digression is perhaps germane here. In Chapter III of this volume, we attempted to debate Beckett and O'Connell's (1977) report that 31.1 percent, 49.2 percent and 51.6 percent, respectively, of the samples in a 1973 study of three Nigerian universities at Nsukka, Ibadan and Zaria had fathers whose occupation was mainly farming -- in a country with neither universal primary education nor universal student loan, bursary or scholarship facilities? Among others, we hinted that an inquiry into the students' major sponsor(s) (rather than simply "father's occupation") would, by coming to terms with the tendency of familial clientelist relations to cut across class lines, better delineate the class character of educational opportunity in Nigeria (see also our review of a report on

Table 5.1.1
Distribution of Sample by Sponsor's Social Class

Social Class	Frequency	Percentage
Bourgeoisie	81	12.7
Small Employers	136	21.3
Petty-bourgeoisie	104	16.3
Managers & Supervisors	246	38.6
Semi-autonomous Employees	55	8.6
Proletariat	16	2.5
TOTAL	638	100.0
(missing cases = 12)		

Table 5.1.2
Distribution of Sample by Sponsor

Sponsor	Frequency	Percentage
Father	361	56.1
Mother	31	4.8
Father & Mother[a]	163	25.3
Brother	20	3.1
Father & Brother	7	1.1
Other in Nuclear Family[b]	10	1.6
Husband/Friend and/or Self	31	4.8
Uncle	6	0.9
Other kindred[c]	14	2.2
TOTAL[*]	643	100.0
(missing cases = 7)		

Notes:
[a] Questionnaire item B4 in the Appendix compelled respondents to finally settle for just one sponsor.
[b] Includes sister, father and sister, brother and sister, brother and mother.
[c] Includes cousin, in-law and other unspecified "relative"
[*] There may be computer rounding error.

Table 5.1.3
Distribution of Sample by Sponsor's Education

Education	Frequency	Percentage
High[a]	460	74.6
Middle[b]	102	16.5
Low[c]	55	8.9
TOTAL	617	100.0
(missing cases = 33)		

Notes:
[a] Includes first degree to doctorate.
[b] Includes completed secondary to higher education below first degree.
[c] Includes none to some secondary.
For details, see Questionnaire items B1 and B3(b) in the Appendix.

Table 5.1.4
Distribution of Sample by Sponsor's Income

Income	Frequency	Percentage
High[a]	270	70.1
Middle[b]	100	25.9
Low[c]	15	3.9
TOTAL*	385	100.0
(missing = 265)		

Notes:
[a] Includes N17,000 - N30,000 or above.
[b] Includes N5,000 - N16,999.
[c] Includes N1,500 - N4,999.
For details, see Questionnaire items B4(i) and B5(e) in the Appendix.
* There may be computer rounding error.

Table 5.1.5
Distribution of Sample by Sponsor's Rank in Work-place Hierarchy

Rank	Frequency	Percentage
Upper[a]	375	80.6
Middle[b]	74	15.9
Lower[c]	16	3.4
TOTAL*	465	100.0
(missing cases = 185)		

Notes:
[a] Includes senior to most senior/executive ranks.
[b] Includes middle to upper middle ranks.
[c] Includes most junior to lower middle ranks.
Details appear in Questionnaire item B4(j) in the Appendix.
* There may be computer rounding error.

Table 5.1.6
Distribution of Sample by Parental Occupation and Education (Percentages)

	FATHER		MOTHER	
	Occupation[a]	Education[b]	Occupation[c]	Education[d]
HIGH	82.2 (494)	72.6 (451)	39.2 (210)	49.4 (291)
MIDDLE	11.7 (70)	13.0 (81)	39.8 (213)	27.5 (162)
LOW	6.2 (37)	14.3 (89)	21.1 (113)	23.0 (135)
TOTAL[*]	100.0 (601) (missing = 49)	100.0 (621) (missing = 29)	100.0 (536) (missing = 114)	100.0 (588) (missing = 62)

Notes:

[a] "High" includes professional, managerial and administrative occupations; "Middle" includes technical-supervisory, clerical and sales employees, as well as teachers in secondary schools and heads of primary schools; "Low" includes unskilled to skilled and sub- clerical workers. Raw responses were obtained through Questionnaire item B2 in the Appendix.

[b] "High" includes first degree to doctorate; "Middle" includes completed secondary school to higher education below first degree; "Low" includes none to some secondary school. For details, see Questionnaire item B1 in the Appendix.

[c] Is as in "a" above.

[d] Is as in "b" above.

[*] There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.1.7
Distribution of Social Class by Gender, Residence, Region, Religion, Level/Program, Academic Performance and Ethnic-Political Constituency
(Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS					
		Workers		Petty Bourgeoisie		Bourgeoisie	
GENDER	Male	81.3	(13)	64.0	(259)	44.2	(96)
	Female	18.8	(3)	36.0	(146)	55.8	(121)
(missing = 12)	TOTAL*	100.0	(16)	100.0	(405)	100.0	(217)
RESIDENCE	Urban	87.5	(14)	92.1	(373)	96.3	(209)
	Rural	12.5	(2)	7.9	(32)	3.7	(8)
(missing = 12)	TOTAL	100.0	(16)	100.0	(405)	100.0	(217)
REGION	North	37.5	(6)	31.8	(128)	21.8	(47)
	South	62.5	(10)	68.2	(274)	78.2	(169)
(missing = 16)	TOTAL*	100.0	(16)	100.0	(402)	100.0	(216)
RELIGION	Christian	81.3	(13)	76.6	(302)	76.3	(164)
	Muslim	18.8	(3)	23.4	(92)	23.7	(51)
(missing = 25)	TOTAL*	100.0	(16)	100.0	(394)	100.0	(215)
LEVEL/PROGRAM	High School	0.0	(0)	54.3	(220)	67.7	(147)
	Law	56.3	(9)	27.9	(113)	18.9	(41)
	Medicine	43.8	(7)	17.8	(72)	13.4	(29)
(missing = 12)	TOTAL*	100.0	(16)	100.0	(405)	100.0	(217)
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE	High	0.0	(0)	16.1	(65)	24.9	(54)
	Moderate	93.3	(14)	74.5	(301)	67.3	(146)
	Low	6.7	(1)	9.4	(38)	7.8	(17)
(missing = 14)	TOTAL*	100.0	(15)	100.0	(404)	100.0	(217)
ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY	Hausa-Fulani	6.3	(1)	15.4	(62)	12.5	(27)
	Yoruba	6.3	(1)	29.4	(118)	40.3	(87)
	Igbo	31.3	(5)	18.4	(74)	19.0	(41)
	Northern Minorities	31.3	(5)	16.4	(66)	9.3	(20)
	Southern Minorities	25.0	(4)	20.4	(82)	19.0	(41)
(missing = 16)	TOTAL*	100.0	(16)	100.0	(402)	100.0	(216)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Kenyan higher education by Hughes, 1987, in Chapter II). In Chapter IV, we settled for the dominant member (i.e. major sponsor) in a broadly conceptualized household/family as the indicator of class location. The dominance principle "allows the husband or wife or significant other" to determine the class location of the family (Duke & Edgell, 1987, p. 452). Elsewhere in Chapters II and III, we noted that Marxian class categories (based upon "relational" rather than "distributive" inequalities) were more likely to give a sharper relief to patterns of educational-cum-social inequalities than conventional liberal-functionalist approaches couched in the idiom of SES and typically employing one or more of father's occupation, education and income, with or without those of the mother. In other words, the occupationalist SES models bequeathed by social mobility/status attainment research may actually be inflating the representation of the underprivileged classes in the choice positions or institutions of society -- perhaps as evidence that everybody has an equal opportunity to rise to the top?

If one considers the distribution in Table 5.1.1 side by side with the data in Tables 5.1.2 to 5.1.6, the reported characteristics of our sample seem to bear out the foregoing argument. Fathers alone do not have a monopoly of the financial responsibility for educational participation. The "low" category in the distribution of sponsor's education (8.9%) seems to exaggerate the representation of the underprivileged groups in our sample. This is slightly so for the equivalent categories in the distribution of sponsor's income (3.9%) and work-place rank (3.4%). We, unfortunately, did not code data dealing purely with sponsor's occupation. But it is interesting that the very instrument which ideally should fall somewhere between sponsor's occupation and sponsor's social class (namely, sponsor's rank in work-place hierarchy of power and responsibility) yielded a lower-category percentage (3.4%) which is closest to the proportion of working class students (2.5%) in our sample as reported in Table 5.1.1 (see Table 5.1.5). The comparative data in Table 5.1.6 also verify for our sample the contention that researchers steeped in the tradition of SES or father's occupation frequently miss the class dynamics in some Nigerian families, to say nothing of inflating the participation of the less privileged groups in the elite streams of the education system.

To return to our major concern with the proportion of the different social classes in the study sample, Table 5.1.7 further explores the distribution of the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and working classes within several characteristics of the sample. As this table reveals, relatively higher concentrations of working class students will be found amongst the male (81.3%), urban (87.5%), southern (62.5%), Christian (81.3%), law (56.3%), moderate-performing (93.3%), as well as the Igbo (31.3%) and the Northern Minority (31.3%) sub-groups. There is no evidence of a working class attribute in the high school sub-group. Conversely, larger concentrations of the bourgeoisie are indicated by the high school (67.7%), female (55.8%) and Yoruba (40.3%) sub-groups. Also, in comparison with their rural, northern, Muslim as well as high- and low-performing counterparts, higher concentrations of the bourgeoisie are again indicated by the urban (96.3%), southern (78.2%), Christian (76.3%) and moderate-performing (67.3%) sub-groups.

Conclusions

Compared to the petty-bourgeoisie (Ralf Dahrendorf's "new middle classes"), who are estimated to constitute between 30 and 40 percent of the Nigerian population (see Diejomaoh & Anusionwu, 1981; Woodhouse, 1987), a figure of 12.7 percent suggests disproportionate over-representation in our sample for the bourgeoisie, who are reported to make up roughly two percent of all Nigerians. And, with a constituency estimated, SES-wise, at 60 percent of the Nigerian population, the working class are definitely disproportionately under-represented in our sample. Essentially, the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie are disproportionately over-represented in the sample. Although the absence of a working class attribute in the high school sub-sample ideally suggests scarcity rather than simply absolute zero, the large concentration of the bourgeoisie in that typically teenage sub-group points toward the ossification of class reproduction in educational participation over the school years between the high school and the professional program cohorts in the sample. That noted, an element of gender, religious and regional selectivity in the sample is such that female, Muslim and northern students, in comparison with their male, Christian and southern counterparts, are more likely to be represented in the sample if they come from privileged or non-working class backgrounds. Allowing for the limitations of representativeness and generalizability usually associated (at least theoretically) with a non-probability sample, maybe the foregoing findings and conclusions extend, more or less, to federal high schools and the professional programs of federal universities.

Research Question #2

What is the proportion of males and females in federal educational institutions?

The Evidence

Table 5.2.1 displays the overall proportion of males and females in our survey sample: 58.3 percent and 41.7 percent, respectively, with a difference of 16.6 percent in favour of males. On exploring gender distribution within a couple of sub-groups, however, it turns out that there are larger concentrations of females among the bourgeoisie (44.8% females versus 26.1% males), urban students (96.7% females versus 90.2% males), Muslims (26.7% females versus 21.3% males), the high school sub-group (63.1% females versus 52.5% males), moderate performers (75.8% females versus 71.0% males), as well as the Yoruba (43.0% females versus 24.5% males). Nevertheless, the distribution suggests gender parity in the southern, law, low-performing and northern minority sub-groups. It shall soon be obvious that the suggested female preponderance and the implied gender parity, respectively, among the Yoruba and the Northern Minorities in the sample are no more than an indication of lower levels of gender disparity vis-a-vis the other constituencies (for the Yoruba) and within northern Nigeria (for the Northern Minorities).

Thus, Tables 5.2.3 to 5.2.5 further display patterns of gender representation with official statistics from the Nigerian government agencies in charge of universities and the education system generally.

Table 5.2.1
Distribution of Sample by Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Males	379	58.3
Females	271	41.7
Total	650	100.0

(missing cases = 0)

Table 5.2.2
Distribution of Gender by Social Class, Residence, Region, Religion, Level/Program, Academic Performance and Ethnic-Political Constituency
(Percentages)

		GENDER	
		Male	Female
SOCIAL CLASS	Bourgeoisie	26.1 (96)	44.8 (121)
	Petty-Bourgeoisie	70.4 (259)	54.1 (146)
	Workers	3.5 (13)	1.1 (3)
(missing = 12)	TOTAL*	100.0 (368)	100.0 (270)
RESIDENCE	Urban	90.2 (342)	96.7 (262)
	Rural	9.8 (37)	3.3 (9)
(missing = 0)	TOTAL*	100.0 (379)	100.0 (271)
REGION	North	30.3 (114)	27.0 (73)
	South	69.7 (262)	73.0 (197)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL*	100.0 (376)	100.0 (270)
RELIGION	Christian	78.7 (289)	73.3 (198)
	Muslim	21.3 (78)	26.7 (72)
(missing = 13)	TOTAL*	100.0 (367)	100.0 (270)
LEVEL/PROGRAM	High School	52.5 (199)	63.1 (171)
	Law	24.8 (94)	27.3 (74)
	Medicine	22.7 (86)	9.6 (26)
(missing = 0)	TOTAL*	100.0 (379)	100.0 (271)
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE	High	20.6 (78)	15.2 (41)
	Moderate	71.0 (269)	75.8 (204)
	Low	8.4 (32)	8.9 (24)
(missing = 2)	TOTAL*	100.0 (379)	100.0 (269)
ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY	Hausa-Fulani	16.0 (60)	12.6 (34)
	Yoruba	24.5 (92)	43.0 (116)
	Igbo	22.1 (83)	14.1 (38)
	Northern Minorities	14.4 (54)	14.4 (39)
	Southern Minorities	23.1 (87)	15.9 (43)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL*	100.0 (376)	100.0 (270)

* There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.2.3
Total Enrolment in Federal High Schools by Gender, Academic Years 1979/80 to 1983/84, 1987/88 to 1988/89 *

Academic Year	Male	Percentage	Female	Percentage	Total
1979/80	8,351	45.4	10,048	54.6	18,399
1980/81	9,450	44.9	11,598	55.1	21,048
1981/82	9,770	40.0	14,660	60.0	24,430
1982/83	11,739	42.9	15,654	57.1	27,393
1983/84	9,600	37.0	16,312	63.0	25,912
1987/88	25,945	56.0	20,378	44.0	46,323
1988/89	26,376	55.7	20,950	44.3	47,326
Total	101,231	(48.0)	109,600	(52.0)	210,831

Sources: Federal Ministry of Education (1985), Statistics of Education in Nigeria 1980-84, Lagos, Nigeria p. 59; (1986-87), Directory of Post-Primary Educational Institutions in Nigeria, Lagos, Nigeria, pp. 98-99; (1989), Mimeograph, Lagos, Nigeria.

* Data for 1984/85 to 1986/87 had lots of incompletes and so were virtually useless.

Table 5.2.4
Total Enrolment in Nigerian Universities by Gender and Selected Programs, Academic Years 1986/87 to 1988/89 (Percentages)

Academic Year		Law	Medicine	Arts	Education	Sciences	Engineering
1986/87	% M	76.5	75.3	66.9	61.8	74.5	93.3
		(6955)	(7423)	(13543)	(17419)	(15785)	(11708)
	% F	23.5	24.7	33.1	38.2	25.5	6.7
		(2136)	(2433)	(6712)	(10759)	(5414)	(847)
1987/88	% M	77.3	76.4	64.1	60.6	73.0	93.0
		(7962)	(7667)	(14354)	(17798)	(18593)	(12982)
	% F	22.7	23.6	35.9	39.4	27.0	7.0
		(2338)	(2367)	(8024)	(11550)	(6873)	(982)
1988/89	% M	75.2	76.4	61.4	57.5	72.6	92.1
		(5732)	(7594)	(10769)	(11601)	(16508)	(10128)
	% F	24.8	23.6	38.6	42.5	27.4	7.9
		(1892)	(2347)	(6776)	(8584)	(6243)	(869)
TOTAL	% M	76.4	80.8	64.3	60.2	73.3	92.8
		(20649)	(30107)	(38666)	(46818)	(50886)	(34818)
	% F	23.6	19.2	35.7	39.8	26.7	7.2
		(6366)	(7147)	(21512)	(30893)	(18530)	(2698)

Sources: Collated and computed from National Universities Commission (1987), Annual Report, Lagos, Nigeria, p. 20, Table 1; (1988) Annual Report, Lagos, Nigeria, pp. T2-T5, Table 2.

Note: % M means percentage for males; % F means percentage for females.

Table 5.2.5
Total Enrolment in Nigerian Universities by Gender, Region, Ethnic-Political Constituency and State of Origin, Academic Years 1980/81 to 1985/86 (Northern Nigeria)

Academic Year		Northern Minority					Hausa-Fulani, etc.							
		Benue	Gongola	Plateau	Kwara		Bauchi	Sokoto	Kano	Kaduna	Niger	Bornu		Sub-total
1980/81	% M	3.3 (2334)	2.0 (1428)	1.9 (1369)	4.3 (3029)	11.5	1.5 (1066)	1.1 (781)	2.1 (1483)	2.8 (1982)	1.2 (827)	1.9 (1363)	10.6	22.1 (15662)
	% F	0.6 (431)	0.2 (176)	0.4 (261)	0.9 (666)	2.1	0.1 (106)	0.1 (81)	0.2 (169)	0.4 (298)	0.2 (128)	0.3 (199)	1.4	3.5 (2515)
1981/82	% M	3.4 (2900)	1.8 (1533)	2.1 (1768)	4.4 (3756)	11.7	1.3 (1124)	1.3 (1077)	2.1 (1778)	3.2 (2719)	1.2 (1035)	1.7 (1441)	10.6	22.3 (19131)
	% F	0.7 (561)	0.3 (272)	0.3 (252)	1.2 (995)	2.5	0.2 (143)	0.1 (94)	0.2 (199)	0.7 (606)	0.2 (170)	0.4 (330)	1.7	4.2 (3622)
1982/83	% M	2.9 (2808)	2.0 (1903)	2.0 (1928)	4.6 (4459)	11.5	1.4 (1391)	1.3 (1296)	2.3 (2173)	2.8 (2656)	1.4 (1386)	1.8 (1772)	11.2	22.7 (21772)
	% F	0.5 (483)	0.4 (351)	0.4 (339)	1.0 (998)	2.3	0.2 (178)	0.1 (144)	0.3 (257)	0.4 (399)	0.2 (168)	0.3 (303)	1.5	3.8 (3620)
1983/84	% M	3.0 (3290)	2.3 (2478)	2.0 (2147)	4.1 (4453)	11.4	1.6 (1735)	1.5 (1581)	2.3 (2494)	3.2 (3487)	1.4 (1573)	1.7 (1888)	11.7	23.1 (25126)
	% F	0.5 (577)	0.4 (430)	0.4 (405)	1.1 (1153)	2.4	0.2 (230)	0.2 (181)	0.3 (301)	0.4 (487)	0.2 (188)	0.5 (590)	1.8	4.2 (4542)
1984/85	% M	3.1 (3661)	2.2 (2634)	2.0 (2327)	4.3 (5127)	11.6	1.7 (2026)	1.4 (1711)	2.3 (2733)	3.4 (4108)	1.5 (1753)	1.7 (2040)	12.0	23.6 (28120)
	% F	0.5 (615)	0.5 (551)	0.5 (546)	1.1 (1256)	2.6	0.3 (347)	0.2 (184)	0.3 (388)	0.5 (636)	0.2 (268)	0.4 (505)	1.8	4.4 (5296)
1985/86	% M	3.0 (3973)	2.1 (2823)	1.8 (2409)	4.1 (5562)	11.0	1.6 (2122)	1.6 (2146)	2.4 (3214)	3.2 (4341)	1.3 (1747)	1.7 (2224)	11.7	22.7 (30561)
	% F	0.6 (754)	0.4 (592)	0.3 (465)	1.2 (1657)	2.5	0.3 (379)	0.2 (264)	0.3 (391)	0.6 (767)	0.2 (248)	0.4 (536)	2.0	4.5 (6053)
TOTAL	% M	84.7 (18966)	84.4 (12799)	84.0 (11948)	79.7 (26386)	82.6	87.2 (9464)	90.1 (8592)	89.1 (13875)	85.8 (19293)	87.7 (8321)	81.3 (10728)	86.6	
	% F	15.3 (3421)	15.6 (2372)	16.0 (2268)	20.3 (6725)	17.4	12.8 (1383)	9.9 (948)	10.9 (1705)	14.2 (3193)	12.3 (1170)	18.7 (2463)	13.4	

Source: Collated and computed from National Universities Commission (1989), NUC Statistical Digest, Lagos, NUC, Nigeria.

Note: % M means percentage for males; % F means percentage for females.

Table 5.2.5 [cont'd]
Total Enrolment in Nigerian Universities by Gender, Region, Ethnic-Political Constituency and State of Origin, Academic Years 1980/81 to 1985/86 (Southern Nigeria)

		Igbo			Southern Minority				Yoruba						
Academic Year		Anambra	Imo		Cross River	Rivers	Bendel		Lagos	Ondo	Ogun	Oyo		Sub-total	Total
1980/81	% M	9.0 (6405)	9.1 (6454)	18.1	4.2 (2945)	4.9 (3456)	9.2 (6535)	18.3	1.2 (854)	6.0 (4274)	4.6 (3293)	8.8 (6205)	20.6	57.0 (40421)	79.1 (56083)
	% F	2.4 (1672)	2.3 (1624)	4.7	1.2 (850)	1.5 (1098)	3.3 (2360)	6.0	0.5 (387)	1.8 (1256)	2.0 (1446)	2.3 (1619)	6.6	17.4 (12312)	20.9 (14827)
1981/82	% M	8.5 (7310)	8.3 (7120)	16.8	4.2 (3605)	4.6 (3923)	8.9 (7667)	17.7	1.1 (945)	6.1 (5272)	4.4 (3789)	9.1 (7866)	20.7	55.2 (47497)	77.5 (66628)
	% F	2.7 (2280)	2.5 (2141)	5.2	1.2 (1025)	1.4 (1194)	3.4 (2942)	6.0	0.5 (465)	2.1 (1816)	2.1 (1808)	2.4 (2056)	7.1	18.3 (15727)	22.5 (19349)
1982/83	% M	8.6 (8278)	8.0 (7700)	16.6	4.2 (4063)	4.8 (4591)	9.1 (8718)	18.1	1.2 (1106)	5.6 (5365)	4.4 (4258)	7.8 (7540)	19.0	53.7 (51619)	76.4 (73391)
	% F	2.9 (2784)	2.6 (2538)	5.5	1.4 (1348)	1.3 (1221)	3.4 (3238)	6.1	0.6 (609)	2.2 (2142)	2.3 (2243)	3.0 (2910)	8.1	19.8 (19033)	23.6 (22653)
1983/84	% M	8.0 (8685)	7.3 (7973)	15.3	5.0 (5489)	4.6 (5048)	9.4 (10279)	19.0	1.5 (1659)	6.8 (7372)	4.4 (4828)	7.9 (8626)	20.6	55.0 (59959)	78.1 (85085)
	% F	2.4 (2598)	2.3 (2519)	4.7	2.1 (2262)	1.1 (1213)	2.8 (3057)	6.0	0.7 (771)	2.4 (2566)	1.9 (2111)	2.0 (2227)	7.0	17.7 (19324)	21.9 (23866)
1984/85	% M	8.1 (9594)	7.1 (8490)	15.2	5.0 (5927)	3.7 (4384)	9.4 (11147)	18.1	1.9 (2245)	6.4 (7636)	3.9 (4641)	8.6 (10237)	20.8	54.0 (64301)	77.6 (92421)
	% F	2.5 (3009)	2.5 (2921)	5.0	2.1 (2457)	0.9 (1128)	2.9 (3457)	5.9	1.0 (1136)	2.0 (2364)	1.8 (2158)	2.3 (2746)	7.1	17.9 (21376)	22.3 (26672)
1985/86	% M	7.7 (10385)	7.8 (10535)	15.5	4.5 (6079)	3.4 (4517)	8.7 (11648)	16.6	2.2 (2950)	6.5 (8677)	4.7 (6272)	8.1 (10892)	21.5	53.5 (71955)	76.2 (102516)
	% F	2.7 (3567)	2.7 (3660)	5.4	2.0 (2734)	0.9 (1260)	3.1 (4198)	6.0	1.1 (1480)	2.1 (2857)	2.2 (2962)	2.3 (3144)	7.7	19.2 (25862)	23.7 (31915)
TOTAL	% M	76.1 (50657)	75.8 (48272)	76.0	72.5 (28108)	78.5 (25919)	74.4 (55994)	74.8	66.8 (9759)	74.8 (38596)	68.0 (27081)	77.7 (51366)	73.7		
	% F	23.9 (15910)	24.2 (15403)	24.0	27.5 (10676)	21.5 (7114)	25.6 (19252)	25.2	33.2 (4848)	25.2 (13001)	32.0 (12728)	22.3 (14702)	26.3		

Source: Collated and computed from National Universities Commission (1989), NUC Statistical Digest, Lagos, NUC, Nigeria.

Note: % M means percentage for males; % F means percentage for females.

Available data suggest that between the 1979/80 and the 1983/84 academic years, female students in federal high schools maintained a representational edge over their male counterparts, who, for whatever reasons, subsequently took the lead by the academic years 1987/88 through 1988/89 (see Table 5.2.3). However, the overall figures for all reported seven years have females with a marginal four percent lead (i.e. 52.0% versus 48.0%). Considering the fact that our survey sample was drawn from the senior years of the two federal high schools in metropolitan Lagos, the representational edge commanded by females prior to the 1987/88 session and in the overall official statistics seems to verify the larger proportion of females in our high school sub-group as reported in Table 5.2.2 (i.e. 63.1% females versus 52.5% males).

Nevertheless, a coherent picture of the under-representation of females in Nigerian universities, irrespective of region of origin, ethnic-political constituency, state of origin and course of study, can be gleaned from Tables 5.2.4 and 5.2.5. The total column in the right end of Table 5.2.5 shows that males consistently accounted for a little over three-quarters of all university students in Nigeria in each of the six reported academic years, 1980/81 through 1985/86. The said column also shows that the proportion of males fell from 79.1 percent in 1980/81 to 76.4 percent in 1982/83. It climbed back to 78.1 percent in 1983/84, only to decline to 76.2 percent in 1985/86. The proportion of female students followed a similar pattern, but in the opposite direction. Thus, females rose from 20.9 percent in 1980/81 to 23.6 percent in 1982/83. After declining to 21.9 percent in 1983/84, female representation again rose to 23.7 percent in 1985/86.

The sub-totals provide for comparison between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria. Briefly, the male-female representational disparity is less pronounced in the southern as against the northern region. While the south averaged a ratio of three males per one female for the six years under review, the north returned an average figure of 6:1 in favour of males within the same period. The percentages set off with rectangles within each year, together with their bottom total figures, provide for comparison within regions and/or between constituencies. In northern Nigeria, for example, the totalled gender disparity is relatively slightly less pronounced in the Minority, as against the Hausa-Fulani, constituency (i.e. 82.6% males versus 17.4% females in the former; 86.6% males versus 13.4% females in the latter). In the south, the Yoruba returned the least total gender differentials in university participation (73.7% males versus 26.3% females), while the Igbo polled the highest (76.0% males versus 24.0% females). But it turns out that the south's worst case is ahead of the north's best example in the balance of male-female representation for the six years under review. Also, the Yoruba constituency, especially by means of Lagos State and Ogun State, indicated the least gender disparity throughout Nigeria over the six years for which official data on male-female enrolment in universities provided for the student's place of origin.

For more recent academic years, 1986/87 to 1988/89, therefore, Table 5.2.4 displays data on gender representation by university program, this time adding to our main areas of interest (i.e. law and medicine) a selection from presumably "gender-blind" (arts and education) and "gender-laden" (science and technology) courses of study. To begin with, the slightly higher level of gender disparity indicated for medicine vis-a-vis law for all three years and within the 1988/89 session appears to verify the under-representation of females reported for the medical sub-group in our survey sample (see Table 5.2.2). Also, the gender equity basically suggested for the law sub-group in the same table should now be interpreted as simply a pointer that law has less of that problem than medicine. In sum, even with a steady but slight pattern of proportionate gain in relation to males in arts, education, the sciences and engineering, the overall picture which emerges is one of female under-representation in Nigerian universities.

Conclusions

Based in part on our survey data but, for the most part, on the vast scatter of official statistics from the Nigerian bureaucracy, the overall picture which emerges is that males outnumber females by a conservative ratio of 3:1 in federal and state universities taken together. Just as among the Yoruba vis-a-vis the other constituencies, or as within the south in relation to the north, gender disparities in Nigerian universities seem to be slightly less pronounced in law than they are in medicine, but they are clearly more entrenched in engineering and the sciences, in that order, than in apparently more equitable disciplines such as education and the arts. As with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois students in relation to the working class in Table 5.1.1, the magnitude of male over-representation would actually increase if placed in the broader demographic context in which females account for a little over 50 percent of the Nigerian population.

However, the pattern in federal high schools seems to be a mixture of the loss and gain of dominance by males on the one hand, and the gain and loss of preponderance by females on the other hand. These competing gender dynamics may be a sign of what is to come, for unreported data from the Federal Ministry of Education indicate that females have assumed a modest lead over males in primary school enrolment in two of the southern states of Nigeria. Another way of putting the matter is that, much like female attrition rates, gender disparities in educational participation in Nigeria tend to increase as one moves up the ladder from primary through higher education. Lastly, the fact that there are larger proportions of females than males among bourgeois and urban respondents, at the same time as gender disparity appears to be less pronounced in the academically low-performing, Muslim, high school, Yoruba, arts and education sub-groups, all this suggests that the balance of male-female representation in federal schools and universities is mediated by social class acting with or apart from urban-rural residence, academic performance, religion, school level/program, region and ethnicity.

Research Question #3

What is the proportion of urban and rural students in federal educational institutions?

The Evidence

Displayed in Table 5.3.1 are data showing the comparative distribution of urban and rural students in our survey sample. As this

Table 5.3.1
Distribution of Sample by Residence

Residence	Frequency	Percentage
Urban	604	92.9
Rural	46	7.1
Total	650	100.0

(missing cases = 0)

Table 5.3.2
Distribution of Residence by Social Class, Gender, Region, Religion, Level/Program, Academic Performance and Ethnic-Political Constituency
(Percentages)

		RESIDENCE			
		Urban		Rural	
SOCIAL CLASS	Bourgeoisie	35.1	(209)	19.0	(8)
	Petty-bourgeoisie	62.6	(373)	76.2	(32)
	Workers	2.3	(14)	4.8	(2)
(missing = 12)	TOTAL*	100.0	(596)	100.0	(42)
GENDER	Male	56.6	(342)	80.4	(37)
	Female	43.4	(262)	19.6	(9)
(missing = 0)	TOTAL*	100.0	(604)	100.0	(46)
REGION	North	27.5	(165)	47.8	(22)
	South	72.5	(435)	52.2	(24)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL*	100.0	(600)	100.0	(46)
RELIGION	Christian	76.6	(455)	74.4	(32)
	Muslim	23.4	(139)	25.6	(11)
(missing = 13)	TOTAL*	100.0	(594)	100.0	(43)
LEVEL/PROGRAM	High School	57.8	(349)	45.7	(21)
	Law	25.7	(155)	26.1	(12)
	Medicine	16.6	(100)	28.3	(13)
(missing = 0)	TOTAL*	100.0	(604)	100.0	(46)
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE	High	19.4	(117)	4.3	(2)
	Moderate	71.9	(433)	87.0	(40)
	Low	8.6	(52)		(4)
(missing = 2)	TOTAL*	100.0	(602)	100.0	(46)
ETHNIC-POLICITAL CONSTITUENCY	Hausa-Fulani	13.8	(83)	23.9	(11)
	Yoruba	34.0	(204)	8.7	(4)
	Igbo	18.8	(113)	17.4	(8)
	Northern Minority	13.7	(82)	23.9	(11)
	Southern Minority	19.7	(118)	26.1	(12)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL*	100.0	(600)	100.0	(46)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

table reveals, there are 85.8 percent more urban than rural students in the entire sample (i.e. 92.9% versus 7.1%). On exploring the nature of urban-rural distribution within several sub-groups of the sample (see Table 5.3.2), one finds larger proportions of rural students among the petty-bourgeoisie (76.2% rural versus 62.6% urban), males (80.4% rural versus 56.6% urban), northerners (47.8% rural versus 27.5% urban), medical students (28.3% rural versus 16.6% urban), moderate performers (87.0% rural versus 71.9% urban), as well as the Hausa Fulani, Northern Minority and Southern Minority constituencies. Also, there are indications of urban-rural parity among the Muslim, law, low-performing and Igbo sections of the sample. However, the preponderance of urban attributes in the overall sample is sustained in the bourgeois, female, southern, high school, high-performing and Yoruba sub-groups.

Conclusions

The magnitude of urban over-representation in our sample is as much as a ratio of 13 urban students per one rural student. And this in a country in which some 70 percent of the population are supposed to be rural dwellers (see Ayeni, 1981; Sada, 1981). To the extent that rural origins appear to constitute a disadvantage in the matter of representation in the overall sample, a rural background does not seem to entail for the petty-bourgeoisie, males, Christians and moderate performers the same degree of impediment as it would appear to pose in the case of the working class, female, Muslim and low-performing sections of the sample. That is, the latter sub-groups, much more than the former, may have a greater chance of being represented in the sample if they come from urban backgrounds. Far from suggesting some form of rural advantage, the preponderance of rural attributes in the Hausa-Fulani, Northern Minority and Southern Minority constituencies reflects the low levels of urbanization within such communities. This explains why the most urbanized community in Nigeria, the Yoruba, polled the highest urban concentration (34.0%) and the least rural presence (8.7%). Of course, an urban area generally carries greater economic and income opportunities than a rural area. This is part of the reason why the largest proportions of the bourgeois (40.3%) and petty-bourgeois (29.4%) classes were found within the same Yoruba in Table 5.1.7. Essentially, our sample suggests that a rural background is a form of educational disadvantage which could be worsened or attenuated by factors such as social class, gender, religion, ethnic homeland and academic performance or intelligence more generally. This may well be so for federal educational institutions at large.

Research Question #4

What is the proportion of Nigeria's five major ethnic-political constituencies (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Northern Minorities and Southern Minorities) in federal educational institutions?

The Evidence

Table 5.4.1 conveys the comparative distribution of Nigeria's five main ethnic-political constituencies in the survey sample. Despite the loss in transit of 44 medical program questionnaires completed in a

Table 5.4.1
Distribution of Sample by Ethnic-Political Constituency

Constituency	Frequency	Percentage
Hausa-Fulani (for northern majorities)	94	14.6
Yoruba (south-western majority)	208	32.2
Igbo (south-eastern majority)	121	18.7
Northern Minorities (the Middle Belt)	93	14.4
Southern Minorities (central and delta)	130	20.1
Total	646	100.0

(missing cases = 4)

Table 5.4.2
Distribution of Ethnic-Political Constituency by Social Class, Gender, Residence, Religion, Level/Program and Academic Performance
(Percentages)

		ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY				
		Hausa-Fulani	Yoruba	Igbo	Northern Minorities	Southern Minorities
SOCIAL CLASS	Bourgeoisie	30.0	42.2	34.2	22.0	32.3
		(27)	(87)	(41)	(20)	(41)
	Petty- Bourgeoisie	68.9	57.3	61.7	72.5	64.6
		(62)	(118)	(74)	(66)	(82)
	Workers	1.1	0.5	4.2	5.5	3.1
		(1)	(1)	(5)	(5)	(4)
	TOTAL*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(missing = 16)		(90)	(206)	(120)	(91)	(127)
GENDER	Male	63.8	44.2	68.6	58.1	66.9
		(60)	(92)	(83)	(54)	(87)
	Female	36.2	55.8	31.4	41.9	33.1
		(34)	(116)	(38)	(39)	(43)
	TOTAL*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(missing = 4)		(94)	(208)	(121)	(93)	(130)
RESIDENCE	Urban	88.3	98.1	93.4	88.2	90.8
		(83)	(204)	(113)	(82)	(118)
	Rural	11.7	1.9	6.6	11.8	9.2
		(11)	(4)	(8)	(11)	(12)
	TOTAL*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(missing = 4)		(94)	(208)	(121)	(93)	(130)
RELIGION	Christian	17.2	78.3	100.0	69.6	99.2
		(16)	(159)	(117)	(64)	(127)
	Muslim	82.8	21.7	0.0	30.4	0.8
		(77)	(44)	(0)	(28)	(1)
	TOTAL*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(missing = 17)		(93)	(203)	(117)	(92)	(128)
LEVEL/PROGRAM	High School	51.1	83.2	37.2	36.6	50.8
		(48)	(173)	(45)	(34)	(66)
	Law	25.5	13.0	38.0	37.6	27.7
		(24)	(27)	(46)	(35)	(36)
	Medicine	23.4	3.8	24.8	25.8	21.5
		(22)	(8)	(30)	(24)	(28)
	TOTAL*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(missing = 4)		(94)	(208)	(121)	(93)	(130)
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE	High	7.4	32.2	16.5	3.3	16.3
		(7)	(67)	(20)	(3)	(21)
	Moderate	83.0	58.2	78.5	82.6	77.5
		(78)	(121)	(95)	(76)	(100)
	Low	9.6	9.6	5.0	14.1	6.2
		(9)	(20)	(6)	(13)	(8)
	TOTAL*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(missing = 6)		(94)	(208)	(121)	(92)	(129)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.4.3
Total Student Enrolment in Nigerian Universities by Region, Ethnic-Political Constituency and State of Origin, Academic Years 1980/81 to 1985/86 (Northern States)*

	Northern Minority[a]					Hausa-Fulani, etc.[b]							
Academic Year	Benue	Gongola	Plateau	Kwara		Bauchi	Sokoto	Kano	Kaduna	Niger	Bornu		Sub-total
1980/81	2748 (2765)	1604 (1604)	1630 (1630)	3674 (3695)		1172 (1172)	850 (862)	1652 (1652)	2280 (2280)	955 (955)	1562 (1562)		18127 (18177)
%	4.0 (3.9)	2.4 (2.3)	2.4 (2.3)	5.4 (5.2)	14.2 (13.7)	1.7 (1.7)	1.3 (1.2)	2.4 (2.3)	3.4 (3.2)	1.4 (1.3)	2.3 (2.2)	12.5 (11.9)	26.7 (25.6)
1981/82	3437 (3461)	1805 (1805)	2020 (2020)	4725 (4751)		1267 (1267)	1147 (1171)	1977 (1977)	3325 (3325)	1205 (1205)	1771 (1771)		22679 (22753)
%	4.2 (4.0)	2.2 (2.1)	2.5 (2.4)	5.8 (5.5)	14.7 (14.0)	1.6 (1.5)	1.4 (1.4)	2.4 (2.3)	4.1 (3.9)	1.5 (1.4)	2.2 (2.1)	13.2 (12.6)	27.9 (26.6)
1982/83	3288 (3291)	2250 (2254)	2267 (2267)	5445 (5457)		1568 (1569)	1440 (1440)	2430 (2430)	3055 (3055)	1553 (1554)	2066 (2075)		25362 (25392)
%	3.7 (3.4)	2.5 (2.4)	2.5 (2.4)	6.1 (5.7)	14.8 (13.9)	1.7 (1.6)	1.6 (1.5)	2.7 (2.5)	3.4 (3.2)	1.7 (1.6)	2.3 (2.2)	13.4 (12.6)	28.2 (26.5)
1983/84	3863 (3867)	2906 (2908)	2552 (2552)	5588 (5606)		2015 (2015)	1762 (1762)	2795 (2795)	3974 (3974)	1758 (1761)	2478 (2478)		29691 (29718)
%	3.9 (3.6)	2.9 (2.7)	2.6 (2.3)	5.7 (5.1)	15.1 (13.7)	2.1 (1.9)	1.8 (1.6)	2.8 (2.6)	4.0 (3.7)	1.8 (1.6)	2.5 (2.3)	15.1 (13.7)	30.2 (27.4)
1984/85	4269 (4276)	3183 (3185)	2873 (2873)	6363 (6383)		2373 (2373)	1895 (1895)	3121 (3121)	4743 (4744)	2021 (2021)	2545 (2545)		33386 (33416)
%	3.9 (3.6)	2.9 (2.7)	2.7 (2.4)	5.9 (5.4)	15.4 (14.1)	2.2 (2.0)	1.8 (1.6)	2.9 (2.6)	4.4 (4.0)	1.9 (1.7)	2.4 (2.1)	15.6 (14.0)	31.0 (28.1)
1985/86	4688 (4727)	3350 (3352)	2874 (2874)	6766 (7219)		2501 (2501)	2410 (2410)	3605 (3605)	5107 (5108)	1995 (1995)	2760 (2760)		36056 (36551)
%	4.1 (3.5)	2.9 (2.5)	2.5 (2.2)	5.9 (5.4)	15.4 (13.6)	2.2 (1.9)	2.1 (1.8)	3.2 (2.7)	4.5 (3.8)	1.8 (1.5)	2.4 (2.1)	16.2 (13.8)	31.6 (27.4)
TOTAL					84168 (84822)							81133 (81185)	165301 (166007)
%					15.0 (13.8)							14.5 (13.2)	29.5 (27.0)

Source: Collated and computed from National Universities Commission (1989), NUC Statistical Digest, Lagos, NUC, Nigeria.

* The figures in brackets include enrolment in state universities.
a Constitutes 38% of Nigerian population.
b Constitutes 16% of Nigerian population.

Table 5.4.3 [cont'd]
Total Student Enrolment in Nigerian Universities by Region, Ethnic-Political Constituency and State of Origin, Academic Years 1980/81 to 1985/86 (Southern States)*

Academic Year	Igbo[c]			Southern Minority[d]				Yoruba[e]						
	Anambra	Imo		Rivers	Cross River	Bendel		Lagos	Ondo	Ogun	Oyo		Sub-total	Total[#]
1980/81	7788 (8077)	7954 (8078)		2214 (4554)	3732 (3795)	8806 (8895)		1220 (1241)	5528 (5530)	4722 (4739)	7807 (7824)		49771 (52733)	67898 (70910)
%	11.5 (11.4)	11.7 (11.4)	23.2 (22.8)	3.3 (6.4)	5.5 (5.4)	12.9 (12.5)	21.7 (24.3)	1.8 (1.8)	8.1 (7.8)	6.9 (6.7)	11.5 (11.0)	28.3 (27.3)	73.2 (74.4)	100.0 (100.0)
1981/82	9031 (9590)	9058 (9262)		2579 (5117)	4529 (4630)	10092 (10609)		1390 (1410)	7082 (7088)	5560 (5591)	9887 (9922)		59208 (63219)	81887 (85972)
%	11.0 (11.2)	11.1 (10.8)	22.1 (22.0)	3.2 (6.0)	5.5 (5.4)	12.3 (12.3)	21.0 (23.7)	1.7 (1.6)	8.7 (8.2)	6.8 (6.5)	12.1 (11.5)	29.3 (27.8)	72.4 (73.5)	100.0 (100.0)
1982/83	10129 (11062)	9915 (10238)		2801 (5812)	5311 (5411)	10818 (11956)		1700 (1715)	7459 (7507)	6091 (6501)	10414 (10450)		64638 (70652)	90000 (96044)
%	11.3 (11.5)	11.0 (10.7)	22.3 (22.2)	3.1 (6.1)	5.9 (5.6)	12.0 (12.5)	21.0 (24.2)	1.9 (1.8)	8.3 (7.8)	6.8 (6.8)	11.6 (10.9)	28.6 (27.3)	71.9 (73.7)	100.0 (100.0)
1983/84	10007 (11283)	10078 (10492)		3193 (6261)	5363 (7751)	11686 (13336)		2400 (2430)	9282 (9938)	5987 (6939)	10751 (10853)		68747 (79283)	98438 (109001)
%	10.2 (10.4)	10.2 (9.6)	20.4 (20.0)	3.2 (5.7)	5.4 (7.1)	11.9 (12.2)	20.5 (25.0)	2.4 (2.2)	9.4 (9.1)	6.1 (6.4)	10.9 (10.0)	28.8 (27.7)	69.8 (72.7)	100.0 (100.0)
1984/85	11070 (12603)	10738 (11411)		3023 (5512)	5657 (8384)	12873 (14604)		2995 (3381)	8611 (10000)	6704 (6799)	12847 (12983)		74518 (85677)	107904 (119093)
%	10.3 (10.6)	9.9 (9.6)	20.2 (20.2)	2.8 (4.6)	5.2 (7.0)	11.9 (12.3)	19.9 (23.9)	2.8 (2.8)	7.9 (8.4)	6.2 (5.7)	11.9 (10.9)	28.8 (27.8)	68.9 (71.9)	100.0 (100.0)
1985/86	11647 (13952)	11228 (14195)		3197 (5777)	5415 (8813)	12474 (15846)		3421 (4430)	9254 (11534)	7051 (9234)	13600 (14036)		77287 (97817)	113343 (134368)
%	10.3 (10.4)	9.9 (10.6)	20.2 (21.0)	2.8 (4.3)	4.8 (6.6)	11.0 (11.8)	18.6 (22.7)	3.0 (3.3)	8.2 (8.6)	6.2 (6.9)	11.9 (10.5)	29.3 (29.3)	68.1 (73.0)	100.0 (100.0)
TOTAL			118643 (130243)				113763 (147063)					161763 (172075)	394169 (449381)	559470 (615388)
%			21.2 (21.1)				20.3 (24.0)					29.0 (27.9)	70.4 (73.0)	100.0 (100.0)

Source: Collated and computed from National Universities Commission (1989), NUC Statistical Digest, Lagos, NUC, Nigeria.

* The figures in brackets include enrolment in state universities.
# There may be rounding errors.
c Constitutes 13% of Nigerian population.
d Constitutes 14% of Nigerian population.
e Constitutes 19% of Nigerian population.

federal university with a strong Yoruba presence, that constituency appears to lead the next in a descending order of representation, the Southern Minorities, by a 12.1 percent margin (i.e. 32.2% versus 20.1%), the third-place Igbo by a margin of 13.5 percent (i.e. 32.2% versus 18.7%), and each of the Northern Minorities and the Hausa-Fulani by slightly over 27 percent.

When we explored the distribution of these constituencies within several sub-groups (see Table 5.4.2), the Yoruba attained the largest proportions among the bourgeoisie (42.2%), females (55.8%), urban dwellers (98.1%), the high school sub-sample (83.2%), as well as the high-performing sub-group (32.2%). However, the largest proportions were ceded to the Northern Minorities among the petty-bourgeoisie (72.5%), the Igbo among males (68.6%), both the Northern Minorities and the Hausa-Fulani among rural dwellers (11.8% and 11.7%, respectively), the Igbo (100.0%) and the Hausa-Fulani (82.8%) among Christians and Muslims, respectively, both the Igbo and the Northern Minorities among law students (38.0% and 37.6%, respectively), the Northern Minorities in the low-performing sub-group (14.1%), and all the other constituencies among moderate performers. The evidence is weak, but compared to the Igbo (5.0%) and even the Southern Minorities (6.2%), low academic performance (perhaps aided by higher social class background and/or admission quotas) does not seem to be such a barrier against larger Northern Minority (14.1%), Yoruba (9.6%) and Hausa-Fulani (9.6%) proportions in the survey sample.

Table 5.4.3 shows the patterns of ethnic participation in federal universities (the unbracketed figures), and in federal and state universities taken together (the bracketed figures), this time for the academic years 1980/81 to 1985/86, and with official statistics from the agency in charge of Nigerian universities. Apparently verifying the proportions suggested by our survey sample in Table 5.4.1, the Yoruba constituency again leads each of the Igbo and the Southern Minority by a ratio of approximately 1.5:1, and each of the Northern Minority and the Hausa-Fulani by a ratio of approximately 2:1 (see the yearly and total percentages set off with rectangles within each constituency in Table 5.4.3). Whether it be for individual years or for all six years under review, the noted pattern is more so in federal, as against federal-cum-state, universities.

Overall, whereas the Igbo basically shared the second position with the Southern Minorities in exclusively federal university figures (21.2% and 20.3%, respectively), the latter marginally seized the second position for itself in the combined figures for federal and state-owned universities (24.0% versus 21.1%). For all six years, too, the Northern Minority constituency and the Hausa-Fulani basically seem to share the last position, whether or not figures for federal and state universities are disaggregated (15.0% versus 14.5% federal figures; 13.8% versus 13.2% combined figures). However, the yearly trajectory is such that the Hausa-Fulani first levelled up with the Northern Minorities on both sets of figures in the 1983/84 session (i.e. 15.1% federal and 13.7% combined, either side), took a marginal lead in federal figures in the 1984/85 session (15.6% versus 15.4%), and assumed an all-round tenuous leadership in the 1985/86 academic year (16.2% versus 15.4% federal; 13.8% versus 13.6% combined). Lastly, in comparison with the three southern ethnic constituencies, each of which basically tended to reduce or else retain its starting set of federal figures over the years, the northern constituencies, especially the Hausa-Fulani, tended to experience percentage increases in federal university participation as one moves from 1980/81 through 1985/86.

Conclusions

It would appear that participation in Nigerian universities is related to ethnic-political constituency. Substantially verifying our survey data, official statistics from the National Universities Commission seem to point toward Yoruba preponderance over the second-place Southern Minorities, the third-place Igbo, and the fourth-place competition between the Hausa-Fulani and the Northern Minorities. For federal universities in particular, if we excluded pre-1984/85 figures, the Hausa-Fulani might claim the fourth position, but should we include figures going as far back as the 1980/81 session, then the Northern Minorities could claim a tenuous fourth place. Maybe, and only maybe, our survey data correctly show the Hausa-Fulani as currently commanding a modest representational edge over the Northern Minorities.

To place these patterns in their proper perspective, however, the broader Nigerian demographic context is one in which the largest constituency is the Hausa-Fulani (38% of the Nigerian population), followed by the Yoruba (19%), then by the Northern Minorities (16%), then by the Southern Minorities (14%), and lastly by the Igbo (13%). Thus, the Hausa-Fulani would actually be the least represented, while the Igbo and the Southern Minorities might well be running neck-a-neck with the Yoruba in an inversely proportionate mode (for enabling official population figures, see Ayeni, 1981, p. 259; Nafziger, 1983, p. 33). In the last analysis, it should not be forgotten that ethnic differentials in participation in Nigerian schools and universities seem, at least for our survey sample, to be mediated positively or negatively by social class acting jointly with, or independently of, urban-rural residence, gender, academic performance, school level/program, as well as religion. With reference to the official statistics, there seems to be some role for historical experience and policy regulation or political/social engineering in shaping the fortunes and vicissitudes of ethnic representation in the valued institutions of the Nigerian society.

Research Question #5

What is the proportion of northern and southern students in federal educational institutions?

The Evidence

Displayed in Table 5.5.1 are data showing the proportions of northern and southern students in our survey sample. As this table shows, there are 42.2 percent more southern than northern students in the entire sample (i.e. 71.1% versus 28.9%). On exploring the north-south distribution within a couple of sub-groups (Table 5.5.2), we still found larger proportions of southern students among the bourgeoisie (37.3% south versus 26.0% north), female students (42.9% south versus 39.0% north), urban students (94.8% south versus 88.2% north), Christians (90.0% south versus 43.2% north), the high school sub-sample (61.9% south versus 43.9%

Table 5.5.1
Distribution of Sample by Region of Origin

Region	Frequency	Percentage
North	187	28.9
South	459	71.1
Total	646	100.0

(missing cases = 4)

Table 5.5.2
Distribution of Region by Social Class, Gender, Residence, Religion, Level/Program, and Academic Performance
(Percentages)

		REGION	
		North	South
SOCIAL CLASS	Bourgeoisie	26.0 (47)	37.3 (169)
	Petty-Bourgeoisie	70.7 (128)	60.5 (274)
	Workers	3.3 (6)	2.2 (10)
(missing = 16)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (181)	100.0 (453)
GENDER	Male	61.0 (114)	57.1 (262)
	Female	39.0 (73)	42.9 (197)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (187)	100.0 (459)
RESIDENCE	Urban	88.2 (165)	94.8 (435)
	Rural	11.8 (22)	5.2 (24)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (187)	100.0 (459)
RELIGION	Christian	43.2 (80)	90.0 (403)
	Muslim	56.8 (105)	10.0 (45)
(missing = 19)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (185)	100.0 (448)
LEVEL/PROGRAM	High School	43.9 (82)	61.9 (284)
	Law	31.6 (59)	23.7 (109)
	Medicine	24.6 (46)	14.4 (66)
(missing = 4)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (187)	100.0 (459)
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE	High	5.4 (10)	23.6 (108)
	Moderate	82.8 (154)	69.0 (316)
	Low	11.8 (22)	7.4 (34)
(missing = 6)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (186)	100.0 (458)

[*] There may be computer rounding errors.

north), as well as the high-performing sub-group (23.6% south versus 5.4% north). Conversely, there were larger concentrations of northern students among the petty-bourgeois, male, rural, Muslim, professional program, as well as low- and moderate-performing sub-groups.

Recalling Table 5.4.3, we further look at official statistics on north-south representation in Nigerian universities, based on the academic years 1980/81 through 1985/86, and with exclusively federal university figures unbracketed. As the sub-totals at the right end of the northern and southern sections of the table reveal, southern students were, overall, 40.9 percent more likely than their northern counterparts to be found in federal universities within the reviewed period (i.e. 70.4% versus 29.5%). This translates into a ratio of 2.4:1 in favour of southerners. When the combined, bracketed figures for federal and state universities are considered, the corresponding distribution climbs up to a 46 percent greater likelihood of running into southern as against northern students in Nigerian universities (i.e. 73.0% versus 27.0%). This would translate into a ratio of approximately 3:1 against the north for all reported years.

However, the intimate details seem to tell a slightly different story. Particularly for federal universities, southern representation fell steadily but slightly from 73.2 percent in 1980/81 down to 68.1 percent in 1985/86, at the same time as northern participation appreciated consistently though gradually from 26.7 percent in 1980/81 up to 31.6 percent in 1985/86. This represents some five percent gain for the north and thus five percent loss for the south within a space of six years. Although the yearly gradient for the combined federal-cum-state university north-south percentage sub-totals is not as smooth, the changing pattern still ended up with a southern loss of some two percent and a northern gain of the same.

For their part, the bottom totals enable further comparison, ethnic-politically speaking, between and within regions. Southern dominance is sustained at varying levels across all five ethnic-political constituencies, with the descending order of preponderance in federal universities being as follows: 29.0 percent Yoruba, 21.2 percent Igbo, 20.3 percent Southern Minorities, 15.0 percent Northern Minorities and 14.5 percent Hausa-Fulani. The corresponding order for combined federal-cum-state university figures is 27.9 percent Yoruba, 24.0 percent Southern Minorities, 21.1 percent Igbo, 13.8 percent Northern Minorities and 13.2 percent Hausa-Fulani. As was earlier noted, however, the yearly figures are such that the Hausa-Fulani actually levelled up with, and subsequently overtook, the Northern Minorities in both federal and combined enrolment proportions within the second half of the six years, 1980/81 through 1985/86 (for details, see Table 5.4.3).

Conclusions

Our two sets of data appear to point toward some connection between participation in Nigerian universities, together with federal high schools, and region of origin. Especially in light of the north's command of some 54 percent of the entire Nigerian population, northern students come across as disproportionately under-represented in such institutions. A six-year overall ratio of approximately 3:1 in favour of the south both because of, and in spite of, generally pro-north preferential treatment policies is good enough sociological evidence that region, indeed, also "tells." But then, neither the north nor the south is a monolith in all this. There are intra-regional variations, and even as the entire north seems to have made steady but modest gains (the obverse of which is steady but modest losses by the south) since the introduction of admission quotas, the Northern Minority constituency appears to be fast losing its intra-regional educational edge to the Hausa-Fulani. Although the Yoruba seem to be ahead of everybody else within the north and the south, the intra-regional competition from and between the Southern Minorities and the Igbo may yet complicate existing patterns of participation in federal and/or state educational institutions. Although the two-to-five percent southern loss or northern gain in university participation in Nigeria in half-a-dozen years is not the best advertisement for the efficacy of public policy in altering historically entrenched patterns of regional disadvantage, those ambitioning political solutions or responses to problems of_social inequality may get some consolation from the fact that something could at least be done about it.

Speaking at least for our survey sample, it would appear that even with the best of intentions, exclusively regional attacks on social inequality tend to be lopsided. The differing but systematic concentrations of northern and southern students within salient sub-groups of the sample suggest that the balance of north-south representation in federal-cum-state educational institutions is mediated by the articulation between and amongst social class, urban-rural residence, gender, religion, school level/program, as well as academic performance. Region is an issue, but it is frequently the case that materially better-off families appropriate socio-economic opportunities officially allotted to groups who might be otherwise disadvantaged. It is thus important that social inequality be appreciated and tackled as a multi-textured phenomenon.

Research Question #6

Are levels of structurally based expectations (SBE) in federal educational institutions related to social class, controlling for gender, residence, ethnic-political constituency and region?

The Evidence

Although we were essentially interested in the levels of expectation indicated by the respondents, the substantive differences in both their levels of schooling and the enabling questionnaire items necessitated treating the high school sub-sample independently of the professional program sub-sample. Therefore, we shall first look at structurally based expectations in the high school sub-sample (SBE-HS). Thereafter, we shall examine structurally based expectations in the professional program sub-sample (SBE-PP). This way, we hope to attain a fuller understanding of the patterns of structurally based expectations in the entire survey sample.

The elaboration paradigm developed by Lazersfeld and his colleagues typically starts with checking for initial or zero-order relationships between and amongst the dependent variable (in this case, SBE-HS/PP) and the relevant set of independent variables as already itemized in the research question above. Following the meaningful

Table 5.6.1
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Social Class, Gender, Residence, Ethnic-Political Constituency and Region (Percentages)

SBE-HS	Social Class*		Gender		Residence		Ethnic-Political Constituency					Region	
	Petty-Brgsie	Brgsie	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	Hausa-Fulani	Yoruba	Igbo	Northern Minority	Southern Minority	North	South
High	78.3 (166)	89.3 (125)	83.6 (158)	81.7 (134)	83.6 (280)	66.7 (12)	77.3 (34)	82.7 (139)	88.6 (39)	61.3 (19)	93.7 (59)	70.7 (53)	86.2 (237)
Medium	15.1 (32)	9.3 (13)	12.7 (24)	12.8 (21)	11.9 (40)	27.8 (5)	20.5 (9)	11.9 (20)	6.8 (3)	25.8 (8)	6.3 (4)	22.7 (17)	9.8 (27)
Low	6.6 (14)	1.4 (2)	3.7 (7)	5.5 (9)	4.5 (15)	5.6 (1)	2.3 (1)	5.4 (9)	4.5 (2)	12.9 (4)	0.0 (0)	6.7 (5)	4.0 (11)
TOTAL**	100.0 (212)	100.0 (140)	100.0 (189)	100.0 (164)	100.0 (335)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (168)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (275
	(missing = 18)		(missing = 17)		(missing = 17)		(missing = 20)					(missing = 20)	

* We did not find "Working Class" attributes in the high school sub- sample.
** There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.6.2
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Social Class Controlling for Gender
(Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS	
Gender	SBE-HS	Petty-Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
MALES	High	80.2 (101)	90.3 (56)
	Medium	15.1 (19)	8.1 (5)
	Low	4.8 (6)	1.6 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (126)	100.0 (62)
FEMALES	High	75.6 (65)	88.5 (69)
	Medium	15.1 (13)	10.3 (8)
	Low	9.3 (8)	1.1 (1)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (86)	100.0 (78)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.6.3
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Social Class Controlling for Residence
(Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS	
Residence	SBE-HS	Petty-Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
URBAN	High	79.4 (158)	89.6 (121)
	Medium	13.6 (27)	9.6 (13)
	Low	7.0 (14)	0.7 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (199)	100.0 (135)
RURAL	High	61.5 (8)	80.0 (4)
	Medium	38.5 (5)	0.0 (0)
	Low	0.0 (0)	20.0 (1)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (13)	100.0 (5)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.6.4
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Social Class Controlling for Gender and Residence (Percentages)

			SOCIAL CLASS	
Residence	Gender	SBE-HS	Petty-Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
URBAN	MALE	High	81.9 (95)	91.7 (55)
		Medium	12.9 (15)	8.3 (5)
		Low	5.2 (6)	0.0 (0)
		TOTAL*	100.0 (116)	100.0 (60)
	FEMALE	High	75.9 (63)	88.0 (66)
		Medium	14.5 (12)	10.7 (8)
		Low	9.6 (8)	1.3 (1)
		TOTAL*	100.0 (83)	100.0 (75)
RURAL	MALE	High	60.0 (6)	50.0 (1)
		Medium	40.0 (4)	0.0 (0)
		Low	0.0 (0)	50.0 (1)
		TOTAL*	100.0 (10)	100.0 (2)
	FEMALE	High	66.7 (2)	100.0 (3)
		Medium	33.3 (1)	0.0 (0)
		Low	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
(missing = 18)		TOTAL*	100.0 (3)	100.0 (3)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.6.5
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Social Class Controlling for Ethnic-Political Constituency
(Percentages)

Ethnic-Political Constituency	SBE-HS	SOCIAL CLASS Petty-Bourgeoisie	 Bourgeoisie
HAUSA-FULANI	High	74.2 (23)	84.6 (11)
	Medium	22.6 (7)	15.4 (2)
	Low	3.2 (1)	0.0 (0)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (31)	100.0 (13)
YORUBA	High	79.8 (75)	86.3 (63)
	Medium	11.7 (11)	12.3 (9)
	Low	8.5 (8)	1.4 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (94)	100.0 (73)
IGBO	High	82.6 (19)	95.2 (20)
	Medium	8.7 (2)	4.8 (1)
	Low	8.7 (2)	0.0 (0)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (23)	100.0 (21)
NORTHERN MINORITIES	High	59.3 (16)	75.0 (3)
	Medium	29.6 (8)	0.0 (0)
	Low	11.1 (3)	25.0 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (27)	100.0 (4)
SOUTHERN MINORITIES	High	91.2 (31)	96.6 (28)
	Medium	8.0 (3)	3.4 (1)
	Low	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
(missing = 21)	TOTAL*	100.0 (34)	100.0 (29)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.6.6
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Social Class Controlling for Region
(Percentages)

Region	SBE-HS	SOCIAL CLASS Petty-Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
NORTH	High	67.2 (39)	82.4 (14)
	Medium	25.9 (15)	11.8 (2)
	Low	6.9 (4)	5.9 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (58)	100.0 (17)
SOUTH	High	82.8 (125)	90.2 (111)
	Medium	10.6 (16)	8.9 11)
	Low	6.6 (10)	0.8 (1)
(missing = 21)	TOTAL*	100.0 (151)	100.0 (123)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.6.7
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Gender, Residence, Ethnic-Political Constituency and Region
(Percentages)

	Social Class			Gender		Residence		Ethnic-Political Constituency					Region	
SBE-PP	Workers	Petty-Brgsie	Brgsie	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	Hausa-Fulani	Yoruba	Igbo	Northern Minority	Southern Minority	North	South
High	12.5 (2)	20.5 (36)	48.6 (34)	23.4 (41)	34.0 (32)	28.7 (70)	12.0 (3)	24.4 (11)	40.6 (13)	32.0 (24)	17.9 (10)	24.6 (15)	20.8 (21)	31.0 (52)
Medium	37.5 (6)	50.6 (89)	35.7 (25)	49.1 (86)	41.5 (39)	45.9 (112)	52.0 (13)	48.9 (22)	43.8 (14)	48.0 (36)	48.2 (27)	42.6 (26)	48.5 (49)	45.2 (76)
Low	50.0 (8)	29.0 (51)	15.7 (11)	27.4 (48)	24.5 (23)	25.4 (62)	36.0 (9)	26.7 (12)	15.6 (5)	20.0 (15)	33.9 (19)	32.8 (20)	30.7 (31)	23.8 (41)
TOTAL*	100.0 (16)	100.0 (176)	100.0 (70)	100.0 (175)	100.0 (94)	100.0 (244)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (32)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (56)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (168)
	(missing = 18)			(missing = 11)		(missing = 11)		(missing = 11)					(missing = 11)	

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.6.8
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Controlling for Gender
(Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS		
Gender	SBE-PP	Workers	Petty Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
MALES	High	15.4 (2)	19.4 (24)	45.2 (14)
	Medium	46.2 (6)	50.0 (62)	41.9 (13)
	Low	38.5 (5)	30.6 (38)	12.9 (4)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (13)	100.0 (124)	100.0 (31)
FEMALES	High	0.0 (0)	23.1 (12)	51.3 (20)
	Medium	0.0 (0)	51.9 (27)	30.8 (12)
	Low	100.0 (3)	25.0 (13)	17.9 (7)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (3)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (39)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.6.9
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Controlling for Residence
(Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS		
Residence	SBE-PP	Workers	Petty Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
URBAN	High	14.3 (2)	21.5 (34)	50.0 (34)
	Medium	42.9 (6)	50.6 (80)	33.8 (23)
	Low	42.9 (6)	27.8 (44)	16.2 (11)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (14)	100.0 (158)	100.0 (68)
RURAL	High	0.0 (0)	11.1 (2)	0.0 (0)
	Medium	0.0 (0)	50.0 (9)	100.0 (2)
	Low	100.0 (2)	38.9 (7)	0.0 (0)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (2)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (2)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.6.10
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Controlling for Gender and Residence (Percentages)

			SOCIAL CLASS		
Residence	**Gender**	**SBE-PP**	**Workers**	**Petty Bourgeoisie**	**Bourgeoisie**
URBAN	MALE	High	16.7 (2)	20.6 (22)	48.3 (14)
		Medium	50.0 (6)	49.5 (53)	37.9 (11)
		Low	33.3 (4)	29.9 (32)	13.8 (4)
		TOTAL*	100.0 (12)	100.0 (107)	100.0 (29)
	FEMALE	High	0.0 (0)	23.5 (12)	51.3 (20)
		Medium	0.0 (0)	52.9 (27)	30.8 (12)
		Low	100.0 (2)	23.5 (12)	17.9 (7)
		TOTAL*	100.0 (2)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (39)
RURAL	MALE	High	0.0 (0)	11.8 (2)	0.0 (0)
		Medium	0.0 (0)	52.9 (9)	100.0 (2)
		Low	100.0 (1)	35.3 (6)	0.0 (0)
		TOTAL*	100.0 (1)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (2)
	FEMALE**	High	–	–	–
		Medium	–	–	–
		Low	100.0 (1)	100.0 (1)	–
(missing = 18)		TOTAL*	100.0 (1)	100.0 (1)	–

* There may be computer rounding errors.

** This scanty section of the table may in itself be indirect evidence of educational privilege for rural males as well as urban females.

Table 5.6.11
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Controlling for Ethnic-Political Constituency (Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS		
Ethnic-Political Constituency	SBE-PP	Workers	Petty Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
HAUSA-FULANI	High	0.0 (0)	17.2 (5)	50.0 (6)
	Medium	100.0 (1)	51.7 (15)	25.0 (3)
	Low	0.0 (0)	31.0 (9)	25.0 (3)
	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (1)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (12)
YORUBA	High	100.0 (1)	21.1 (4)	66.7 (8)
	Medium	0.0 (0)	68.4 (13)	8.3 (1)
	Low	0.0 (0)	10.5 (2)	25.0 (3)
	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (1)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (12)
IGBO	High	0.0 (0)	32.0 (16)	42.1 (8)
	Medium	60.0 (3)	44.0 (22)	52.6 (10)
	Low	40.0 (2)	24.0 (12)	5.3 (1)
	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (5)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (19)
NORTHERN MINORITIES	High	0.0 (0)	8.6 (3)	46.7 (7)
	Medium	20.0 (1)	51.4 (18)	46.7 (7)
	Low	80.0 (4)	40.0 (14)	6.7 (1)
	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (5)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (15)
SOUTHERN MINORITIES	High	25.0 (1)	18.6 (8)	41.7 (5)
	Medium	25.0 (1)	48.8 (21)	33.3 (4)
	Low	50.0 (2)	32.6 (14)	25.0 (3)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (4)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (12)

[*] There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.6.12
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Controlling for Region (Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS		
Region	SBE-PP	Workers	Petty Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
NORTH	High	0.0 (0)	12.5 (8)	48.1 (13)
	Medium	33.3 (2)	51.6 (33)	37.0 (10)
	Low	66.7 (4)	35.9 (23)	14.8 (4)
	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (6)	100.0 (64)	100.0 (27)
SOUTH	High	20.0 (2)	25.0 (28)	48.8 (21)
	Medium	40.0 (4)	50.0 (56)	34.9 (15)
	Low	40.0 (4)	25.0 (28)	16.3 (7)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL[*]	100.0 (10)	100.0 (112)	100.0 (43)

[*] There may be computer rounding errors.

patterns earlier indicated by the distribution of the social classes within the gender, residential, ethnic-political and regional sub-groups of the entire survey sample (see Table 5.1.7), we will assume that at least modest associations exist between social class and each of these other independent variables in both the high school and the professional program sub-samples, and so we do not have to bother with such relationships here. And what is more, Morris Rosenberg's modification of the classic elaboration paradigm has shown that the method can be usefully applied even with initial relationships of "zero," for some other factor might be distorting or suppressing the true relationships between the variables at issue (Babbie, 1986, p. 399).

Part A: The High School Sub-sample

Table 5.6.1 shows the initial or zero-order relationships between levels of structurally based expectations in the high school sub-sample (SBE-HS) and social class, gender, residence, ethnic-political constituency, as well as region. As this table reveals, the offspring of the bourgeoisie are over-represented at high expectations (89.3%) and under-represented at medium expectations (9.3%). Conversely, petty-bourgeois respondents seem to be over-represented at medium expectations (15.1%), while being under-represented at high expectations (78.3%). There are only 1.9 percent more males than females at high expectations (83.6% versus 81.7%), and only 1.8 percent more females than males at low expectations (5.5% versus 3.7%). Whereas substantially more urban than rural respondents indicated high expectations (83.6% versus 66.7%), a larger proportion of rural students are found at medium expectations (27.8% rural versus 11.9% urban). Also, there are 15.5 percent more southern than northern respondents at high expectations (i.e. 86.2% south versus 70.7% north). Conversely, larger proportions of northern than southern students are found at both medium and low expectations. Similarly, while the Southern Minorities (93.7%), the Igbo (88.6%) and the Yoruba (82.7%), in that order, are over-represented at high expectations and under-represented at medium expectations, it is the reverse for the Hausa-Fulani (77.3% at high, 20.5% at medium) and the Northern Minorities (61.3% at high, 25.8% at medium).

We now begin to explore the nature of the indicated relationship between levels of SBE-HS and social class, through the introduction of first-order controls. Thus, Table 5.6.2 shows the relationship between levels of SBE-HS and social class, this time controlling for gender. Although the new percentage distributions remain basically the same thing as the original patterns, one can still notice that the petty-bourgeoisie gained approximately two percent at high expectations among males (i.e. 80.2% versus 78.3%), only to lose approximately three percent at high expectations among females (i.e. 78.3% versus 75.6%). Also, while the bourgeoisie gained one percent at high expectations among males, they lost approximately the same amount at high expectations among females. In essence, the offspring of the bourgeoisie, irrespective of gender, basically appear to have the same levels of expectations. It is among the petty-bourgeoisie that gender seems to mediate expectations slightly in favour of males in the high school sub-sample.

Table 5.6.3 revisits the relationship between levels of SBE-HS and social class, in this instance controlling for residence. Whereas the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie basically retained their initial proportions at high expectations under the urban test condition, they indicated a decrease of 9.3 percent (i.e. 89.3% versus 80.0%) and 16.8 percent (i.e. 78.3% versus 61.5%), respectively, at that level under the rural test condition. Thus, a rural condition appears to dampen expectations on both sides such that the magnitude of the original disparity between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie (11%) is almost doubled (18.5%).

In addition to the argument in our introductory chapter to the effect that the Nigerian version of equal opportunity neglects structurally transcendent issues, such as social class, gender and urban-rural residence, the tendency in radical feminist discourse to articulate a "gender-only" approach to social inequality challenged us to take another look at the relationship between levels of SBE-HS and social class, this time controlling for gender and residence simultaneously. The relevant findings are displayed in Table 5.6.4. Every computed distribution is presented for information's sake, but we shall focus on the more meaningful percentages. In the urban sub-group, for example, petty-bourgeois males gained 3.6 percent at high expectations (i.e. from 78.3% in the original Table 5.6.1 relationship up to 81.9% in the current second-order relationship), while their female counterparts lost 2.4 percent (i.e. 78.3% original versus 75.9% current). Also, bourgeois females lost 1.3 percent (89.3% versus 88.0%), at the same time as bourgeois males crept up to a 2.4 percent gain (91.7% versus 89.3%). We note here that the magnitude of the original disparity between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie (11%) was basically replicated among urban males (9.8%) as well as urban females (12.1%). Within the same urban sub-group, there were 9.8 percent more bourgeois than petty-bourgeois males at high expectations (91.7% versus 81.9%), just as 12.1 percent more bourgeois than petty-bourgeois females checked high expectations (88.0% versus 75.9%).

In the rural sub-group, however, one finds that even a common class origin does not make the life chances of males uniform. Thus, petty-bourgeois males lost as much as 18.3 percent at high expectations (i.e. 78.3% original versus 60.0% current). Although the data for petty-bourgeois females is not meaningful, it seems to suggest basically the same pattern as that of their male counterparts. And bourgeois females, again allowing for scanty data, do not seem to be any worse than their male counterparts in the rural condition. Essentially, generalized statements claiming that males are always more privileged than females may, at least for our high school sub-sample, benefit from the qualification that it depends which groups of males and/or females one is referring to. If nothing else, there are 15.9 percent more urban petty-bourgeois females at high expectations than rural petty-bourgeois males (i.e. 75.9% versus 60.4%). But for the problem of a small sample size, we would have explored the foregoing distribution within each region and ethnic constituency.

Appearing in Table 5.6.5 are data re-examining, by controlling for ethnic-political constituency, the relationship between SBE-HS and social class. Overall, it seems that ethnicity somehow distorts (i.e. mediates positively and negatively) the relationship between expectations and social class. For whereas petty-bourgeois elements among the Southern Minorities (91.2%), the Igbo (82.6%) and the Yoruba (79.8%), in that order, experienced percentage gains at high expectations vis-a-vis the original 78.3 percent polled by the petty-bourgeoisie, their Hausa-Fulani (74.2%) and Northern Minority (59.3%) counterparts, in that order, indicated losses. A similar trend is observed among the bourgeoisie, except that the Yoruba sub-group (86.3%) experienced a three percent loss at high expectations vis-a-vis the original bourgeois proportion of 89.3 percent. Thus, whether it be among the bourgeoisie or the petty-bourgeoisie, the two most favoured high school sub-groups, expectation-wise, are the Southern Minorities followed by the Igbo; conversely, the two most disadvantaged sub-groups are the Northern Minorities as well as the Hausa-Fulani. The Yoruba segment of the two social classes taken together seems to fall somewhere in-between, with a mixture of modest advantage and disadvantage. A point that must be noted here, however, is that whereas the original 11 percent disparity between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie was basically returned among the Hausa-Fulani (10.4%) and the Igbo (12.6%), it increased most among the Northern Minorities (15.7%) and declined most among the Southern Minorities (5.4%).

Lastly, we look at the relationship between SBE-HS and social class, controlling for region (Table 5.6.6). Among the petty-bourgeoisie, the northern segment lost 11.1 percent at high expectations while the southern section gained 4.5 percent, when compared with the original 78.3 percent. Whereas bourgeois northerners lost 6.9 percent (i.e. 89.3% versus 82.4%) at high expectations, their southern counterparts basically replicated the original proportion (i.e. 90.2% versus 89.3%). Of course, the ethnic distributions in Table 5.6.5 have demonstrated that much of the northern loss was accounted for by the Northern Minorities, while the bulk of the southern gain was made by the Southern Minorities. Especially in light of the relative distributions of these two minority constituencies within the social class and the urban-rural sub-groups in Table 5.4.2, all this suggests that region as well as class and residence could make minority status no more than a numerical expression in the case of Nigeria's Southern Minorities in our survey sub-sample. Indeed, an equivalent profile of socio-economic prominence comes across for Canadians and Americans of otherwise minority Jewish origin in Li (1988) and Ogbu (1983), respectively. Yet again, we must note that the original 11 percent disparity between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie at high expectations declined slightly among southerners (7.4%), while increasing slightly among northerners (15.2%).

Part B: The Professional Sub-sample

Table 5.6.7 displays data on the relationship between levels of structurally based expectations in the professional program sub-sample (SBE-PP) and social class, gender, residence, ethnic-political constituency, as well as region. As this table shows, the bourgeoisie, much like their high school counterparts, are over-represented at high expectations (48.6%), and under-represented at low expectations (15.7%). The offspring of workers polled the largest proportion at low expectations (50%), followed at some distance by their petty-bourgeoisie counterparts (29%), who actually finished second at high expectations (20.5%). Whereas 34 percent of females as against 23.4 percent of males indicated high expectations, a slightly larger proportion of males (27.4% males versus

24.5% females) will be found in low expectations. This gender pattern is the opposite of the distribution in the high school sub-sample (see Table 5.6.1). Quite familiarly, there are 16.7 percent more urban than rural students at high expectations (28.7% versus 12.0%), as against 10.6 percent more rural than urban students at low expectations (36.0% versus 25.4%). Unlike their kindred in the high school sub-sample, the Yoruba polled the largest proportion at high expectations (40.6%), to say nothing of appearing least at low expectations (15.6%). The Igbo again finished second at high expectations (32.0%), as well as last but one at low expectations (20.0%). The highest expecting section of the high school sub-sample, the Southern Minorities, now polled a marginal third at high expectations (24.6%), and even the second most represented group at low expectations (32.8%). Here again, the Northern Minorities finished last at high expectations (17.9%) and first at low expectations (33.9%). Similarly, there are 10.2 percent more southern than northern students at high expectations (31.0% versus 20.8%), as against 6.9 percent more northern than southern students at low expectations (30.7% versus 23.8%).

To further explore the nature of the indicated association between social class and expectations, we now introduce relevant control variables in turns. Thus, Table 5.6.8 revisits the said association, this time controlling for gender. Unlike the trend in the high school sub-sample, it is among females that the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie, respectively, gained 2.7 percent and 2.6 percent vis-a-vis their initial proportions at high expectations. Also, the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie, respectively, lost 3.4 percent and 1.1 percent at high expectations among the male sub-group. Although the bourgeoisie reduced their proportion at low expectations among males while increasing it among females, the petty-bourgeoisie went in the opposite direction. Allowing for scanty evidence, all three working class females indicated low expectations, as against the medium-to-high expectations (61.6%) polled by eight of their male counterparts. Yet, five of the 13 working class males featured (38.5%) indicated low expectations -- a proportion that is 11.5 percent less than the original 50.0 percent. Overall, gender again appears to contribute little or nothing to class differentials in expectations between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie. That noted, bourgeois and, to a lesser extent, petty-bourgeois females in the professional sub-sample seem to be slightly better off, expectation-wise, than their male counterparts. It would appear, however, that working-class males have some edge over their female counterparts in this matter. In the last analysis, however, the original 28.1 percent disparity at high expectations between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie is basically replicated, more so among females (28.2%) than among males (25.8%).

Table 5.6.9 re-examines the relationship between SBE-PP and social class by controlling for residence. Under a rural test condition, the 71.1 percent originally netted by the petty-bourgeoisie at medium-to-high expectations now drops down to 61.1 percent. Conversely, the urban working class increased their medium-to-high representation by 7.2 percent (i.e. 57.2% current versus 50.0% original). The urban bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes basically retained their original patterns at high expectations. Much like the high school sub-sample, then, an urban background appears to add little or nothing to the professional practice prospects of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois students. But this is not to say that a rural background does not seem to compromise the expectations of the petty-bourgeoisie in the professional sub-sample, and the petty-bourgeoisie as well as the bourgeoisie in the high school sub-sample. The offspring of workers seem to profit the most from an urban background in terms of professional practice expectations.

To further make sense of all this, Table 5.6.10 again reconsiders the relationship between SBE-PP and social class, this time holding gender and residence simultaneously constant. In the urban male sub-group, the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie basically retained their original proportions at high expectations, while their working class counterparts increased their proportion at medium-to-high expectations by 16.7 percent (i.e. 66.7% current versus 50.0% original). In the urban female sub-group, however, the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie improved their proportions at high expectations by 2.7 percent and 3.0 percent, respectively (i.e. 51.3% current versus 48.6% original for the bourgeoisie; 23.5% current versus 20.5% original for the petty-bourgeoisie), only that the original 28 percent class differential at high expectations is again replicated. And, much like the negative impact of rural origins acknowledged in the immediately preceding paragraph, the 71.1 percent originally polled by the petty-bourgeoisie at medium-to-high expectations now drops to 64.7 percent for the featured male sub-group. Much like the high school sub-sample, then, neither males nor females in the professional sub-sample appear to be privileged or disadvantaged in an invariant manner. A lot depends on which sub-groups of males and/or females one has in mind. For one thing, there are 11.7 percent more urban petty-bourgeois females at medium-to-high expectations than are rural petty-bourgeois males (i.e. 76.4% versus 64.7%). For another, the virtual absence of female attributes in the rural sub-group and among the urban working class suggests a gender-linked disadvantage the same way as the absence of rural working class males says something of the comparative advantage of their urban working class counterparts. For a third, Table 5.6.8 has shown that bourgeois females in particular could have better prospects than bourgeois and petty-bourgeois males, at the same time as working class males seem to have an edge over their female counterparts.

Displayed in Table 5.6.11 are data reviewing the relationship between structurally based expectations in the professional sub-sample (SBE-PP) and social class, by controlling for ethnic-political constituency. Much like the high school sub-sample, ethnicity seems to distort, by at once reducing and boosting, the association between expectations and social class. Thus, while the bourgeoisie increased their proportions at high expectations vis-a-vis the original 48.6 percent amongst the Yoruba (66.7%) and the Hausa-Fulani (50.0%), in that order, they suffered losses among the Southern Minorities (41.7%), the Igbo (42.1%) and the Northern Minorities (46.7%), in that order. Also, while the petty-bourgeoisie made a fairly reasonable gain at high expectations among the Igbo (32.0%) vis-a-vis the original 20.5%, they suffered considerable losses among the Northern Minorities (8.6%) and, to a lesser degree, among the Hausa-Fulani (17.2%) and the Southern Minorities (18.6%). Here again, we note that the original 28.1 percent disparity at high expectations between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie was substantially reduced to 10.1 percent among the Igbo, and considerably increased to 45.6 percent among the Yoruba. Part of the mechanism through which this pattern occurred may be the similar proportions of those two social classes among the Igbo, as well as the very large proportion of the bourgeoisie among the Yoruba in Table 5.1.7.

Lastly on the professional sub-sample, we look at the relationship between SBE-PP and social class, controlling for region (Table 5.6.12). Somewhat similar to the pattern in the high school sub-sample, the bourgeoisie basically replicated the original proportion of 48.6 percent at high expectations not just among southerners (48.8%), but this time also among northerners (48.1%). Whereas the petty-bourgeoisie returned, like their high school counterparts, a 4.5 percent greater proportion at high expectations among southerners (i.e. 25.0% current versus 20.5% original), they again lost 8.0 percent at that level among northerners (20.5% original versus 12.5% current). And while the working class gained 10 percent at medium-to-high expectations among southerners (60% current versus 50% original), they added a 16.7 percent burden at low expectations among northerners (i.e. 66.7% current versus 50.0% original). Thus, it is among the working class that region seems to have the most mediating effect in favour of the south in the matter of expectations in our professional sub-sample. We should also note that the original 28.1 percent disparity at high expectations between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie rose to 35.6 percent among northerners, but declined to 23.8 percent among southerners.

Conclusions

Whether it be in the high school or the professional program sub-sample, there seems to be a dependable association between levels of structurally based expectations and social class. Whereas the offspring of the bourgeoisie in each case tended to be disproportionately over-represented at high expectations, followed at some distance by those of the petty-bourgeoisie, their working class counterparts in the professional sub-sample tended to be concentrated at low-to-medium expectations, again followed at a reasonable distance by their petty-bourgeois cohorts.

However, the association between expectations and social class is mediated by residence in particular, and also by ethnicity, region and, least of all, gender. Allowing for rather scanty data, it is among the working class that the mediating effects of residence, region (itself a dichotomous geo-political reconstitution of ethnicity in Nigeria), and gender seem to be the most pronounced. Also, a bourgeois background is generally affected minimally, one way or the other, by the said mediating factors. For their part, the petty-bourgeoisie are affected to a lesser or greater extent from one situation to another, with the rural and the Northern Minority conditions indicating the most deleterious effects.

Finally, neither the male nor the female section of our survey sample experienced privilege or disadvantage in a synchronous manner. Instead, social class, together with residence, seems to make an awful lot of difference in levels of structurally based expectations between and among males and females. For example, working class males appear to have an edge, expectation-wise, over their female counterparts, the same way as urban petty-bourgeois females expressed much better prospects than rural petty-bourgeois males. Thus, our respondents seem to imply that when all other conditions are favourable (e.g. bourgeois, urban, professional, elite high school), it probably would make little or no difference, in terms of social opportunities, whether the individual was male or female.

Research Question #7

Controlling for social class in each case, are levels of structurally based expectations in federal educational institutions related to gender, residence, ethnic-political constituency and region?

The Evidence

The essence of this section is largely to enable us to compare more straightforwardly across non-class factors, while watching top-down the effects of bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and working class test conditions. To the extent that the relevant tables are but another way of looking at what has already been presented, described and interpreted in some detail under research question number six, we shall be brief here, and the tables will speak for themselves as a complement to the information in the immediately preceding section. At any rate, we will be making comparative references to the original relationships between expectations and gender, residence constituency as well as region in both the high school and the professional sub-samples (see, respectively, Tables 5.6.1 and 5.6.7).

Table 5.7.1
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Gender, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		GENDER	
Social Class	SBE-HS	Male	Female
BOURGEOISIE	High	90.3 (56)	88.5 (69)
	Medium	8.1 (5)	10.3 (8)
	Low	1.6 (1)	1.3 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (62)	100.0 (78)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	80.2 (101)	75.6 (65)
	Medium	15.1 (19)	15.1 (13)
	Low	4.8 (6)	9.3 (8)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (126)	100.0 (86)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.7.2
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Gender, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		GENDER	
Social Class	SBE-PP	Male	Female
BOURGEOISIE	High	45.2 (14)	51.3 (20)
	Medium	41.9 (13)	30.8 (12)
	Low	12.9 (4)	17.9 (7)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (31)	100.0 (39)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	19.4 (24)	23.1 (12)
	Medium	50.0 (62)	51.9 (27)
	Low	30.6 (38)	25.0 (13)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (124)	100.0 (52)
WORKERS	High	15.4 (2)	0.0 (0)
	Medium	46.2 (6)	0.0 (0)
	Low	38.5 (5)	100.0 (3)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (13)	100.0 (3)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.7.3
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Residence, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

Social Class	SBE-HS	RESIDENCE Urban	 Rural
BOURGEOISIE	High	89.6 (121)	80.0 (4)
	Medium	9.6 (13)	0.0 (0)
	Low	0.7 (1)	20.0 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (135)	100.0 (5)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	79.4 (158)	61.5 (8)
	Medium	13.6 (27)	38.5 (5)
	Low	7.0 (14)	0.0 (0)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (199)	100.0 (13)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.7.4
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Residence, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

Social Class	SBE-PP	RESIDENCE Urban	 Rural
BOURGEOISIE	High	50.0 (34)	0.0 (0)
	Medium	33.8 (23)	100.0 (2)
	Low	16.2 (11)	0.0 (0)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (68)	100.0 (2)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	21.5 (34)	11.1 (2)
	Medium	50.6 (80)	50.0 (9)
	Low	27.8 (44)	38.9 (7)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (158)	100.0 (176)
WORKERS	High	14.3 (2)	0.0 (0)
	Medium	42.9 (6)	0.0 (0)
	Low	42.9 (6)	100.0 (2)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (14)	100.0 (2)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.7.5
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Ethnic-Political Constituency, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY				
Social Class	**SBE-HS**	**Hausa Fulani**	**Yoruba**	**Igbo**	**Northern Minorities**	**Southern Minorities**
BOURGEOISIE	High	84.6 (11)	86.3 (63)	95.2 (20)	75.0 (3)	96.6 (28)
	Medium	15.4 (2)	12.3 (9)	4.8 (1)	0.0 (0)	3.4 (1)
	Low	0.0 (0)	1.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	25.0 (1)	0.0 (0)
	TOTAL[a]	100.0 (13)	100.0 (72)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (29)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	74.2 (23)	79.8 (75)	82.6 (19)	59.3 (16)	91.2 (31)
	Medium	22.6 (7)	11.7 (11)	8.7 (2)	29.6 (8)	8.8 (3)
	Low	3.2 (1)	8.5 (8)	8.7 (2)	11.1 (3)	0.0 (0)
(missing = 21)	TOTAL[a]	100.0 (31)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (34)

[a] There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.7.6
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Ethnic-Political Constituency, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY				
Social Class	**SBE-PP**	**Hausa Fulani**	**Yoruba**	**Igbo**	**Northern Minorities**	**Southern Minorities**
BOURGEOISIE	High	50.0 (6)	66.7 (8)	42.1 (8)	46.7 (7)	41.7 (5)
	Medium	25.0 (3)	8.3 (1)	52.6 (10)	46.7 (7)	33.3 (4)
	Low	25.0 (3)	25.0 (3)	5.3 (1)	6.7 (1)	25.0 (3)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (12)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (12)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	17.2 (5)	21.1 (4)	32.0 (16)	8.6 (3)	18.6 (8)
	Medium	51.7 (15)	68.4 (13)	44.0 (22)	51.4 (18)	48.8 (21)
	Low	31.0 (9)	10.5 (2)	24.0 (12)	40.0 (14)	32.6 (14)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (29)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (43)
WORKERS	High	0.0 (0)	100.0 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	25.0 (1)
	Medium	100.0 (1)	0.0 (0)	60.0 (3)	20.0 (1)	25.0 (1)
	Low	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	40.0 (2)	80.0 (4)	50.0 (2)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (1)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (4)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.7.7
Structurally Based Expectations in High School (SBE-HS) by Region, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		REGION	
Social Class	SBE-HS	North	South
BOURGEOISIE	High	82.4 (14)	90.2 (111)
	Medium	11.8 (2)	8.9 (11)
	Low	5.9 (1)	0.8 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (17)	100.0 (123)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	67.2 (39)	82.8 (125)
	Medium	25.9 (15)	10.6 (16)
	Low	6.9 (4)	6.6 (10)
(missing = 21)	TOTAL*	100.0 (58)	100.0 (151)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Table 5.7.8
Structurally Based Expectations in Professional Program (SBE-PP) by Region, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		REGION	
Social Class	SBE-PP	North	South
BOURGEOISIE	High	48.1 (13)	48.8 (21)
	Medium	37.0 (10)	34.9 (15)
	Low	14.8 (4)	16.3 (7)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (27)	100.0 (43)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	12.5 (8)	25.0 (28)
	Medium	51.6 (33)	50.0 (56)
	Low	35.9 (23)	25.0 (28)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (64)	100.0 (112)
WORKERS	High	0.0 (0)	20.2 (2)
	Medium	33.3 (2)	40.0 (4)
	Low	66.7 (4)	40.0 (4)
(missing = 18)	TOTAL*	100.0 (6)	100.0 (10)

*There may be computer rounding errors

Thus, Table 5.7.1 shows the relationship between SBE-HS and gender, controlling for social class. Among the bourgeois, both males and females increased their proportions at high expectations by approximately seven percent, even as they retained the original zero association, strictly speaking, between expectations and gender in Table 5.6.1. Among the petty-bourgeoisie, however, each group suffered a drop at high expectations such that some evidence of gender-related difference in expectations emerges in the form of a 4.6 percent male advantage (80.2% versus 75.6%). Thus, males and females in the high school sub-sample have basically the same levels of expectations among the bourgeoisie. It is among the petty-bourgeoisie that gender seems to affect expectations very slightly in favour of males.

Table 5.7.2 examines the situation in the professional sub-sample. Among the bourgeoisie, both males and females increased their proportions at high expectations such that the original female advantage in Table 5.6.7 (10.6%) drops down to 6.1 percent (51.3% versus 45.2%). Among the petty-bourgeoisie, each group experienced losses at high expectations to the extent that the initial female advantage further narrows down to 3.7 percent (23.1% versus 9.4%). Thus, while a bourgeois background slightly reduces the advantage our professional women seem to have over their male counterparts, the said advantage diminishes more meaningfully under a petty-bourgeois condition. Here again, social class affects the way in which gender impacts on expectations.

The relationship between SBE-HS and residence is revisited in Table 5.7.3, this time holding social class constant. Among the bourgeoisie, urban and, especially, rural students increased their proportions in high expectations such that the original 16.9 percent urban advantage now drops to 9.6 percent (89.6% versus 80.0%). Conversely, the losses suffered by each group among the petty-bourgeoisie were such that the original urban advantage is retained with an extra two percent. Table 5.7.4 presents the pattern in the professional sub-sample. Among the bourgeoisie, urban respondents increased their proportion at high expectations by as much as 21.3 percent (50.0% current versus 28.7% original). Among the petty-bourgeoisie, however, the losses suffered by each group at medium-to-high expectations ended up producing basically the same magnitude of urban advantage at medium-to-high expectations as in the original association (i.e. 11%). And the urban working class lost much more than their petty-bourgeois counterparts at medium-to-high expectations. Once again, social class appears to substantially affect the way in which expectations are related to residence. Whereas a bourgeois condition seems to increase everyone's proportion at high expectations while reducing urban-rural disparities, a petty-bourgeois condition appears to reproduce the same degree of urban advantage while reducing everyone's proportion at medium-to-high expectations.

Data re-evaluating the relationship between SBE-HS and ethnic-political constituency by holding social class constant are displayed in Table 5.7.5. Typically, a bourgeois condition so increased each group's proportion at high expectations that the original 32.4 percent distance between the best-case Southern Minorities (93.7%) and the worst-case Northern Minorities (61.3%) is now reduced to 21.6 percent (i.e. 96.6% versus 75.0%). Rather familiarly, too, the petty-bourgeois test condition so reduced everyone's proportion at high expectations that the approximately 32 percent distance between the best and the worst cases is basically retained (i.e. 91.2% versus 59.3%). The situation in the professional sub-sample is displayed in Table 5.7.6. While substantially increasing everyone's proportion at high expectations, the bourgeois test condition did not attenuate the original 22.7 percent disparity between the worst case (Northern Minorities) and the best case (Yoruba) (i.e. 17.9% versus 40.6%). Instead, there occurred a gap of 25 percent between the new worst case (Southern Minorities) and the conventional best case (Yoruba) (i.e. 41.7% versus 66.7%). There, however, was a three percent reduction in the new gap between the Yoruba and the original worst case, the Northern Minorities. Among the petty-bourgeoisie, the basically 23 percent distance between the best case and the worst case is, as usual, sustained, only that the new best case, the Igbo, singularly did not reduce their original proportion at high expectations (i.e. 32%). Allowing for the somewhat deviant bourgeois situation in the professional sub-sample, then, social class affects the association between expectations and ethnicity in such a way that a bourgeois background reduces constituency disparities while increasing everyone's proportion at high expectations. Also, a petty-bourgeois background typically reproduces constituency disparities while generally reducing everyone's proportion at high expectations.

Appearing in Table 5.7.7 are data showing the relationship between SBE-HS and region, controlling for social class. As usual, a bourgeois test condition reduced the original 15.5 percent southern advantage at high expectations (i.e. 86.2% South versus 70.7% North in Table 5.6.1) to 7.8 percent (i.e. 90.2% South versus 82.4% North), at the same time as northerners and southerners alike increased their proportions at that level of expectations. Also, the petty-bourgeois test condition returned precisely the 15.6 (actually 15.5) percent original southern advantage at high expectations (70.7% versus 86.2% original; 67.2% versus 82.8% current), even while typically reducing everyone's proportion at that level of expectations. The corresponding patterns in the professional sub-sample are shown in Table 5.7.8. Among the bourgeoisie, the original association between expectations and region (10.2% in favour of the south at high expectations; 6.9% against the North at low expectations) dramatically disappeared, even as each group, especially the north, increased its proportion at high expectations, while also pulling much of the membership out of low expectations. It is among the petty-bourgeoisie that the magnitude of the originally indicated relationship between expectations and region (10.2% in favour of the South at high expectations) is reproduced with an additional 2.3 percent. Among the working class, scanty data do suggest that northern over-representation at low expectations increased from 6.9 percent in the original relationship to 26.7 percent in the current situation (i.e. 66.7% North versus 40.0% South in Table 5.7.8).

Conclusions

Although a general case can be made for some connection between structurally based expectations and residence, gender, ethnic-political constituency, as well as region, yet such a relationship may be better explained or interpreted in terms of the associated effects of social class, a link which perhaps comes across in the distribution of the different social classes across the relevant sub-groups in Table 5.1.7. It may also be worthwhile to specify that such an implied association between structurally based expectations and the itemized non-class factors in our survey sample is generally more so among the offspring of the petty-bourgeoisie as well as the working classes, than among the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie. Put in other words, a bourgeois background seems to provide a considerable shield against the structural disadvantages which may otherwise be connected with the individual's residential, regional, ethnic-political as well as gender affiliations.

However, in addition to the replication of the basic magnitude of the original relationships under the petty-bourgeois test condition generally, the non-disappearance of the initial associations among the bourgeoisie in the majority of the cases suggests that questions of social or educational/occupational inequalities are not exhausted by social class considerations alone. Class remains pervasive and fundamental, but does not by itself obliterate other social fractions. Indeed, the scanty data available seem to show that the working class in an otherwise privileged group may well have better prospects than their counterparts in an otherwise disadvantaged group. This notwithstanding, the class differentials at high expectations within the groups themselves underscore the fact that no group itself is a monolith.

Research Question #8

Does academic performance affect the relationship between structurally based expectations (SBE) and social class the same way as social class affects the relationship between psychologically based expectations (PBE) and academic performance?

The Evidence

Tables 5.8.1 to 5.8.7 show the initial or zero-order relationships between and amongst the relevant variables under this research question. As Table 5.8.1 reveals, there are approximately five percent more working class than bourgeois students at the level of moderate performance (relabelled "high" performance for the group in tables with test conditions) in the professional sub-sample (i.e. 93.3% versus 88.6%). In the high school sub-sample, however, there are 7.6 percent more bourgeois than petty-bourgeois students at high performance (36.7% versus 29.1%), and 5.7 percent more petty-bourgeois than bourgeois students at low performance (11.8% versus 6.1%).

As information, the relationship between psychologically based expectations (PBE) and structurally based expectations (SBE) in the high school sub-sample is presented in Table 5.8.2. As this table shows, 93.5, 76.2 and 46.2 percent, respectively, indicated high PBE-HS within the high, medium and low categories of SBE-HS. The equivalent experience in the professional sub-sample (Table 5.8.3) is such that within the high, medium and low categories of SBE-PP, 76.0, 59.4 and 34.6 percent, respectively, expressed high PBE-PP.

Table 5.8.1
Academic Performance by Social Class

Academic Performance	SOCIAL CLASS				
	(Professional Sub-sample)			(High School Sub-sample)	
	Workers	Petty-Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie	Petty Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
High	0.0 (0)	0.5 (1)	0.0 (0)	29.1 (64)	36.7 (54)
Moderate	93.3 (14)	92.9 (171)	88.6 (62)	59.1 (130)	57.1 (84)
Low	6.7 (1)	6.5 (12)	11.4 (8)	11.8 (26)	6.1 (9)
TOTAL*	100.0 (15)	100.0 (184)	100.0 (70)	100.0 (220)	100.0 (147)
	(missing = 11)			(missing = 3)	

* There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.2
PBE-HS by SBE-HS

	SBE-HS		
PBE-HS	Low	Medium	High
High	46.2 (6)	76.2 (32)	93.5 (259)
Moderate	30.8 (4)	21.4 (9)	4.3 (12)
Low	23.1 (3)	2.4 (1)	2.2 (6)
TOTAL* (missing = 38)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (277)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.3
PBE-PP by SBE-PP

	SBE-PP		
PBE-PP	Low	Medium	High
High	34.6 (18)	59.4 (60)	76.0 (38)
Moderate	32.7 (17)	34.7 (35)	24.0 (12)
Low	32.7 (17)	5.9 (6)	0.0 (0)
TOTAL* (missing = 77)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (50)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.4
Structurally Based Expectations (SBE-HS) by Social Class, Academic Performance, Gender, Residence and Region
(Percentages)

	Social Class*		Academic Performance			Gender		Residence		Region	
SBE-HS**	Petty-Brgsie	Brgsie	Low	Moderate	High	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	North	South
High	78.3 (166)	89.3 (125)	61.8 (21)	81.5 (167)	91.2 (104)	83.6 (158)	81.7 (134)	83.6 (280)	66.7 (12)	70.7 (53)	86.2 (237)
Medium	15.1 (32)	9.3 (13)	26.5 (9)	14.6 (30)	5.3 (6)	12.7 (24)	12.8 (21)	11.9 (40)	27.8 (5)	22.7 (17)	9.8 (27)
Low	6.6 (14)	1.4 (2)	11.8 (4)	3.9 (8)	3.5 (4)	3.7 (7)	5.5 (9)	4.5 (15)	5.6 (1)	6.7 (5)	4.0 (11)
TOTAL***	100.0 (212)	100.0 (140)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (205)	100.0 (114)	100.0 (189)	100.0 (164)	100.0 (335)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (275)
	(missing = 18)		(missing = 17)			(missing = 17)		(missing = 17)		(missing = 20)	

* We did not find "Working Class" attributes in the high school sub- sample.

** Structurally Based Expectations - High School Sub-sample.

*** There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.5
Psychologically Based Expectations (PBE-HS) by Social Class, Academic Performance, Gender, Residence and Region (Percentages)

	Social Class*		Academic Performance			Gender		Residence		Region	
PBE-HS**	Petty-Brgsie	Brgsie	Low	Moderate	High	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	North	South
High	87.7 (173)	90.6 (125)	77.4 (24)	90.4 (169)	91.4 (106)	91.1 (163)	87.7 (136)	89.9 (284)	83.3 (15)	82.4 (56)	91.3 (240)
Medium	7.2 (14)	8.0 (11)	12.9 (4)	7.5 (14)	6.0 (7)	6.1 (11)	9.0 (14)	7.3 (23)	11.1 (2)	14.7 (10)	5.7 (15)
Low	4.1 (8)	1.4 (2)	9.7 (3)	2.1 (4)	2.6 (3)	2.8 (5)	3.2 (5)	2.8 (9)	5.6 (1)	2.9 (2)	3.0 (8)
TOTAL***	100.0 (195)	100.0 (138)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (187)	100.0 (116)	100.0 (179)	100.0 (155)	100.0 (316)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (68)	100.0 (263)
	(missing = 37)		(missing = 36)			(missing = 36)		(missing = 36)		(missing = 39)	

* We did not find "Working Class" attributes in the high school sub- sample.
** Psychologically Based Expectations - High School Sub-sample.
*** There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.6

Structurally Based Expectations (SBE-PP) by Social Class, Academic Performance, Gender, Residence and Region (Percentages)

	Social Class			Academic Performance¤			Gender		Residence		Region	
SBE-PP*	Workers	Petty-Brgsie	Brgsie	Low	Moderate	High	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	North	South
High	12.5	20.5	48.6	23.8	27.8	0.0	23.4	34.0	28.7	12.0	20.8	31.0
	(2)	(36)	(34)	(5)	(68)	(0)	(41)	(32)	(70)	(3)	(21)	(52)
Medium	37.5	50.6	35.7	33.3	47.3	100.0	49.1	41.5	45.9	52.0	48.5	45.2
	(6)	(89)	(25)	(7)	(116)	(1)	(86)	(39)	(112)	(13)	(49)	(76)
Low	50.0	29.0	15.7	42.9	24.9	0.0	27.4	24.5	25.4	36.0	30.7	23.8
	(8)	(51)	(11)	(9)	(61)	(0)	(48)	(23)	(62)	(9)	(31)	(41)
TOTAL**	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(16)	(176)	(70)	(21)	(245)	(1)	(175)	(94)	(244)	(25)	(101)	(168)
	(missing = 18)			(missing = 13)			(missing = 11)		(missing = 11)		(missing = 11)	

* Structurally Based Expectations - Professional Program Sub-sample.

** There may be computer rounding errors.

*** The virtual absence of "High" attributes should be seen in terms of (a) more stringent grading systems in universities/professional programs vis-a-vis high schools, and (b) our failure to adjust the survey instrument accordingly (Questionnaire item A12[a]). The "Moderate" and "High" attributes are combined into a "High" category in subsequent analyses employing test conditions.

Table 5.8.7
Psychologically Based Expectations (PBE-PP) by Social Class, Academic Performance, Gender, Residence and Region (Percentages)

	Social Class			Academic Performance			Gender		Residence		Region	
PBE-PP*	Workers	Petty-Brgsie	Brgsie	Low	Moderate	High	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	North	South
High	35.7 (5)	59.1 (78)	58.8 (30)	70.6 (12)	56.0 (103)	100.0⌗ (1)	55.9 (80)	60.0 (36)	55.3 (99)	70.8 (17)	42.0 (29)	64.9 (87)
Medium	57.1 (8)	29.5 (39)	29.4 (15)	5.9 (1)	33.7 (62)	0.0 (0)	32.9 (47)	28.3 (17)	32.4 (58)	25.0 (6)	42.0 (29)	26.1 (35)
Low	7.1 (1)	11.4 (15)	11.8 (6)	23.5 (4)	10.3 (19)	0.0 (0)	11.2 (16)	11.7 (7)	12.3 (22)	4.2 (1)	15.9 (11)	9.0 (12)
TOTAL**	100.0 (14)	100.0 (132)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (184)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (143)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (179)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (69)	100.0 (134)
	(missing = 83)			(missing = 78)			(missing = 77)		(missing = 77)		(missing = 77)	

* Psychologically Based Expectations - Professional Program Sub-sample.
** There may be computer rounding errors.
⌗ This is meaningless.

Table 5.8.8
SBE-HS by Social Class, Controlling for Academic Performance (Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS	
Academic Performance	**SBE-HS**	**Petty-bourgeoisie**	**Bourgeoisie**
HIGH	High	87.1 (54)	96.2 (50)
	Medium	6.5 (4)	3.8 (2)
	Low	6.5 (4)	0.0 (0)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (62)	100.0 (52)
MODERATE	High	78.2 (97)	86.3 (69)
	Medium	16.1 (20)	12.5 (10)
	Low	5.6 (7)	1.3 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (124)	100.0 (80)
LOW	High	57.7 (15)	75.0 (6)
	Medium	30.8 (8)	12.5 (1)
	Low	11.5 (3)	12.5 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (26)	100.0 (8)
(missing = 18)			

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.9
SBE-PP by Social Class, Controlling for Academic Performance (Percentages)

		SOCIAL CLASS		
Academic Performance	**SBE-PP**	**Workers**	**Petty Bourgeoisie**	**Bourgeoisie**
HIGH	High	14.3 (2)	21.0 (34)	50.0 (31)
	Medium	42.9 (6)	51.2 (83)	35.5 (22)
	Low	42.9 (6)	27.8 (45)	14.5 (9)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (14)	100.0 (162)	100.0 (62)
LOW	High	0.0 (0)	16.7 (2)	37.5 (3)
	Medium	0.0 (0)	33.3 (4)	37.5 (3)
	Low	100.0 (1)	50.0 (6)	25.0 (2)
(missing = 19)	TOTAL*	100.0 (1)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (8)

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.10
PBE-HS by Academic Performance, Controlling for Social Class (Percentages)

		ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE		
Social Class	**PBE-HS**	**Low**	**Moderate**	**High**
BOURGEOISIE	High	87.5 (7)	86.8 (66)	96.3 (52)
	Medium	12.5 (1)	10.5 (8)	3.7 (2)
	Low	0.0 (0)	2.6 (2)	0.0 (0)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (8)	100.0 (76)	100.0 (54)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	73.9 (17)	92.7 (102)	87.1 (54)
	Medium	13.0 (3)	5.5 (6)	8.1 (5)
	Low	13.0 (3)	1.8 (2)	4.8 (3)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (23)	100.0 (110)	100.0 (62)
(missing = 37)				

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Table 5.8.11
PBE-PP by Academic Performance, Controlling for Social Class
(Percentages)

		ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE	
Social Class	PBE-PP	Low	High
BOURGEOISIE	High	71.4 (5)	56.8 (25)
	Medium	0.0 (0)	34.1 (15)
	Low	28.6 (2)	9.1 (4)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (7)	100.0 (44)
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE	High	66.7 (6)	58.2 (71)
	Medium	11.1 (1)	31.1 (38)
	Low	22.2 (2)	10.7 (13)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (9)	100.0 (122)
WORKERS	High	100.0 (1)	33.3 (4)
	Medium	0.0 (0)	58.3 (7)
	Low	0.0 (0)	8.3 (1)
	TOTAL*	100.0 (1)	100.0 (12)
(missing = 83)			

*There may be computer rounding errors.

Appearing in Table 5.8.4 are data showing the initial relationships between SBE-HS and social class, as well as academic performance. There are 11.0 percent more bourgeois than petty-bourgeois students at high SBE-HS (i.e. 89.3% versus 78.3%). Also, there are 9.7 percent more high performers than moderate performers at high SBE-HS (71.2% versus 81.5%), 19.7 percent more moderate than low performers at high SBE-HS (81.5% versus 61.8%), as well as 29.4 percent more high than low performers at high SBE-HS (91.2% versus 61.8%).

The initial relationships between PBE-HS and social class, as well as academic performance, are shown in Table 5.8.5. As this table reveals, there is basically a relationship of "zero" between PBE-HS and social class. That is, the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie polled essentially the same proportions at high and medium PBE-HS. Similarly, high and moderate performers surprisingly expressed essentially the same proportions at high and medium psychologically based expectations in the high school sub-sample. Nevertheless, there were 14 percent more high than low performers at high PBE-HS (91.4% versus 77.4%), and 13 percent more moderate than low performers at that level of PBE-HS (90.4% versus 77.4%).

Displayed in Table 5.8.6 are data showing the initial relationships between structurally based expectations in the professional sub-sample (SBE-PP) and social class, as well as academic performance. There are 28.1 percent more bourgeois than petty-bourgeois students at high SBE-PP (48.6% versus 20.5%), as well as 13.3 percent more petty-bourgeois than bourgeois students at low SBE-PP (29.0% versus 15.7%). Whereas four percent more low than moderate performers indicated high SBE-

PP (27.8% versus 23.8%), 18 percent more low than moderate performers polled low SBE-PP (42.9% versus 24.9%).

The original associations between psychologically based expectations in the professional sub-sample (PBE-PP) and social class, as well as academic performance, are shown in Table 5.8.7. As this table reveals, low performers surprisingly out-polled moderate performers at high PBE-PP by a margin of 14.6 percent (70.6% versus 56.0%). And, much like the high school sub-sample, the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie indicated basically the same proportion at high and medium PBE-PP (59.1% versus 58.8% at high; 29.5% versus 29.4% at medium). However, each of them was some 23 percent ahead of the working class (35.7%) at high PBE-PP.

Thus far, there are some suggestions that, unlike the situation with structurally based expectations (the effects of material resources) vis-a-vis the different levels of academic performance, psychologically based expectations (the effects of mental resources) do not seem to produce any differences between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie in both the high school and the professional sub-samples. Indeed, one surprising development is that psychologically based expectations did not produce any variation between high and moderate performers in the high school sub-sample, to say nothing of the 14.6 percent edge which low performers had over moderate performers at high psychologically based expectations in the professional sub-sample.

To help make better sense of it all, the following tables revisit four essential relationships while controlling for certain relevant variables. Thus, Table 5.8.8 shows the relationship between structurally based expectations in high school (SBE-HS) and social class, this time controlling for academic performance. Although the highly academic section of the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, respectively, experienced 8.8 percent and 6.9 percent gains at high expectations, the magnitude of the original disparity between the two in Table 5.8.4 (11.0%) is basically replicated (9.1%). This suggests that the original association is dependable, and that high academic performance makes no difference to structural expectations between the two social classes. While contributing an insignificant three percent drop to the proportion of the bourgeoisie at high SBE-HS, a test condition of moderate academic performance also returned basically the magnitude of the original disparity between the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. It is among low achievers that fairly substantial percentage drops at high SBE-HS ended up producing 6.3 percent more disparity between the two social classes (i.e. 17.3% current disparity versus 11.0% original difference). The corres-ponding situation in the professional sub-sample is conveyed in Table 5.8.9. Among high performers, the proportions originally polled by the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie at high, medium and low SBE-PP in Table 5.8.6 were basically returned, and so the magnitude of the initial disparities were essentially replicated. Here again, high academic performance failed to produce any differences between the two social classes. The working class did, however, improve its proportion at medium expectations by 5.4 percent vis-a-vis the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes.

Table 5.8.10 revisits the relationship between psychologically based expectations in high school (PBE-HS) and academic performance, controlling for social class. Under a bourgeois test condition, the relative percentage gains experienced at high PBE-HS by low performers (10.1%) and high performers (4.9%) resulted in a 5.2 percent reduction in the magnitude of the original disparity (14.0%) between them in Table 5.8.5. Also, while the original 13.0 percent disparity between low and moderate performers basically vanished, the initial difference of essentially zero between moderate and high performers is now replaced with a 9.5 percent advantage for high performers. Thus, a bourgeois test condition at once reduced, obliterated and introduced a relationship between PBE-HS and differing categories of academic performance. Among the petty-bourgeoisie, however, the magnitude of the original disparity at high PBE-HS between low and high performers (14.0%) was basically replicated. But then, not only did the petty-bourgeois condition increase the original 13.0 percent disparity at high PBE-HS between low and moderate performers, it also introduced a 5.6 percent disparity in the initial difference of essentially zero between moderate and high performers at the level of high PBE-HS. The comparative experience of the professional sub-sample is shown in Table 5.8.11. Among the bourgeoisie, no change occurred in the proportions indicating high PBE-PP within or between the academic performance groups. This replication of the original association between PBE-PP and academic performance suggests that social class has virtually no effect in this instance. Under a petty-bourgeois condition, however, the original 14.6 percent disparity at high PBE-PP between low and high performers was reduced to 8.5 percent. Even with limited evidence, there also is some indication that high performers dropped substantially out of high PBE-PP and into the medium level among the working class. There thus appears to be some mediating role for social class at the petty-bourgeois and working class, rather than the bourgeois, test conditions in the professional sub-sample.

Conclusions

Even as a tentative proposition to be subjected to more detailed study and analysis, there seems to be some heuristic value in considering educational-cum-occupational expectations as a two-dimensional concept. The first dimension is based largely upon one's financial-structural leverage, while the second is to a considerable extent a function of the individual's intellectual-psychological resources. As a general pattern, the various sub-groups in our entire survey sample increased their proportions at high expectations in the psychological as against the structural dimension. This suggests that, contrary to the liberal-functionalist meritocracy-cum-mobility model of school and society, our respondents seem to believe that getting ahead in life (i.e. social opportunity/inequality) is more a question of structural resources/constraints than a matter of intellectual resources/constraints.

There are in varying degrees a relationship between structurally based expectations (SBE) and social class as well as academic performance on the one hand, and psychologically based expectations (PBE) and academic performance as well a social class, on the other hand. In comparison with the impressive distribution of low performers vis-a-vis moderate or high performers in the psychological dimension, the dismal chances of the working class, or even the petty-bourgeoisie, vis-a-vis those of the bourgeoisie in the structural dimension also suggest that poverty is more of an impediment to getting ahead than lack of brains. Indeed, the distribution of the different performance groupings in the PBE-performance relationship sometimes showed unexpected patterns, in terms of either a greater proportion of low as against moderate-high performers at high expectations or identical proportions of moderate and high performers at high, medium and low expectations. Quite expectedly, however, the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie indicated substantial disparities in the SBE-class relationship, while returning basically identical proportions in the psychological dimension of expectations. It may well be that differences in academic performance do not influence their organic portfolio of expectations (the psychological dimension) to the same extent as differences in social class shape their ontological province of expectations (the structural dimension).

Furthermore, our survey sample suggests that social class affects the relationship between PBE and academic performance far more than the limited mediating influence of academic performance in the SBE-class association. Whereas the bourgeois and the petty-bourgeois test conditions almost consistently restructured the magnitude of the disparities (or even lack of one) between and among the various academic groupings in the PBE-performance relationship, it was only among low performers that the bourgeoisie increased their proportion vis-a-vis the petty-bourgeoisie at high expectations in the SBE-class association. Thus, neither high nor moderate academic performance seems to add anything to class differentials in SBE between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie. It was only the working class that barely improved their proportion at medium (rather than high) SBE in comparison with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes under a test condition of high academic performance. Yet, a bourgeois background seems to boost the PBE of low performers much more than a high academic performance is able to improve the SBE of the working class. Another way of putting the matter is that whereas the bourgeoisie generally did not improve their SBE position in relation to the petty-bourgeoisie under a condition of high academic performance, the high-performing sub-group improved its PBE profile vis-a-vis moderate performers under a bourgeois test condition.

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Summary

Inspired by the structural dilemmas and contradictions implicit in the ethnic-territorial orientation of equal opportunity policy and politics in Nigeria, this study sought to determine whether educational opportunity, seen in terms of patterns of participation and expectation, was related to social class, gender, urban-rural residence, ethnic-political constituency, and region of origin. Given its occupationalist, individualist and voluntarist orientation, mainstream status attainment research was seen as the intellectual program of the ruling liberal-conservative ideology of an open, objective and meritocratic society. To the extent that this research tradition assigns to schooling a rather exaggerated role in economic development, equal opportunity and nation-building, its conceptual and methodological weaknesses rendered it inappropriate for the present study of educational-cum-social opportunity in Nigeria.

Thus, our theoretical model underscored the reproductive-contradictory, reformulative-accommodative, as well as hegemonic-but-contested character of public education in the delineation of class, gender, ethnic-racial, urban-rural, regional and other structural relations. Conceptualized in the revised sense of differential control over economic-production, political-coercive and cultural-ideological structures of domination and appropriation, social inequality was summarized as a class structure stratified or fractionalized on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, region, religion, language, age and so forth. And, without necessarily positing a one-to-one correspondence, educational stratification and inequalities were understood as fundamentally the bequest of social inequality. Such was the theoretical foundation from which this investigation was launched.

Other than nation-wide university and federal high school enrolment figures collected, respectively, from the National Universities Commission and the Federal Ministry of Education, the survey data were generated by a research population which was delimited to the federal high schools in the Lagos Territory, as well as the law and medical programs of the conventional federal universities taken together with the Nigerian Law School in Lagos. The higher education sample was drawn with such stratification, quota and purposive guidelines as would allow for a comparable representation not only of males and females, but also of the major ethnic-territorial groups in Nigeria. A total of 650 survey respondents fully participated in the study. The major instrument was a structured survey questionnaire, which inquired into background characteristics and post-graduation prospects among others. Data thus collected were subjected to cross-tabulation analysis, illuminated on occasion with Lazarsfeld's elaboration technique.

The major findings and conclusions are summarized below. First, compared to their working class counterparts, students from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois backgrounds seem to be disproportionately over-represented in the survey sample. Female, Muslim, northern and even rural students seem more than their male, Christian, southern and urban counterparts to depend upon bourgeois and petty-bourgeois backgrounds for making it to federal universities and high schools. Second, males appear to outnumber females three times in Nigerian universities, with the gap widening as one proceeds from education and the arts, through the sciences, law and medicine, on to engineering or engineering technology. The pattern in federal high schools is less clear, but does suggest an interchange of comparable levels of preponderance and under-representation between males and females. Overall, gender disparity appears to be less pronounced among the Yoruba in the national and survey data, as well as bourgeois, urban, high mother's education, Muslim and academically low-performing respondents. Third, urban students appear to outnumber their rural counterparts by a margin of 13:1 in federal educational institutions. Compared to their materially privileged, male, Christian and academically better-off counterparts, the working class, female, Muslim and low-performing sub-populations seem to have a greater chance of being represented in federal universities and high schools if they come from urban rather than rural backgrounds.

Fourth, participation in Nigerian universities and federal high schools appears to be more or less related to ethnic-political constituency. Much as the Hausa-Fulani and the Northern Minorities tended, relative to the other constituencies, to experience apparently quota-assisted percentage increases in university participation over the years, Yoruba preponderance seems to be as determined as the keen competition for the second and third positions going on, respectively, between the Igbo and the Southern Minorities on the one hand, and the

Hausa-Fulani and the Northern Minorities on the other hand. Fifth, our data point toward some connection between participation in Nigerian universities, together with federal high schools, and region of origin. Between the academic years 1980/81 and 1985/86, the ratio of southern preponderance over the north in Nigerian universities was approximately 3:1, and this in spite of the five percent representational gain made by the north relative to the south in federal universities as a result of preferential treatment procedures. To the extent that the north-south representational gap narrows down substantially among working class, rural and academically low-performing respondents, the balance of regional participation in federal educational institutions seems to be mediated by social class, residence and academic performance, among others.

Sixth, there seems to be a dependable association between structurally based educational-cum-occupational expectations and social class. Whereas the offspring of the bourgeoisie and those of the working class, respectively, were disproportionately concentrated at the extremes of high and low expectations, respondents from petty-bourgeois backgrounds generally steered a middle course, with a mixture of privilege and disadvantage. Although the association between structurally based expectations and social class is mediated by residence, as well as ethnicity, region and, possibly, gender, it is the working class who seem to be affected the most, the petty-bourgeoisie more or less, and the bourgeoisie least of all.

Seventh, as long as it is appropriately understood in the context of the associated or mediating effects of social class, a general case can be made for some connection between structurally based expectations and residence, ethnic-political constituency, region, as well as gender. This implied connection between expectations and "non-class" factors is evidenced more among the petty-bourgeois and working class sub-groups than among the bourgeoisie. And the working class in an otherwise privileged sub-group (e.g. urban or southern respondents) may well have better prospects than their counterparts in an otherwise disadvantaged sub-group (e.g. rural or northern respondents). That noted, the association between structurally based expectations and gender is at best moderate and two-edged (in favour of males in the high school sub-sample; in favour of females in the professional sub-sample), and at worst complex and contradictory. Whereas working class males appear to have some edge, expectation-wise, over their female counterparts, the same way as urban petty-bourgeois females indicated much better prospects than rural petty-bourgeois males, our respondents seem to imply that gender makes little or no difference once other conditions are favourable -- bourgeois, urban, professional, elite high school. Overall, and social class notwithstanding, the lowest-expecting group are the Northern Minorities. The other constituencies indicated varying degrees of privilege from one sub-sample to another. Also, the offspring of the northern petty-bourgeoisie appear to be more disadvantaged than their southern counterparts.

Eight, there seems to be some heuristic value in seeing educational-cum-occupational expectations in terms of two related but conceptually and methodologically separable factors. Whereas the first dimension is based largely upon one's financial-structural leverage, the second is to a considerable extent a function of the individual's intellectual-psychological resources. As a general pattern, the various sub-groups in our survey sample were more constrained in their proportions at high expectations in the financial-structural, rather than in the intellectual-psychological, dimension. Indeed, low academic performers compared favourably with moderate or high performers in the intellectual-psychological dimension, as against the dismal showing of the working class (or even the petty-bourgeoisie) vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie in the financial-structural dimension. It may well be that differences in academic performance do not influence their organic portfolio of expectations (the intellectual-psychological dimension) to the same extent as differences in social class shape their ontological province of expectations (the financial-structural dimension).

That noted, there are in varying degrees a relationship between structurally based expectations (SBE) and social class as well as academic performance, on the one hand, and psychologically based expectations (PBE) and academic performance as well as social class, on the other hand. However, social class seems to restructure the relationship between PBE and academic performance much more than the limited effect of academic performance on the SBE-social class association. Thus, a high level of academic performance does not seem to lend to the SBE of the working class the kind of boost that a bourgeois background appears to give to the PBE of the academically low-performing. Overall, a working class background, academic performance notwithstanding, seems to constitute a greater burden on educational-cum-occupational expectations than would a low academic performance, social class notwithstanding. Ultimately, educational opportunity (i.e. patterns of participation and expectation) in Nigeria appears, in varying degrees, to be related to social class, urban-rural residence, ethnic-political constituency, region of origin, gender, as well as academic performance in complex and often contradictory ways.

Implications

The findings and conclusions of this study generally accord with and extend those of Akande (1987), Anderson and Vervoorn (1983), Bach, Gadalla, Khattab and Gulick (1985), Beckett and O'Connell (1977), Bhagwati (1985), Biraimah (1987), Blakemore and Cooksey (1981), Blakely and Harvey (1978), Bonacich (1972, 1976), Boyd (1985), Diejomaoh and Anusionwu (1981), Garnier and Raffalovich (1984), Halsey (1977, 1980), Jencks et al. (1979), Lee and Lockheed (1990), Levin (1984), Li (1988), Samoff (1979, 1987), Selvaratnam (1988), Spaulding and Hussain (1989), Thomas (1983), Wang (1983), Wesley (1981), and Woodhouse (1987), among others, whose report on countries as far afield as Nigeria, Australia, Egypt, India, the United States, Canada, France, Britain, El Salvador, Tanzania, Malaysia, and China point, in varying degrees, toward the perpetuation of three or more of class, gender, ethnic-racial, caste, urban-rural and regional inequalities in educational opportunities despite, if not indeed because of, policy focus on school reforms and expansion.

More specifically, detailed work on the paradigmatic case of Malaysia is unequivocal that preferential treatment policies, in their present form and official guise, have not only failed to deliver on national unity, but also have perpetuated intra- and trans-ethnic class inequalities (Selvaratnam, 1988, p. 196; see also Spaulding and Hussain, 1989; Thomas, 1983; Wang, 1983). A comparative investigation of the bases, forms and outcomes of "positive discrimination" in the education systems of India, Malaysia, the United States and Sri Lanka among others by Wang (1983) reaches similar conclusions. The same lessons have also been drawn from the supposedly pro-peasant and pro-rural experiments in China (Wesley, 1981), the experiences of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India (Arnove, 1984; Bhagwati, 1985), as well as the district-, regional- or ethnic-oriented policies in Kenya (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981), Tanzania (Samoff, 1987) and Zaire (Coleman and Ngokwey, 1983). A point which is made in almost all of these works is that the expected goals of equity and national unity cannot be realized, unless attention is also paid to the achievement of universal primary or basic-cycle education by the poorer and rural sections of all groups.

On the question of national unity, the evidence we have does not seem to bode well for Nigeria's nationhood. Although 51 percent of the respondents claimed that their school experience has enabled them to see many similarities in Nigeria's ethno-religious diversity (the very goal of "unity" high schools, federal universities, etc.), yet as many as 64 percent would serve/save their religion instead of Nigeria, while 56 percent felt, rather strongly in the majority of cases, that their people were being persecuted in the country (contrary to the sense of belonging which educational and employment quotas were supposed to bring about).

As for the lopsided pursuit of ethnic-territorial or regional equity, our reported evidence is yet another lesson on the limits and possibilities of public policy in altering historically entrenched patterns of privilege and disadvantage. A northern representational gain of five percent in federal universities relative to the south within a space of six years (1980/81-1985/86) says something of the vigour with which quota policies have been pursued by the northern-dominated federal government. Yet, the real northern gain relative to the south within the same period was approximately two percent, when enrolments in federal and state universities were combined. Such gains, in any case, seem to be appropriated by the materially privileged, as well as male, northerners, the same way as the poorer, rural and even female sub-populations are yet to have a fair share of the overall educational advantage of the south. Thus, over and above the constitutional and policy rhetoric of equal educational opportunity for individual Nigerian citizens (liberal-Western style), it is the nation-building imperative that has tended to shape the reality of educational restructuring in the country.

While a modest improvement has been made in the balance of ethnic-regional representation in especially federal universities, it remains to be seen whether Nigeria's "ethnic-arithmetic" approach to national unity shall prove to be an ill-fated shorthand for a complex problem. Especially as the federal government periodically allocates special grants to the (upper) northern states for the expansion of primary school facilities and enrolment, the full effect of preferential treatment policies may not be known for another decade or even a generation. Nevertheless, it should be fairly obvious that questions of national unity and social justice are much more complex than the frequently lopsided approaches which politicians and policy makers have so far tinkered with. The comparative experiences of Malaysia, Canada, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Zaire and the United States suggest that such terrains of "social technology" (borrowing from Knopff, 1989) are sitting ducks of the structural dilemmas and contradictions within the polity and society at large.

Furthermore, our findings indirectly corroborate those of Bach et al. (1985) and Boyd (1985), whose research in Egypt and Canada, respectively, found a connection between female educational-cum-occupational plans and mother's educational attainment acting independently and jointly with father's SES. Indeed, 60 percent of females as against 48 percent of males in our sample indicated high mother's education. Conversely, 27 percent of males as against 13 percent of females expressed low mother's education. The implication is that female educational opportunity has something to do with mother's educational/ occupational attainment.

The same corroboration goes for our confirmation of the primacy of social class over cognitive skills in expectations of getting ahead, a position which, in addition to the harmful effects of malnutrition on mental growth, has been empirically and/or theoretically demonstrated in Western Europe (Tyler, 1977; Rose and Rose, 1980), Canada (Porter, Porter and Blishen, 1979, cited in Li, 1988), the United States (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, 1977; Jencks et al., 1979), India (Bhagwati, 1985) and sub-Saharan Africa (Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981). However, one extension which the present study has made is that it may sometimes be useful to split the notion of expectation into the financial-structural (class-related) and the intellectual-psychological (intelligence-related) dimensions, and then watch with more precision the chances of the same set of respondents in each case while controlling, respectively, for academic performance and social class.

Given the fact that law and medicine are conventionally regarded as elite programs, and considering the fact that federal high schools are somewhat the Nigerian version of British "public" schools, French lycées and American residential high schools, our rather substantial evidence of class reproduction in mainstream Nigerian education must, in league with similar findings in Africa and the developing world generally (e.g. Blakemore and Cooksey, 1981; Cooksey, 1981; Hughes, 1987; Kamat, 1985; Kumar, 1987; Levin, 1984; Niles, 1981; Samoff, 1979; and Woodhouse, 1987), cast serious doubt on the alleged absence of social class and social reproduction in the social structures and education systems of the Third World, a viewpoint which has been misleadingly propagated by Foster (1977), Husen (1987) and Rathgeber (1985), among others.

Beyond all that, our findings and conclusions sustain, modify, and extend those of many other Nigerian studies which, to a greater or lesser extent, have reported evidence of class reproduction, gender and religious selectivity (to the disadvantage of especially the poorer sections of the female and Muslim populations), northern under-participation as well as rural under-representation and aspirational ceiling in federal universities, polytechnics and high schools (e.g. Akande, 1987; Beckett and O'Connell, 1977; Biraimah, 1987; Blakemore an Cooksey, 1981; Diejomaoh and Anusionwu, 1981; Woodhouse, 1987). Similar but incidental findings about state (as different from federal) high schools appear in Lee and Lockheed (1990). Like Beckett and O'Connell (1977), we found that there was more parity of gender participation among the Muslim than the Christian student population. We also found, to use their own words, that female and Muslim students "tend to be drawn from higher family backgrounds in terms of education and income than the general student population" (p. 45). All this could be interpreted as strong indirect evidence that a privileged class background can dramatically alter the social disadvantages normally associated with gender, religion and other socio-cultural dynamics.

We did not, however, find anything near the 30 to 51 percent farm background claimed for a 1973 sample of three federal universities by Beckett and O'Connell (1977). This may be due partly to the passage of time, and due mainly to methodological details as we attempted to show early in Chapter V. Mindful of the clientelist and extended networks in the dynamics of many Nigerian families, we inquired into the class location of the respondents' major sponsor(s), rather than merely the conventional idea of "father's occupation" as was used by these authors. Also, we earlier attempted to demonstrate that the occupationalist-educationalist SES model bequeathed by social mobility research serves the ideological function of inflating the representation of the underprivileged groups in the choice institutions of society -- perhaps as evidence that we can all pull ourselves up by our bootstraps? It also should not be forgotten that our survey population was delimited not only to the professional programs of federal universities, but also to federal high schools which are supposed to be a model for the rest of the country. Anyhow, Beckett and O'Connell (1977) not only admitted that the "perpetuation and consolidation of privilege definitely occurs" (p. 46), but actually cautioned that their "farm background" was a block category which included artisans and petty-traders among others.

Essentially, our report on the relative representation of three essential social classes in the survey sample squares well with Blakemore and Cooksey's (1981) prediction that "the class reproduction function [of education in Africa is likely] to increase in importance" (p. 93). Indeed, other than Akande's study (1987), which is more interested in the educational prospects of the rural versus urban girl, all the other Nigerian studies indicated above are unequivocal about elite consolidation and reproduction in Nigerian education. It may be germane to add here that up to 62 percent and 53 percent of our sample, respectively, attended expensive private nursery and private elementary schools. As well, 61 percent have occasionally or frequently used the services of paid private tutors. The corresponding figures for the elite-ridden high school sub-sample are 78 percent private nursery, 79 percent private elementary, and 76 percent private tutorial. In fact, the cycle or configuration of social privilege in the study population has been such that not only did 87 percent of the sample attend urban secondary schools, but up to 31 percent of the professional program sub-sample attended federal high schools themselves.

Within the purview of extending these other Nigerian studies by at once dealing jointly and severally with the salient dimensions of educational-cum-social opportunities or inequalities in Nigeria (i.e. social class, urban-rural residence, gender, ethnic-political constituency and region of origin), this study may have brought some illuminating qualifications to bear on Biraimah's (1987) exasperation with her finding that female students "represented an elite segment of the Nigerian population but held equal or lower educational and career expectations than did the more socially and economically diverse male student sample" (p. 582). When we first cross-tabulated structurally based expectations by gender for the entire survey sample, females polled 64.3 percent at high expectations (as against 54.7% for males) and 12.4 percent at low expectations (as against 15.1% for males). Next, we controlled for social class, and found that bourgeois males and females levelled up at high expectations (75.3% males versus 76.1% females), petty-bourgeois females outclassed their male counterparts at high expectations (55.8% versus 50.0%), while 38.5 percent of working class males (5 out of 13 persons), as against 100 percent of their female counterparts (3 persons in all), expressed low expectations.

In the third stage, we cross-tabulated structurally based expectations by social class and controlled simultaneously for gender and urban-rural residence. Among the rural working class, the poll was equally low expectation for the one male and the one female shown. Among the urban working class, however, 67 percent of the males (8 persons) indicated medium-to-high expectations, while "100 percent" of their female counterparts (only 2 persons) expressed low expectations. Turning to the rural and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, more females than males in each case indicated high expectations (50% versus 30% rural; 56% versus 53% urban). Whereas males had slightly better prospects than females among the urban bourgeoisie (78% versus 75%), the three females among the rural bourgeoisie (which means 100%) indicated high expectations, as against the medium-to-high expectations expressed by 75 percent of their male counterparts (3 persons). One problem with part of these findings, however, is that of paltry cell or frequency counts both in the working class column and among rural females generally. Allowing for such limitations, the summary implication seems to be that, contrary to the impression created by Biraimah (1987), neither males nor females experience educational/occupational advantage or disadvantage in a synchronous manner. Gender is an issue, but so are residence and social class. As Apple (1986) would say, it is the articulation among the three of them that needs to be understood.

This brings us, ultimately, to the implications of our findings and conclusions for the perception, theory and debate over social inequality, the role of schooling and the relative efficacy of cognitive skills and social origins in the delineation of educational-cum-career opportunities. First, the common assumption that the working class are one suffering monolith is rendered arguable by our findings. Through some spill-over or demonstration effect, it turns out that the working class of an otherwise advantaged group (e.g. the Yoruba, southerners and urban dwellers) are actually better off than their counterparts in an otherwise disadvantaged group (e.g. the Northern Minorities, northerners and rural dwellers). However, the fact that sub-group (ethnic-regional, residential, gender) differentials in educational opportunity tended to be quite pronounced among their working classes bears out a corollary assumption that any serious war against inequality must start with a showdown with poverty. Second, and drawing on the above, our findings generally confirm not only the primacy of social class in the determination of life chances, but also the multiple and articulated bases of domination and inequality, as was indicated in our delineation and integration of the relevant classical and contemporary perspectives.

Third, the reproductive-though-contested and reformulative character of public education in the matter of social inequality seems to come squarely across in our findings. This is particularly evident in the dynamics of ethnic-territorial participation in Nigerian universities, both in themselves and in articulation with class, gender and urban-rural inequities.

Finally, the IQ "ideology" or "astrology" (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, 1977; Rose and Rose, 1980) is once again rendered dubious in our findings regarding educational or/and occupational expectations. Quite simply, a high level of academic performance does not seem to help the poor to the same extent as a bourgeois background appears to assist the academically low-achieving. Especially in a context without even universal primary education, what this suggests is that the liberal-capitalist twin ideological onslaught of cognitive determinism and individual culpability would be a hard sale among Nigerian students. That is, contrary to the ruling liberal-conservative ideology in especially the West (i.e. the presumed tight fit between academic performance and socio-economic success), our respondents seem to believe that getting ahead in life is more a question of structural, rather than cognitive, resources or constraints.

Policy Recommendations

We start with some prefatory remarks. Although the notion of "Federal Character" is a potentially brilliant concept in what has been variously described as "ethnic engineering" or "social technology" (borrowing, respectively, from Kirk-Greene, 1983; Knopff, 1989), yet the question of reflecting the federal character of Nigeria, or the character of any administrative constituencies thereof, in public appointments, civil service employment, admissions to universities and high schools, award of scholarships, etc., carries a real danger of being pushed to extremity and absurdity in the context of a northern-dominated polity and population. To the extent that the meaning of Nigeria is more than the sum of its parts, the application of the federal character principle must at all times place the economic and political survival of the country itself over and above the narrower cravings of its component parts. In addition to the April 1990 unsuccessful attempt to redraw the map of Nigeria through a military coup, the development blunders and economic irrationalities which a mindless pursuit of federal character has had to visit upon Nigeria's ambitious iron and steel complexes in Ajaokuta and Alaja should be sufficient warning for the leadership and the followership alike.

If the Nigerian ruling class is actually serious about social justice and equal opportunity, let the rule of thumb become something like this:

> Deal first with the poor and disadvantaged of all groups or states in the federation; pursue first the attainment of quality universal primary or basic cycle education for the mass of the Nigerian population; ensure first the physical survival and socio-economic well being of the mass of rural Nigerians and their compatriots in urban slums.

Not only is direct, transcendent redistribution the most effective strategy for making socio-economic life more equitable, but the elaborate politics of university admission and job hiring in Nigeria frequently masks the fact that there are generations of poor families in the country who are yet to send their first-ever offspring to any form of public education. In this regard, rural families, who account for about 70 percent of the Nigerian population, are usually the hardest hit. Having thus indicated our policy predispositions, the following are suggested:

First, the Nigerian government should consider the advisability of making not only the quality of rural primary and secondary schools, but also the material and cultural improvement of rural life, high priority targets with new development policy initiatives. As in the related case of poor urban neighbourhoods, the quality of library and laboratory facilities in rural schools, to say nothing of the quality and morale of the teaching staff, deserves special attention. Indeed, the rural populations need a structural transformation of their material and cultural life exactly as the country needs an ethnic engineering of its political life.

Second, to the extent that the conditions which made, or which should have made, artificial intervention necessary in the past still exist, the use of quotas in employment, admissions, scholarships and so forth could be continued with the following provisos:

1. Expand the criteria for preferential treatment to include, in a descending order of importance, indigence/family income, rural background, state of origin, gender, and catchment area;
2. Set a date like the year 2000 for the abolition of the state-of-origin and catchment-area components;
3. To the extent that the issue in Nigeria is neither the systematic exclusion of one group by another, nor discrimination against certain groups or individuals by others, but, instead, historical under-participation or lack of opportunity by some groups due to the

accidents and imperatives of geography and colonial penetration, restrict the use of employment quotas to the point of initial entry on the job;

4. Borrowing from the pragmatic division of labour in transnational combines (consequent on the indigenization policies of the 1970s) in such a way that the symbolic-honorific, personnel-administrative, legal-advisory and other public relations roles were conceded to Nigerians, even as expatriates retained the critical finance, technology and production-line management, further separate initial hiring into "quota applicable" and "quota inapplicable" areas, leaving the latter up to cognate merit criteria;
5. In the event that two or more "merit" candidates are equally qualified, apply the quota principle as expanded above in one out of every two cases.

Third, the Nigerian government should revisit and pursue vigorously the matter of fee- and facility-free universal primary or basic cycle education for the mass of Nigerians. The fact that the federal government allowed the 1976 UPE project to collapse in 1979 "for lack of money," even as the same government literally sprinkled 14 "federal character" universities across the Nigerian landscape in the short space between 1975 and 1980, is strong evidence that financing UPE depends more on political priorities than on economic calculations. If anything, university students, who are actually among "the fortunate few," should each be taxed two naira annually for the exclusive purpose of floating and servicing a UPE trust fund.

Finally, the Nigerian government would be well advised to come up with a more comprehensive, firmly established and forward looking strategy for dealing with the social dislocations and disillusionment stemming from the rising tide of educated unemployment, poverty and malnutrition in the country. Existing approaches are too ad hoc, expedient and disposed to journalistic flash and splash to stand any chance of dealing with the structural roots of the problem. In particular, the large armies of credentialed young people being sent off annually into a constricted job market by Nigeria's thousand-and-one universities are a phenomenon which, in the foreseeable future, is sure to haunt the very ruling class that had sought to buy over the different ethnic-political constituencies with higher education carrots from Lagos. At the very least, the subordination of quick political gains to the economic logic of rational resource allocation and investment would help to lay the foundation for an effective utilization of Nigeria's critical mass of educated labour. Eventually, the technically ambiguous idea of national unity may depend more on the chances the ordinary Nigerian has for realizing a decent-enough standard of living, irrespective of state of residence or provenance, than on simply the elitist and largely diversionary ethnic-territorial arithmetic of who gets what position and when.

Further Research

It remains for further research to take this kind of investigation beyond the frontiers of the professional faculties or the conventional universities as the case may be. For example, how polytechnics, colleges of education, as well as universities of technology or agriculture compare with the trends in conventional universities might make an interesting study. As our high school sub-population happened to belong to the first generation of federal high schools, subsequent investigators might wish to compare our findings with the trends in the post-independence, post-civil war, or post-1980 generations. This way, a fuller understanding of the role of formal education in the delineation of social opportunities or inequalities in contemporary Nigeria, as well as the trajectory thereof, can be achieved. Also, other investigators will have to make a hard choice between, on the one hand, a modest set of goals, a possibly probability sample, as well as a leeway in methods of data analysis, and, on the other hand, a competing set of objectives, a possibly non-probability sample, as well as rather limited data analysis options. Whichever one the investigator chooses, s/he would be well advised to take due cognizance of the time and resources available for that venture.

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APPENDIX A

CORRESPONDENCES

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS
FACULTY OF EDUCATION
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

October 16, 1989

To Officers in Charge:
Federal schools and universities;
ministries, institutions & parastatals;
agencies, departments, units etc.

Dear Sirs/Madams:

Introductory Letter and Request for Assistance

The bearer, Mr. G. Okezie Ugbor, is a University of Alberta/CIDA scholar undertaking research toward a Ph.D. degree in International Education and development policy.

Mr. Ugbor is Nigerian and was a lecturer at the Anambra State College of Education, Awka, before embarking upon a doctorate here in Canada.

His research focus is educational and social opportunity in Nigeria within the context of developing, multi-ethnic societies. I am his supervisor, and I earnestly request the assistance of any persons to whom he may turn for the purpose of gathering the necessary data.

Thanks in advance for your cooperation.

DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

sincerely,

Dr. M.K. Bacchus
Professor & Chairman
Department of Educational
Foundations
Director, Centre for
International Education and
Development

5-104 EDUCATION NORTH, EDMONTON, ALBERTA, CANADA T6G 2G5 PHONE (403) 432-3728

C/O Centre for International Education
and Development,
Department of Educational Foundation,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton,
Canada.

24th October, 1989.

The Honourable Minister,
Federal Ministry of Education,
Victoria Island,
Lagos.

Attention: A.D.E. Statistics

Dear Sir,

APPLICATION FOR ASSISTANCE WITH RESEARCH DATA

With reference to the introductory letter attached here, I wish to ask for your assistance with the following set of data:

1. The latest student population (enrolment) figures in all Federal universities classified under (a) sex (b) programme/course of study and (c) state of origin.
2. The progressive enrolment figures for all Federal universities within the period 1979 to 1989, classified under (a) sex and (b) state of origin.
3. The current population of students in all Federal government colleges classified under (a) sex and (b) state of origin.
4. The current number of (a) Federal government colleges classified into (i) all-male; (ii) all-female; (iii) mixed and (iv) state where located.
5. The current number of (a) Federal polytechnics and (b) Federal colleges of education/Federal advanced teacher training colleges, showing states where located.
6. Figures for nation-wide primary and secondary school enrolment within the period 1979 - 1989 and divided by (a) sex and (b) state.

I strongly hope, Sir, that the foregoing set of data would help me periodise and understand Nigeria's educational opportunity profile in the 1979 - 89 decade.

Thanks in advance.

Yours sincerely,

C. OKEZIE UGBOR

C/o Centre for international
Education and Development
University of Alberta
Edmonton Canada.
October 29, 1989.

The Secretary to Legal Council,
Nigerian Law School
Victoria Island
Lagos.

Dear Sir,

**Request for Law School Student
Enrolment figures, 1979 - 1989**

With reference to the attached introductory letter, I wish to apply for the following:-

1. Student enrolement figures (actual/expected) for the current 1989/1990 School year, showing
   (a) Male/Female composition
   (b) Uninversity attended; and
   (c) State of origin

2. Total student enrolment figures for the decade 1979-1989, showing
   (a) Male/Female composition;
   (b) University attended; and
   (c) State of origin.

It would be very much appreciated if you could furnish me with the research information noted above.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

G. Okezie Ugbor

c/o Centre for International
Education and Development,
Department of Educational
Foundations,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton,
Canada.

30th October, 1989.

The Executive Secretary
National Universities Commission
Lagos.

Dear Sir,

REQUEST FOR UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT FIGURES, 1979-1989

With reference to the attached introductory letter, I wish to apply for the following sets of research data:

1. Nation-wide university student enrolment figures in Law and Medicine for the current 1989/90 (or 1988/89) school year, showing:
   - (a) male/female composition;
   - (b) university of attendance; and
   - (c) state of origin.

2. Nation-wide university student enrolment figures for the decade 1979-1989, showing:
   - (a) male-female composition;
   - (b) state of origin;
   - (c) discipline/course of study; and
   - (d) university of attendance.

3. A current list of all Nigerian universities. The study I am carrying out on educational and social opportunity in Nigeria would be immensely enriched if you could help me with the sets of data noted above.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

G. OKEZIE UGBOR

NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PROF IDRIS A ABDULKADIR

Cablegrams: UNICOMM LAGOS.
TEL: 635233

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPLEX
TAFAWA BALEWA SQUARE
P.M.B. 12684
LAGOS, NIGERIA.

OFFICE OF
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Our Ref: NUC/ES/CR3/2

Your Ref: ....

7th Nov., 19 89

G. Okezie Ughor
c/o Centre for International Education &
Development,
Department of Educational Foundations,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Canada.

RE: REQUEST FOR UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT FIGURES 1979 - 1989

With reference to your letter on the above subject, I am directed to forward the enclosed NUC Statistical Digest 1980/81 - 1985/86, 1987 and 1988 N[illegible] Annual Reports to you accordingly.

I hope you will find the information useful.

Dr. I. W. Sama'ila
For: Executive Secretary

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

NIGERIAN STUDENT SURVEY ON EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

This survey questionnaire seeks to build a picture of the sociological characteristics and the occupational or further educational expectations of Nigerian students in federal schools and universities.

Your willingness to participate fully in the study should help us not only to learn more about patterns of student participation and expectations in federal educational institutions, but also to compare the Nigerian profile with the trends in other developing and industrially advanced countries.

Of course this is not a test. Every response that frankly and accurately describes your real situation and future career expectations counts for much. We do not need to know you or your name. The questionnaires completed by individuals are not for public consumption either. Only an overall, statistical summary report will be prepared as a contribution to scholarship and development policy. Your own job, simply and squarely, is to read and answer each question carefully, frankly and accurately. Welcome to the study!

ANSWER by circling the appropriate response number, or by ticking inside the applicable response box, or else by filling up a blank space where necessary. Should you meet any difficulty trying to understand or answer any question, do not hesitate to ask us for assistance.

Thanks for being generous with your time.

Survey conducted by:

G. 'Kezie Ugbor
c/o Centre for International Education and Development
Department of Educational Foundations
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2G5
Canada

For Office Use Only

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION

A1. What is your sex? (Tick the appropriate box)
  1 [ ] Male
  2 [ ] Female

A2. (a) Fill out your school/institution ------------------------------------
  (b) Which Form or Year of Study are you in? ----------------------------
  (c) Which level/programme of study? (tick)
    1 [ ] LLB or Bar Admission
    2 [ ] MB BS
    3 [ ] Federal Secondary School -----------------------------------

A3. What is your age range?
  1 [ ] 10-14 yrs.
  2 [ ] 15-19 yrs.
  3 [ ] 20-24 yrs.
  4 [ ] 25-29 yrs.
  5 [ ] 30-34 yrs.
  6 [ ] 35 yrs. and above

A4. What is your marital status?
  1 [ ] single
  2 [ ] married
  3 [ ] divorced
  4 [ ] any other (please specify) --

A5. (a) How many brothers and sisters do you have? ----------------
  (b) Are you the first child or the last or in the middle or what?

  (c) If you are married or divorced, how many children do you have?

A6. (a) What is your state of origin? -------------------------------------
  (b) In which state do you normally reside? ------------------------------

A7. What is your religion? (Tick)
  1 [ ] Christian
  2 [ ] Muslim
  3 [ ] Any Other (please specify)----------------------------------

....2

For Office Use Only

A8. (a) Name the "town" in which you (have) lived your childhood and teenage years longest.

____

(Note that we would like to know whether your usual place of residence, which is different from the places you visit or sojourn in occasionally, is classified as an urban area or as a rural area. Every accurate answer is important in the research.)

(b) Using the categories below, which kind of environment does your named "town" fall into? (Note: City and other urban dwellers do not become rural residents simply because they attended primary or secondary schools located in rural areas. Also, if you were/have been normally resident in rural locations, but attended an urban primary or secondary school, you should still classify yourself as living longest in rural towns and villages. Okay? Here we go. (Tick the appropriate box)

1 ☐ Cities and major Nigerian towns: This category falls into, or is the equivalent of, federal and state capitals, as well as any other major towns in Nigeria with chains of industrial, commercial and financial/insurance service establishments.

2 ☐ Small urban towns: The standard examples here are all the older local government headquarters, together with any other towns housing modest business/industrial, banking or higher-education institution(s). This category has almost all the modern amenities in cities and big towns (NEPA electricity in most homes and streets, pipe-borne water in many homes and streets, network of tarred roads, ready bus/taxi service, telephone facility, government secretariat, club and cinema houses, etc.). Also included are modest commercial or travellers' centres with some of the listed amenities.

3 ☐ Rural towns and villages: This category has either no public amenities at all or a few which are restricted to the market square and the major road(s) running through the area. Residents depend mostly on farm-related occupations, including basic cassava/grain/palm-oil mills.

A9. You will now tell us something about your educational history:

(a) What kind of nursery/kindergarten did you attend? (tick)

1 ☐ private
2 ☐ public/government/church/community
3 ☐ none

(b) What kind of primary school did you attend?

1 ☐ private
2 ☐ public/government

....3

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(c) Do you (did you ever) have teachers who give (gave) you paid private lessons at home?
1 [ ] Yes, frequently
2 [ ] Yes, sometimes
3 [ ] No

(d) (For post-secondary students only) What kind of secondary school did you attend? (Tick only one, of course)
1 [ ] federal government school
2 [ ] city/urban secondary school
3 [ ] rural community secondary school

A10. (For Secondary students only. Others go to A11.)

(a) What was your total score in the federal entrance exam? --------------

(b) Do you remember your score in:
1) The oral exam? --------------
2) Other papers? (Please list papers and scores):

(c) Leaving all that aside, what were your two most recent positions in class exams? (Please state the positions in relation to the number of students concerned, e.g. 20th out of 40 students)

(i) -------------------- (ii) ----------------------

A11. (For Post-Secondary Only. Others continue at A12. See you there!)

(a) What was your total score in the JAMB exam? ------------
(b) Leaving that aside, what was your most recent Grade Point Average (GPA)?

(c) Whatever it is, what class of degree do you expect to get/did you get? (Tick)
1 [ ] first class
2 [ ] second upper
3 [ ] second lower
4 [ ] third class
5 [ ] pass degree

....4

For Office Use Only

A12. For ALL respondents:

(a) Which category below captures your average range of marks in school subjects (or courses) in recent years?

1 [ ] Less than 40%
2 [ ] 40% - 49%
3 [ ] 50% - 59%
4 [ ] 60% - 69%
5 [ ] 70% - 79%
6 [ ] 80% and above

(b) Compared to other students in your class/form/school/program, how do you rate yourself in terms of school ability or performance?

1 [ ] Among the best
2 [ ] much above average
3 [ ] above average
4 [ ] average
5 [ ] below average
6 [ ] among the poorest

(c) What is the major language of parent-child communication in your family home? (Tick only one please)

1 [ ] English
2 [ ] Native language (Please specify) ————————————————

FAMILY BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

We would now like to learn about the education and occuaption of your parents and other important family members.

B1. Which category captures the highest level of schooling or certificate acquired by: (a) your father, and (b) your mother; and, excluding yourself, by your most educated (c) brother, and (d) sister? (Circle the one appropriate number for each of them. If you have never had a brother or sister, say so.)

	Father	Mother	Brother	Sister
- None, or some primary schooling; or attempted apprenticeship	1	1	1	1
- Completed primary school; or certificated apprenticeship	2	2	2	2
- Some secondary/commercial/trade/ technical school	3	3	3	3
- Completed sec./comm./tech.sch., e.g. GCE 'O' Level; WASC; RSA, City & Guilds; Teacher Grade II without sec. school	4	4	4	4

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	Father	Mother	Brother	Sister
- Completed Sixth Form/HSC/'A' Level; Teacher Grade II after WASC/ 'O' Level	5	5	5	5
- Completed Higher Education Below University Degree: OND, NCE, Diploma in Nursing/Education/Journalism/ Social Work; Associateship Certificate in Education	6	6	6	6
- Completed University Degree or Equivalent, e.g. BA/BEd/BSc; HND, PGDE	7	7	7	7
- Completed Master's or Top Professional Degrees: MA/MEd/MSc; MB BS, LLB, B.Pharm., B.Arch., B.Engr., LLM, MBA	8	8	8	8
- Completed PhD, DSc, LLD, DEd, etc.	9	9	9	9

B2. Fill up the major Occupation of each of the four persons whose educational levels appear above. (If anyone is now retired, unemployed/retrenched, or even departed, report their last job. If your mother or sister does not have any job outside the home, quote full-time housewife as her occupation.) In reporting any occupation, tell us its name, title, activity or size, and location.

Take some examples: a truck driver, GLO5, in the federal ministry of works; or a USS13 lecturer at a university/polytechnic; or a GL12 teacher/deputy head in a primary/secondary school; or a captain in the army; or a petty/medium-sized/big-scale trader/business(wo)man who runs his/her own market stall/kiosk/shop/ department store. Quote Years of Experience and Salary Grade Level if you can.

Father's occupation = ----------------------------

Mother's occupation = ----------------------------

Brother's occupation = ----------------------------

Sister's occupation = ----------------------------

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B3. (a) Which category below carries the major financial responsibility for your schooling? (We would prefer just one person who has the major financial responsibility. But if two persons share the responsibility equally, tick for the two of them, and respond accordingly in subsequent questions. At any rate, do not tick for more than two persons.) Here we go:

1 [ ] Father	2 [ ] Mother
3 [ ] Brother	4 [ ] Sister
5 [ ] Uncle	6 [ ] Aunt
7 [ ] Cousin	8 [ ] In-law
9 [ ] Family or Personal Friend	
10[ ] Any Other (please specify) ------------------	

(b) Using the educational levels listed in Question B1 above, fill out the one number (1 to 9) corresponding to the highest level of schooling or credential acquired by the major person sponsoring your education.

Major (or first) Person: Highest level of schooling = No. ------
2nd Person (if equally shared): Highest level of schooling = No. ------

What does this second person do for a living? ---------------------

B4. Whatever you may have filled out so far, we now deal fully with the major job or occupation of the major person who has the major financial responsibility for your education.

(a) Is he/she employed by any of (a) the government and (b) somebody/a company in the private sector? (Tick)

1 [ ] Yes 2 [ ] No
If No, go to Question B5.

(i) If for Government, which level?

1 [ ] federal 2 [ ] state
3 [ ] LGA

(ii) If for Private Individual/Company, what type of business?

(b) What exactly does he/she do and in what capacity? We need specific details here: the job, the title or rank, the job description/activity, and the kind of place, such as higher institution, school, ministry, company, military, traditional or religious institution. Take some examples:

- gateman in an oil company, or in a school
- associate editor/director/senior reporter/junior announcer in the NTA/Daily Times/Guardian/Newswatch
- salesman/Personnel manager in a big company; nurse in a private hospital
- head/deputy/teacher in a primary/federal government school
- commissioner/minister/director/permanent secretary in a federal or state ministry/corporation
- a private, or major, or divisional commander, in the army

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For Office Use Only

Now that you have seen some scanty examples, take three lines to tell us about the major occupation of your major sponsor:

1--
2--
3--

(c) How many years has he/she been on that job? -----------

(d) What is his/her salary Grade Level (or USS for universities)? Try to be exact.

[Just in case you need a reminder, there are GL01 (lowest paid) to GL17 (highest paid) in the Nigerian public service. Junior positions occupy GL01 to GL05; lower middle positions take GL06 to GL07; middle ranks take GL08 to GL09; upper middle ranks take GL10 to GL12; senior positions occupy GL13 and above. Permanent secretaries and professors take GL15 to GL17.]

(e) From what you hear/know about his/her work place and colleagues, do you think his/her work involves receiving instructions from, or preparing reports for, other more senior employees?
1 ☐ I think so 2 ☐ No
3 ☐ I really don't know

(f) Do you think his/her work involves giving instructions to, receiving reports from, supervising or exercising some powers (promotion, demotion, suspension, etc.) over other workers?
1 ☐ I don't think so 2 ☐ Yes
3 ☐ I really don't know

(g) Does he/she hire and fire workers on behalf of the government, or the company/individual employing him/her?
1 ☐ Yes - 2 ☐ No
3 ☐ I really don't know

(h) Not minding any of the above, do you think he/she has the freedom and autonomy to put his/her ideas and values into practice in the workplace without being cautioned or queried by the boss?
1 ☐ No 2 ☐ Yes
3 ☐ I really don't know

(i) What is your best estimate of the approximate annual income of this your major sponsor? (Tick one box)
1 ☐ N 1500 - N 2999 2 ☐ N 3000 - N 4999
3 ☐ N 5000 - N 8999 4 ☐ N 9000 - N12999
5 ☐ N13000 - N16999 6 ☐ N17000 - N20999
7 ☐ N21000 - N[illegible]4999 8 ☐ N25000 - N30,000
9 ☐ No idea at all

....8

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(j) Supposing we set up a hierarchy of seniority (i.e. power and responsibility) in his/her workplace, where does he/she fall in? (After answering this, continue at Question B6)

1 [ ] most junior rank   2 [ ] junior rank
3 [ ] lower middle rank   4 [ ] middle rank
5 [ ] upper middle rank   6 [ ] senior rank
7 [ ] most senior/executive rank

B5. For those who answered "No" to Question B4(a) above: As your major sponsor is in his/her own business or self-employment, we now want to know the calibre of job or business involved.

(a) State the type and size of business or service involved (e.g. petty trading; big construction company; traditional/religious officer with station; medium-sized hospital; small-scale transport/hair-dressing business):

---

(b) Does he/she actually work in his/her business/hospital/shop/market stall/industry, etc.? (There may be individuals who just employ other people to work for them, while they themselves do not work at all.) (Tick)

1 [ ] Yes   2 [ ] No
3 [ ] I don't know

(c) Is/are there any person(s) who is/are actually employed as worker(s) in his/her business? (Note that an employed worker is different from an apprentice in a shop or market stall or workshop, who is given just meal allowance and who doubles as a houseboy/maid.) (Tick)

1 [ ] Yes   2 [✓] No
3 [ ] I don't know

(i) If yes, how many workers? (Tick)

1 [ ] One or two   2 [ ] two to nine
3 [ ] ten or more persons

(ii) If he/she has apprentices/assistants, state their number: -----------

(d) How many years has he/she been running this business? ----------

(e) Using the income ranges listed in Question B4(i) above, which of numbers 1 to 8 matches your best estimate of the approximate annual income of your major sponsor? (If it is clearly above N30,000, say so):

No. ----------------

B6. For ALL respondents. To conclude this section, we now want you to do two things.

(a) List the quantity and brand (if any) of (i) motor vehicles, (ii) electronic equipment, and (iii) commercial plots/buildings owned by your sponsor.

Motor vehicles: ------------------------------------
Electronic Equipment: ------------------------------
Plots/buildings: -----------------------------------

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(b) If your sponsor is a traditional ruler, or a religious minister, say whether it is at the town level, or with a particular posting/station, respectively:

____

OCCUPATIONAL/FURTHER EDUCATIONAL EXPECTATIONS

Here we want to know the things that are most likely to happen at the end of your present school level or programme. Those in federal secondary schools should answer Section C, and then jump over to Section E. Those in post-secondary institutions (i.e. universities and professional schools) should answer Section D, and then continue at Section E. Okay?

SECTION "C": For Secondary Schools Only

C1. (a) Considering only the limitations or problems which may arise from the financial resources and social influence of your sponsor and/or family generally, which category below captures what you are most likely to do at the end of your secondary schooling? [As usual, just tick one number. Try to face reality. Remember that some courses require more time (5-6 yrs.) and more money (costly textbooks, projects, and dress codes) to complete than others.]

1 ☐ Stop schooling, mainly because of lack of money
2 ☐ Suspend schooling, and try to get a job and earn some money first
3 ☐ Go into business to make money, rather than waste my time reading further
4 ☐ Proceed to institutions where I could get a qualification in three years: school of nursing, college of education, school of health technology, polytechnic, etc.
5 ☐ Proceed to university for straight, four-year courses like arts/humanities, social sciences, education, and natural sciences
6 ☐ Proceed to university for four-to-five-year courses like microbiology, biochemistry, business administration, estate management, accountancy, optometry, pharmacy, or engineering
7 ☐ Proceed to university to spend five or six years, with all the money involved, reading Law (including Law School) or Medicine, respectively
8 ☐ Some Other (please state):

____

(b) Assuming that you did not have any problems with financial resources and social connection, which number above should have been the case?

____

C2. (a) Considering ONLY the limitations or problems which may arise from your proven mental ability, which category below captures what you are most likely to do at the end of your secondary schooling? (As usual, tick only one number. Try to be realistic. Remember that even though money is very important, your brains will still have to pass the required exams.)

1 ☐ Stop schooling, mainly because I don't have the brains to go further
2 ☐ Stop/suspend schooling, and so give my brains some breathing space

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3 [ ] Try 'A' Level or School of Arts/Science, so as to build up my mental ability
4 [ ] Proceed to intellectually more accessible institutions like School of Nursing, College of Education, Polytechnics, School of Agriculture/Journalism, etc.
5 [ ] Proceed to university, but take care to read single subjects in humanities, social sciences, education or natural sciences
6 [ ] Proceed to university, for courses like microbiology, biochemistry, business/estate management, accountancy, optometry, pharmacy, or engineering
7 [ ] Proceed to university for either Medicine or Law
8 [ ] Some Other (please specify)

(b) Assuming that you did not have any problems with academic ability, which number above should have been the case?

C3. For all those who realistically expect to do further studies at the end of secondary schooling, what is the highest level of education/credential that you are most likely to reach? (considering your financial support, social connections, academic abilities). (Tick the appropriate box)

1 [ ] GCE "A" Level, Teacher Grade II, etc.
2 [ ] OND, NCE, Diploma in Nursing/Social Work/Journalism, etc.
3 [ ] HND, BA/BSc/BEd/PGDE, etc.
4 [ ] LLB (law), MB BS (Medicine)
5 [ ] MA/MSc/MEd/LLM/MBA, etc.
6 [ ] PhD/DSc/DEd/LLD, etc.

SECTION "D": For those already in Post-Secondary Institutions (i.e. universities or professional schools).

D1. (a) Considering ONLY the limitations or problems that may arise from the financial resources and social influence of your sponsor and family generally, which category below captures what you are most likely to do after completing the basic requirements for beginning professional practice? (Please face reality here. If you are definite about one category, tick only one; if you have two or more likely categories, tick only two, taking care to indicate the one that is your first choice. Okay?)

1 [ ] Seek employment in government establishments, for my major hope lies there
2 [ ] Seek employment in government establishments, because I have the necessary connections
3 [ ] Seek employment in government establishments, and when I settle, start my own practice
4 [ ] Seek employment with private companies/hospitals/chambers or individuals, for I have the necessary contacts
5 [ ] Just try my luck seeking employment with private companies/hospitals/chambers/individuals

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6 [ ] Join, or start professional practice in, family or relation's or friend's business/hospital/chambers, etc.
7 [ ] Start my own professional practice right away, for I have ready resources/ connections for that purpose
8 [ ] Manage to start my own little professional practice, for I really do not have the resources/connections to start something big
9 [ ] Proceed to higher degrees right away, for I am interested in scholarly careers and have ready private financial support
10[ ] Try first to make some money through public or private practice and, thereafter, proceed to higher degrees

(b) Assuming that you did not have any problems with financial resources and connections, which number above should have been the case? (Please, if you have to mention more than one number, do not exceed two numbers, and try to show the first choice)

D2. (a) Considering ONLY the limitations which may arise from your mental academic resources or skills, which of numbers 1 to 10 in D1 above captures what you are most likely to do after completing the basic requirements for starting professional practice? (If you are definite about one number, just write that number; if you have two or more likely numbers, write out the two most likely ones, indicating which one actually comes first. Wherever the terms "resources/ connections/contacts/financial support" occur in the said D1, numbers 1 to 10, regard them as mental or academic skills/resources for purposes of Question D2(a) and (b) below.) So which number(s) capture(s) your most likely situation in the context of this Question D2(a)?

(b) Assuming that you did not have any problems with mental resources/skills, which number in the same D1(a) should have been the case? (If you must mention more than one number, don't go beyond two numbers, and try to show the first option.)

EDUCATION, CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTITY

SECTION "E": For ALL Respondents

E1. (a) Rank-order the levels/kinds of self-identity below, in such a way as to show which of them comes 1st, 2nd and 3rd in your consciousness:

[ ] my ethnic group/community
[ ] my state of origin
[ ] my country, Nigeria

(b) Should you have to make a choice, which of the following would you take first? (Tick only one)

[ ] serving/saving my religion
[ ] serving/saving Nigeria

....12

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E2. After reading each of the following statements, indicate your choice of agreement or disagreement by circling the appropriate number.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
- The opportunity to study and mix with other Nigerians has enabled me to see the many similarities within our ethnic/cultural/religious diversity	1	2	3	4
- I have increasingly begun to appreciate and accept other ethnic/religious groups as basically my fellow countrymen and women	1	2	3	4
- Over the years, the actions, utterances, names, faces and policies of key persons in government make me feel that Nigeria is indeed my country	1	2	3	4

Thank You

APPENDIX C

MAP: 21 STATES OF NIGERIA

The 21 States of Nigeria


SOKOTO
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BORNO STATE
MAIDUGURI
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BAUCHI STATE
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NIGER STATE
MINNA
JOS
FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
ABUJA
PLATEAU STATE
GONGOLA STATE
YOLA
KWARA STATE
ILORIN
OYO STATE
IBADAN
ABEOKUTA
OGUN STATE
IKEJA
LAGOS STATE
AKURE
ONDO STATE
BENIN CITY
BENDEL STATE
MAKURDI
BENUE STATE
ANAMBRA STATE
ENUGU
IMO STATE
OWERRI
CROSS RIVER STATE
CALABAR
PORT HARCOURT
RIVERS STATE
UYO
AKWA-IBOM STATE
N
S
KEY:
Lagos Capital Territory
Hausa-Fulani, etc.
Yoruba
Igbo
Northern Minorities
Southern Minorities

APPENDIX D

MISCELLANEOUS

I

ILLUSTRATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS*

Case Description	Occupational Ranking	Class Location
I. **Professionals:** lawyers, doctors, accountants, engineers, architects, etc.		
• Who are employers	6	6/5
• Who are just self-employed/partners	6	4
• Who are employed in expressly/implicitly managerial/supervisory positions	6	3
• Who have been employed for one or two years and without any known managerial/supervisory powers	5/6	2
II. **Academics/Researchers/Senior Educational Personnel**		
• Who are employers	6/5	6/5
• Who are self-employed/partners	5/6	4
• Who are university/higher education professors/lecturers, bureaucrats/top administrators; institute/agency/ministry/parastatal/laboratory top notches functioning as:		
(i) presidents or vice-chancellors or rectors or provosts or institutional directors or registrars or deans or zonal commissioners;	6/5	5
(ii) heads or chairpersons or coordinators or directors (of departments, units, sections, etc.);	5/6	3
(iii) all others, depending on qualification, rank and experience	4/5/6	3/2
III. **Other Educational Employees**		
• Who are zonal administrators/inspectors/superintendents or heads of secondary/teacher training schools	4/5	3
• Who are secondary school teachers or support staff with first degree, or heads of primary schools	4	2
• Who are secondary/primary teachers or support staff with higher education diplomas/certificates	3	2
• All others with varying skill levels	2/1	1
IV. **Agricultural Proprietors and Workers**		
• Who are large-scale, mechanized employers	4/5/6	5/6
• Who are medium/small-scale, mechanized self-employed or cooperators	4/5	4
• Who are agricultural officers or superintendents	4/3	3/2
• Who arer peasant/small-holder producers (although generally owning their main means of crude production -- land, their involvement in commodity relation is limited; but then, they are coercively dominated and exploited by the political and cultural- ideological instances under periphery capitalism).	1	1
• Who are farm labourers, fishermen, truckers, etc.	1	1
V. **Rank-and-File Workers**		
• Includes night/day watchmen, messengers, petty motor mechanics, artisans, forest workers and drivers	1/2	1

* Lowest rank/location = 1; highest rank/location = 6.

II

SOURCES OF DATA

Part A: Survey Data

1. Federal High Schools (i.e. Federal Government Colleges)
   - a) Queen's College, Yaba, Lagos
   - b) King's College, Lagos
2. Universities/Professional Schools
   - a) Nigerian Law School, Lagos (Federal Territory)
   - b) Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria (Northern majority location)
   - c) University of Jos, Jos (Northern minority location)
   - d) University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus (South-eastern majority location)
   - e) University of Benin, Benin City (Southern minority location)
   - f) University of Lagos, Akoka (South-western majority location; completed questionnaires were lost between Ikeja and Heathrow)

Part B: Nation-wide Enrolment Data

1. Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos (for all 41 full-fledged Federal Government Colleges to date)
   - Nation-wide enrolment figures by gender: 1979/80 - 1983/84; 1987/88 - 1988/89.
2. National Universities Commission, Lagos (for all 28 full-fledged federal- and state-owned universities to date)
   - Nation-wide enrolment figures by gender and state of origin: 1980/81 - 1985/86*
   - Nation-wide enrolment figures by gender and selected programs: 1986/87 - 1988/89.

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* In the six academic years, 1980/81 to 1985/86, a total of 30,353 students had unidentified states of origin in all 28 universities put together. Of that total, Ahmadu Bello University alone accounted for as many as 16,695 unidentified cases.